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A New Understanding of Sophistic Rhetoric: A Translation, with Commentary, of
Mario Untersteiner’s “Le origini sociali della sofistica”
Elisabeth LoFaro
ABSTRACT

This dissertation translates an essay by Mario Untersteiner ―Le origini sociali della
sofistica‖ (―The Social Origins of Sophistry‖) unpublished in English, and explores its
significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory, as well as the
composition classroom. In the process, I attempt to contribute to reestablishing sophistry
and rhetoric within our contemporary cultural milieu. More specifically, the dissertation
is organized into five main parts: The first chapter offers an introduction to and thorough
background of the sophists in ancient and classical Greece; the second chapter reviews
the scholarship about the sophists, as well as that on Mario Untersteiner and his ―Le
origini,‖ exploring the commonly known difficulties of translation. Chapter three
provides my translation of the complete essay, while chapter four presents my
interpretation of the most salient issues in the essay and their importance to classical
rhetorical theory. The concluding chapter presents my conclusions and relates my
findings to the composition classroom, the university, and society at large, arguing for the
reintegration of certain sophistical rhetorical theories and practices.

iv

Chapter One
Introduction

Science, politics, philosophy, drama, literature, architecture—a great number of Western
civilization‘s most prized, honored, and respected achievements emerged in classical
Athens at roughly the same time in which rhetoric and sophistry1 developed and
flourished. The reasons behind this coterminous appearance offer room for speculation,
yet some educated conjectures materialize more strongly than others. Social,
philosophical, cultural, and political circumstances not only enabled but also created the
conditions for the emergence of sophistry, for the sophistic movement responded to a
new need in a dynamic, evolving social configuration. The sophistic tradition thus
emerged 2,500 years ago in the Mediterranean at a time of ardent fervor and shifts in the
organization of human life and Western civilization. This dissertation examines the
conditions that engendered this tradition, including a review of the literature to date, a
translation of a germinal essay by Mario Untersteiner ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖
(―The Social Origins of Sophistry‖) unpublished in English, and discusses Untersteiner‘s
significance in terms of classical and contemporary rhetorical theory, with implications in
the composition classroom. I attempt to the continuing reassessment of sophistry and

1

Although sophistry is now often a pejorative term, as it was in Antiquity, I am using the term
descriptively rather than evaluatively.
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rhetoric within our contemporary cultural milieu. More specifically, the dissertation is
organized into five main parts: the first chapter offers an introduction to and thorough
background of the sophists by contextualizing them in archaic Greece; the second chapter
reviews the scholarship about the sophists, as well as that on Mario Untersteiner and his
―Le origini,‖ exploring the commonly known difficulties of translation. Chapter Three
provides my translation of the essay in its entirety, while Chapter Four presents my
interpretation of what I deem the most salient issues in the essay in terms of classical
rhetorical theory and scholarship. The final chapter presents my conclusions by relating
my findings to contemporary rhetorical theory, the composition classroom, the university,
and society at large.
In order to understand the importance of sophistry, one must recognize the
circumstances that were in place before and during the time in which sophistry emerged,
prior to the social conditions that Mario Untersteiner discusses in his essay. These
circumstances allowed sophistry to flourish and within the scholarly and public
imagination, even if in a negative manifestation and despite the pejorative perspectives of
Plato‘s dialogues. I discuss the circumstances leading up to classical Greece, the context
of Untersteiner‘s essay, in terms of their socio-historical, cultural, and philosophical
manifestations.
There is, of course, inevitable overlap between categories, for any sort of
grouping or classification system will reveal complications, inconsistencies, and overlap.
Definitional categories are inherently somewhat unstable, and, to a degree, arbitrary.
However, they are necessary to organize and present opportunities for analysis. In order
to elaborate upon the context of Untersteiner‘s essay, I divide the contextual background
2

of the sophists into distinct (although constructed categories) that are not flawless and
may blur in some places. I include political events and the development of rhetoric within
the socio-historical section, discuss education in the cultural section, and briefly review
the pre-Socratics in the philosophical one. Without question, these could have been
arranged differently. Nevertheless, they are necessary for communication and for
understanding the context of the events discussed in Untersteiner‘s essay, which
examines the social conditions in the age that followed promoting the appearance of
sophistry.
The main events that stimulated radical changes in Greece and created conditions
favorable to the appearance of sophistry occurred due to a number of ―paradigm shifts,‖
to borrow Thomas Kuhn‘s famous expression, which took place around 600 BCE. These
events and changes are important not only for the birth and flourishing of sophistry but
also, by extension, of the whole of Western civilization, for the advancements (political
and social) of this time laid the foundations of Western thought, even if not always for
the best, and, continue to be aspirational and inspirational for many individuals. By the
time the sophists appeared, Athens was a cultural cauldron of activity. The arts and
sciences were thriving, and a previously unseen inquisitiveness and suspicion regarding
myth, superstition, and custom emerged, as well as a new belief in ―progress‖ and the
potential of human beings. The literary arts, oratory, and rhetoric flourished in response
to contemporary needs. These great, unparalleled accomplishments were the fruit of a
number of shifts from earlier ways of thinking, changes that arose out of the events that
occurred during the centuries before the Golden Age. Among the most significant sociohistorical, political, and philosophical events leading up to this Golden Age of the
3

Hellenes were the transformations in the social organization of, between, and for the
historical population.

Socio-Historical Context
The development of the polis occurred over a long period of time. For thousands of years,
the Aegean, a small sea in the eastern Mediterranean, hosted many societies—first the
Aegean civilization in the third millennium BCE, then the Minoan, and finally the
Mycenaean in the subsequent thousand years. These societies leave records of their
cultures in the oral myths of Homer. One significant change occurred when the few
kingdoms that ruled Greece in the second millennium BCE, known as the Mycenaean
Age, ended suddenly in 1200 BCE. A period of deep economic and cultural cutbacks
accompanied by a decline in population that lasted for 350 years ensued after this time
and came to be known as the Dark Ages, from roughly 1200 BCE to 800 BCE. Historians
argue that, in these conditions, the necessary component of Greek life was the selfsufficient farming villages, ruled by basileis, a term that approximates the word
―chieftan‖ more than ―king‖ (Starr 17). From these villages, the new poleis were to
emerge in the eight century BCE (Nagle & Burstein 2).
At this time, Greece divided into small communities that shifted from being
controlled by basileis to being under aristocratic rule by 700 BCE. Only kings and holy
seers were allowed to speak in this political landscape. Homer offers an example of this
trend in Book 2 of the Iliad, when common soldier Thersites attempts to address an
assembly of the Greek army and asks what would today be considered a plausible and
excellent question: ―Why must we continue to die here for the greed and lust of you
4

kings?‖ (Qtd. in Robinson 22). Homer shows Thersites as ridiculed and silenced
(Wooodruff and Gagarin x, Robinson S 22). At this time, only people of higher classes
were considered competent to speak and make decisions. Hesiod‘s political accounts of
the time also show a similar situation in a pastoral setting. Kings had all the power, and
justice remained arbitrary and fragile (Wooodruff and Gagarin xi).

Development of the poleis
The greatest changes concerning every feature of Greek life took place from the eighth to
the sixth century BCE, the period immediately preceding the emergence of sophistry and
the Golden Age of Athens. At this time, a civilization began to emerge whose existence
was recorded in much greater detail than ever before. From the eighth century forward,
small independent city states, or poleis, developed out of self-sufficient farming villages
around the Aegean. Historical data regarding the actual dates of the development of the
poleis is scarce until sixth-century Athens, which was among the later poleis to develop,
but the work of political anthropologists investigating the evolution of poleis dates them
after the Dark Ages. These Aegean states, such as Corinth, Argos, Thebes, Sparta, and
Athens, were societies of farmers and craftsmen. Many of them were isolated by
mountains, yet the inhabitants developed abilities as seamen, abilities that enabled trade.
The trade links they established with each other and with peoples from the Near East, the
Western Mediterranean, and beyond enabled these poleis or city-states to grow
prosperous on trade. Although independent and autonomous, the people of these citystates began to develop a common national identity, and as merchant classes became

5

economically independent. A move away from the government by kings began to
develop.
These poleis also brought about the development of constitutions and codification
of laws. A population boost and a dynamic economic growth that had not been witnessed
since the second millennium BCE culminated in the creation and spread of currency, a
development that radically changed economic activity (Nagle and Burstein 43). Further, a
common language and alphabet came into being around the Aegean. A nation was
forming, with religion providing the strongest unifying force, and the poleis were the
center of the entire process. Archeological records note that shrines also began to appear
around this time. Centers of civic unity, these temples replaced the huts of the earlier part
of the eighth century (Starr 39). While this development can be overemphasized, festivals
at these early sanctuaries drew large masses of people together and held economic
functions as well.
Polis commonly translates as city-state in English. The numerous contemporary
definitions of city and state, however, cannot capture the full meaning of polis and even
the closest contemporary understanding possible cannot come close to the meaning of
this ancient social organization, as is often the case with ancient Greek terms. The polis
was quite different from today‘s city and state. D. Brendan Nagle and Stanley Burstein
point out that the connotations of the two words—city and state—have little to do with
the poleis of ancient Greece. Rather than political institutions, poleis had politai, that is,
citizens whose citizenship was passed on by questionable claims of descent and who both
govern and are governed, as Aristotle would later state. For Gagarin and Woodruff, the
polis was ―a tightly knit community bound by cultural and religious ties and sharing
6

certain military and economic goals‖ (xi). Therefore, more than its usual translation as
―city-state,‖ the polis was a ―community of self-governing citizens‖ (Nagle and Burstein
1).
Philip Manville offers a particularly pointed exploration of the term. Agreeing
that the Greek polis meant more than any state or city-state current or historical ,
Manville finds answers in the Politics, the treatise in which Aristotle most closely
examines the character and qualities of the Greek polis, despite Aristotle‘s common
blending of the theoretical and the empirical (38). The encouragement of arête, a term
with a complex meaning which I will explore throughout the dissertation but that loosely
translates to virtue, emerges most prominently and is among the most interesting
requisites of the poleis, as well as central to this discussion. For Aristotle, Manville
elucidates, ―the polis exists by nature [and] developed out of simpler forms of society,
evolving toward its ultimate goal of ‗the good life‘‖ (43). More than an association or an
alliance, the polis is a koinōnia, which is a special type of association that ―unites and
harmonizes the functions of its members for their mutual benefit . . . consisting of rulers
and ruled whose final common purpose is the encouragement of excellence (arête)
among all citizens‖ (43—44).
To ensure this goal, dikē or justice becomes a fundamental element of the polis
and inextricably linked to arête. Justice, however, cannot be guaranteed exclusively
through institutions such as the constitution, laws, and courts, but must be a ―spiritual
commitment of the citizens, a shared belief that the form and processes of the institutions
will lead to goodness‖ (44). As a result, the polis had to articulate what is just so as not
only to enable but also to encourage the best human qualities to burgeon. Despite
7

Aristotle‘s quarrels with the sophists regarding nomos, physis, and dikē, one basic belief
remained regarding the polis: ―it was a special kind of community in which citizens
benefited by their membership‖ (48). For Werner Jaeger, the development of the poleis
marked the beginning of classical Greek culture (Paideia, Vol. 1, 77). The benefits
citizens gained through their membership could and were abetted by the services that the
sophists provided in Greek poleis, as I will discuss below.
The Greeks founded hundreds of these totally independent city-states in the
Mediterranean and Black Sea basins between the mid-eighth and the late sixth century
BCE. Of 1500 poleis around the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, most did not
cover areas larger than one hundred square miles and had fewer than one thousand
citizens. Founding colonies, however, was an arduous and perilous process—what today
would be considered a speculative venture—that included the risk of death. The impetus
behind these hazardous undertakings stemmed in part from the possibilities of
accumulating wealth but perhaps even more so such colonization offered the possibility
of a fresh start that differed from the conditions and friction of Archaic Greece. Such
feelings and attitudes of optimism and apprehension of the pioneering Greek explorers
emerge prominently already in the Odyssey (Nagle and Burstein 21). Herodotus also
offers accounts of the founding of some poleis, for example, in his account of the case of
Cyrene. Such colonization obviously promotes a clash between peoples that inevitably
leads to the encounter and spreading of new ideas. As the Greeks sought new arable land
and trade prospects, these new ideas entered Greek thought, not always for the best and
too often with violent outcomes. Nevertheless, the proliferation of these emerging
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concepts predictably produced fertile ground for change and development, out of which
the sophists with their inquiring could raise a rich array of questions.

Political Context
A definite power shift also occurred in Greece after the developments of the tenth and
ninth centuries BCE. Exact dates are unavailable due to the lack of writing at the time,
and the reasons for the shift from aristocracy to democracy are too many to explore in
this brief introduction; nonetheless, an adequate preamble is necessary and aligned with
the scope of this introduction. Once again, Homer offers the first discussions of political
thought.
Worth quoting at length, Kurt Raaflaub posits that Homer discusses political
problems and as a result educates the people:

[T]he concerns emphasized by the epic poet . . . deal with basic problems of life
and relationships in a community. The thought devoted to these concerns is
political thought. It occupies a remarkably prominent place already in these
earliest works of western literature. In keeping with the literary and poetic nature
of these works, such thought is fully integrated into the narrative and expressed
through action and speech. In other words, the poet uses traditional mythical
narrative to discuss ethical and negative models of social behavior, by
illuminating the causes and consequences of certain actions and relating those to
the well-being of the community, the poet raises the level of awareness among his
listeners, he forces them to think, he educates them. Here then, to say it
9

paradoxically, in non-political poetry in a prepolitical society, lie the roots of
Greek political thought. (―Homer‖ 33)

Raaflaub argues that, from its earliest records, Greek thought addressed a great number of
issues: the injurious results of clashes within the leading classes and of reckless actions of
the nobility; the ways to avoid such clashes and overcoming them should they occur; the
discrepancy between communal and individual interests; the ways to improve and
implement justice; the role of the community and nobility for outsiders and the socially
underprivileged; and the political and moral problems surrounding warfare (34). Such
issues were of critical importance to the development and success of the community and
remained within Greek thought for centuries. They also indicate a shift of responsibility
from the gods to human agents, who now become accountable for actions and mistakes
within society and must, therefore, cogitate and deliberate upon their own actions. The
most significant changes within political organization occur when human beings begin to
question relations between social classes, formerly thought of as ordained by the gods,
setting the stage for the subsequent appearance of the sophists.

Shift from Tyranny to Aristocracy to Democracy
The eighth century BCE brings yet another change, one of the earliest events that began
changing the course of Western civilization. Deference to the dominant elites of past
times, elites who did not heretofore have to answer to anyone, began crumbling as these
poleis developed throughout Greece (Robinson S. 21—22). The masses of Greeks rather
suddenly and consciously rejected absolute authority, a transformation in consciousness
10

that caused a change in power relations (21). This change created a need for rhetorical
prowess, as I will discuss in more depth below, for the Greek masses now had to be
persuaded by their leaders even while the aristocracy continued to dominate. Already in
the worlds represented by Homeric epic poetry, kings and military leaders depended upon
their rhetorical dexterity to function smoothly; as the often quoted dictum indicates: ―a
hero must be not only a doer of fine deeds, but a speaker of fine words‖ (Homer, Iliad
IX). Although the aristocracy had ultimate power over the people, leaders nonetheless
had to gain consensus from the masses of Greek farmers, who also comprised the
militias. The causes for this alteration in power relations remain concealed behind a lack
of written records during the ninth and tenth centuries BCE. However, what records
remain clearly indicate a modification of power from absolute to consensual in the eight
century.
A stir in socioeconomic/political relationships also took place at this time, and
would turn out to be one of the greatest changes in terms of the developments it set into
motion. Military service and political privilege were very directly linked until this time,
as already evident in the earliest classical Greek history and literature such as Homeric
poems. In the Iliad Homer portrays societies ruled by a ―warrior elite of great
landowners,‖ referring to them as ―heroes‖ and ―kings‖ who alleged to descend from the
gods and claimed that their paramount role in battle held the right to govern their
communities (Nagle and Burstein 28). This connection between military glory and
community leadership, however, dissolved around the seventh century BCE, when the
aristocracy, whose members also claimed to be of divine descent, replaced the monarchy.
Daniele Vignali, dean of the Istituto Paritario Nobel in Rome, states that aristocratic
11

power was primarily economic and only later did the aristocrats claim themselves as
superior based on the virtue of their birth and the possession of ethical virtues connected
to their divine descent; he writes that the aristocrats, ―la cui potenza era principalmente
ed originariamente di carattere economico, si presentarono in un secondo tempo come
individui superiori rispetto ai propri concittadini in virtù della loro nascita e del
possesso di virtù etiche legate appunto alla loro presunta discendenza da una stripe
divina‖ ([the aristocrats] whose power was primarily and originally of an economic
character, presented themselves at a later time as superior individuals compared to their
fellow citizens by virtue of their birth and possession of ethical virtues tied to their
supposed descent from a divine bloodline) (22). This shift in political power soon led to
yet another development, between the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, one that saw the
imperious economic ascent of the middling class due to the expansion of mercantile trade
and radically changing social conditions (22).
Wealth and welfare, formerly extremely circumscribed, broadened. Even the
honor of being part of the army and therefore defend the native land, formerly reserved
exclusively to the nobles, was granted to anyone who could afford arms for combat due
to mutations in military strategy and especially with the institution of the hoplite phalanx,
a disciplined heavy infantry (Vignali 22, Nagle and Burstein 29, 43). The development of
the hoplites slowly dissolved the supremacy of the cavalry and the aristocrats, who held
most of their power because they had the funds for horses. Once the middle class could
afford armor and weapons, a sense of community between the leaders and the middle
class emerged. While at first these nouveaux riche attempted to integrate with the
aristocratic elite, the conditions of aristocratic domination were miserably crumbling.
12

Power now hinged on how well a phalanx of hoplites could fight together in the interest
of the community as a whole. At this stage, the individualism of an Achilles disappeared
altogether (Wooodruff and Gagarin xi).
Because of their military commitment and wealth, non-noble citizens began
demanding both political recognition and a written codification of laws that protected
them against the arbitrary will of the aristocratic courts and protect the non-nobles from
the abuse of power of the nobles (Vignali 23). These factors engendered the birth of the
first written legislations, particularly those of Solon at the beginning of the sixth century
BCE, which essentially formed a timocracy,2 a salient step towards democracy,
lightening the pressure of aristocracy over the people. The interests of those who served
in the army—a middle class of farmers, artisans, and merchants—were of primary
importance at this stage. Political reform started to occur, and social classes had to find a
middle ground rather than win one over the other. Solon‘s reforms, however, pleased
neither the aristocracy nor the middling class, creating a political instability that led to the
tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons until 510. This tyranny, however, was not able to
impede the complex political-social process that would bring about the rise of the first
democratic institutions (Vignali 23).
The tyranny of Peisistratus was benevolent, for he turned to common Athenians
for support, thereby further undermining the hierarchy of aristocrats over commoners that
had endured for centuries. Jaeger argues that tyranny was successful when in the hands of
a genuinely gifted man such as Peisistratus, who was devoted to the service of the people;

2

A stage of political development in which political and civil honors are distributed according to wealth
(Unabridged Webster).
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for both political and economic motivations (228). Agrarianism accelerated and
production soared, finding a ready market with other city-states and in the rest of the
Mediterranean. Although it inhibited individual initiative and upheld every state action,
the tyranny of Peisistratus nonetheless had considerable weight politically, in his words,
―by creating, through legislation, an ideal which allowed and even enjoined political
activity on the part of the citizens‖ (229). While the tyrant did not educate the people
toward political arête, he stood as a model in another sense, becoming the ―prototype for
alter centuries‖ as the first to engage in ―real politics‖ (229). From these earliest dabbles
in democracy which allowed unprecedented freedom, the Athenians had shown their
remarkable capacity for extraordinary achievement. When Peisistratus‘ son Hippias took
over and did not share his father‘s fair-minded ruling for very long; the freedoms that
Athenians had gained under Peisistratus quickly vanished as a the full-blown tyranny of
Hippias took over when his brother was murdered.
Cleisthenes overturned him, ushering in a new (democratic) era in which, as
within the Olympic Games, anyone could seize victory and glory. This new ideology,
however, made power more unstable, and soon others were conspiring against
Cleisthenes. Isagoras, another aristocrat, with the help of the Spartans, overturned and
banished Cleisthenes and hundreds of others households, establishing an oligarchy. This
arrangement did not last long, and for what many deem the first time in recorded history,
the ordinary people, after that taste for freedom and self-governing, like their mythical
heroes, took their destinies into their own hands, turned on their rulers, and seized power
for themselves by rising up in revolution. The Athenians turned to Cleisthenes, calling
him back from exile; in a sense, he was to face the remarkable challenge of designing a
14

revolutionary governmental solution for a revolutionary political situation since neither
putting a group of aristocrats back into power nor making himself tyrant were options at
this point.
At this time, the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes created what many consider
the first democratic institutions. The challenge that Cleisthenes faced was how to give his
fellow Athenians the say in their future that he knew they now must have. He therefore
had a great meeting place carved out from the bare rock where citizens of Athens could
gather to discuss the future of their state. This place is the ancestor of the British House
of Commons, the U.S. Congress, and various parliaments across the world. In these
forums, rich and poor alike could stand and address their fellow citizens. Whereas
government had once been decided by strength, Cleisthenes instituted the simple vote—a
white pebble for yes, and a black pebble for no—the rule of the people, a system of
government now known as democracy. The great Athenian assembly would gather every
nine days covering the entire administration of the state: from the raising of taxes to the
building of roads, from the price of olives to the declaration of war.
The route to democracy went from monarchy, aristocracy, timocracy, tyranny, a
very brief oligarchy and finally democracy at the end of the sixth century. The ―official‖
date usually attributed to the birth of democracy is 507-08 BCE with the reforms of
Cleisthenes. At that time, Athens, still a tiny city in mainland Greece, saw ordinary
people turning on their rulers and demanding freedom from centuries of oppression.
Democracy represented a decisive break from what had preceded it. An originally elitist
culture was now turned around, and the idea was that even common Greeks who were not
aristocratic nor rich could be, as it were, heroes in politics. It was a system of government
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that would transform this tiny state and stimulate one of the greatest flowerings of
civilization that the world had ever seen. The fifth century saw a rapid growth of
democracy in Greece, with its climax occurring in fifth-century Periclean Athens. At this
juncture, Sophistry emerged and flourished in Greece, displaying its connection to
democratic political thought.
Several scholars have asserted that the essential qualities of democracy legitimate
the rise of sophistry. For example, Daniele Vignali argues that democracy accounts for
the rise of sophistry, stating that this form of government, ―in ragione di alcune sue
peculiarità giustifica e legittima il sorgere della sofistica‖ (23—24). The doctrines of the
sophists, he continues, would hardly be comprehensible and explicable if not viewed as a
rejoinder to the needs of a novel democratic society: in his original words, ―La [sic]
dottrine dei Sofisti risulterebbero difficilmente comprensibili qualora non fossero
considerate come una risposta alle peculiari esigenze poste dalla nuova società
democratica Greca‖ (25). Like other scholars who explore this connection, Vignali
attributes the correlation between sophistry and democracy to the ―centralità assoluta‖
(absolute centrality) of the ―arte della parola‖ (the art of speech), the oratorical ability
which could move public opinion determining its political vote (25). Rhetorical ability
and dialectical skill thus became essential abilities of the ruling class. Drawing on Martin
Heidegger and R. Dherbey Gilbert, he underscores the dedication of the sophists to these
disciplines, presenting themselves as teachers of rhetoric and dialectic, for these thinkers
offered their students the competence and knowledge necessary to reach and exercise
power within a democratic society (25).
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Thomas Conley also champions this view regarding the connection between
democracy and sophistry. Conley finds that, due to the political reforms of the time, ―[i]t
is no accident that the sophists should have been drawn to Athens‖ where they found ―a
ready market for their wares, particularly in terms of rhetorical instruction‖ (4). More
specifically, the reforms of Cleisthenes establishing a form of democratic government
and those of Ephialtes reforming the court system in Athens initiated two basic
principles: ―that power should reside in the people as a whole, not in an elite few, and . . .
that high offices should be entrusted by lot to those among the citizens who were
perceived as best fitted for them‖ (4). The reforms of Cleisthenes created an
unprecedented social mobility by opening up Athenian politics allowing any citizen to
―become a member of the assembly, to vote on public issues, and to hold administrative
offices‖ and ―aspire to a career in politics or civil service,‖ while those of Ephialtes
instituted the right for every citizen to bring suit against any other and be decided by a
Heliastic jury (4). Because lawyers such as those of today were nonexistent, every citizen
involved in a lawsuit had to argue his (not her) own case; furthermore, these juries
consisted of over two hundred members, making deliberations significantly more public
than today‘s (4—5). As a result, eloquence became extremely advantageous and therefore
sought-after. Among the numerous skills that the sophists offered in their teachings,
adroitness in public speaking was the most in demand.
The importance of a free, democratic regime cannot be overemphasized, for the
sophists would have had no market without a society of free individuals. An
unquestioned tyranny, aristocracy, or monarchy has no use for teachers of persuasion,
oratory, and other skills useful to free citizen politai. The end of tyranny, in fact, marks
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the beginning of rhetoric and vice versa; according to Thomas Habinek , ―the ancient
belief in the mutual exclusivity of tyranny and rhetoric is itself a variation on the wider
theme of rhetoric‘s role in the foundation of the state‖ (8). Rhetoric, one of the main
subjects many scholars argue fell into the realm of most sophists‘ curriculum, would not
be relevant in a society in which truth were undisputed, unchallenged, and certain,
regardless of the claims that the idealist philosophy of Plato, for example, would like to
hegemonize. Athens, as the center of the Greek empire, was the perfect and obvious
choice for the sophists to market the commodity they were offering. Without the
establishment of democracy in the fifth century BCE, the prodigious success of the
sophists would be inexplicable—as would the immense hostility and enmity they aroused
in their most ardent competitors from philosophy.
An indispensable element for the development of sophistry, then, democracy saw
the appearance of certain fundamental constitutional innovations starting in 460 BCE that
allowed even the poorest to hold public office. Power was distributed on relatively equal
bases on all Athenian citizens, which did not include women, metics, and slaves. Worthy
of note, only property-owning, male, Athenians-born citizens took part in and benefitted
from democracy. According to Josiah Ober, the citizen population was ―never much more
than about 15 to 20 percent of the total population or half the adult male population‖
(117). Public decisions were reached in public assemblies in which the different factions
confronted one another dialectically. The art of rhetoric and debate, as a result, became
the primary ingredients of political success. As a matter of fact, rhetoric and oratory
began appearing as human communities systematized into identifiable city-states
(Habinek 1). When speaking of the socio-historical and political context of sophistry, one
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cannot but recognize the nexus between democracy, sophistry and rhetoric—or more
specifically, the systematic study of rhetoric—for these emerged contemporaneously.

Cultural Context
A cultural shift also occurred from the Dark Ages and Archaic to Classical Greece in the
paideia. The Greek term paideia denotes culture in a more multifaceted and expansive
way than today‘s conception of culture, encompassing the ―entire complex of all the ways
and expressions of life which characterize any one nation,‖ particularly ―a consciously
pursued ideal‖ (xvii). This Greek ideal of culture differs from any other Pre-Hellenic
culture; what begins with the Greeks is a ―world in which a cultural ideal was first
established as a formative principle‖ (xviii). Jaeger identifies a ―new awareness of the
position of the individual in the community‖ and ―the beginning of a new conception of
the value of the individual‖ (xix). The Greeks realized that the ―world is governed by
definite and comprehensible laws‖ (xx). Werner Jaeger defines education as ―the process
by which a community preserves and transmits its physical and intellectual character‖
and sees in the Greeks, the beginning of civilization (xiii—xiv). The role of Sparta in
creating the new Greek ideal of man3 as citizen remains among the easiest to define than
the rest of Greece due to its key movement toward this ideal (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1,
99). Ionia, despite the dearth of reliable information, also played an influential role in the
development of these innovative Greek ideals. Even though the aristocracy remained in
power since the political and legal reforms did not eliminate the privileges of status and
bloodline, the polis was nonetheless a new social ideal.
3

I use the term ―man‖ for human beings because in effect these new ideals applied more directly to men.
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Much of what scholars know about early education once again originates in
Homer (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol 1, 100). Many scholars believe that the works attributed to
Homer had a strong pedagogical influence on Greek society. Jaeger goes as far as
considering him ―the first and the greatest creator and shaper of Greek life and the Greek
character‖ (36). Deemed the earliest and utmost testaments of Greek literature, Homer‘s
epics had as their purpose not the writing of history but the exploration of human
capabilities and limitations (Starr 17). Werner Jaeger also claims that neither epic can be
examined as a ―historical description‖ (Paideia, Vol. 1, 16). What the Iliad can do is tell
the story of ―an age almost wholly dominated by the ancient hero-spirit of arête‖ and
show the ―glorification of fighting and heroic prowess‖ (17—18). While the Iliad offers
―a largely idealized picture of the aristocracy‖ and of the ―superhuman arête of the
ancient heroes,‖ the Odyssey displays more human characters, both commoners and
nobles, who nonetheless bear ―the invariable stamp of decorum and good breeding in all
situations‖ (19—20). Jaeger believes that Homer had an educational purpose in glorifying
their culture and high refinement, one that is marked by ―discipline, the deliberate
formation of human character through wise direction and constant advice‖ (21). Although
directed toward the aristocracy, this process shows education turning into culture for the
first time. Once democracy took form, this process extended to the middling class and
questions of the teachableness of virtue or arête became issues discussed at large in
classical Greece. Before democracy and the sophists, myth and heroic poetry are the
nation‘s source of ideals and standards (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 41). Among their various
innovations, the sophists questioned the divine will that governs these epics.
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The Hellenes regarded every part as subsidiary to an ideal whole, the universal,
the logos, and aimed to utilize that knowledge as a ―formative force in education . . . to
shape the living man as the potter moulds clay and the sculptor carves stone into
preconceived form,‖ making the human being into ―the greatest work of art‖ and being
the ―first to recognize that education means deliberately moulding human character in
accordance with an ideal‖ (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, xxii). This molding of human
character directly relates to the social role that the sophists provided. Given this focus on
the shaping of character, the appearance of the sophists once again emerges prominently
and unsurprisingly. They aimed to help, for a profit, individuals to compete for their own
good, as inspired by the polis and encouraged by the paideia. The sophists descanted on
traditional Greek themes about human nature and society, justice and happiness. In
general, the sophists agreed with Socrates on several counts, believing that flourishing
communities and lives necessitate civic virtues like justice and moderation, that moral
education of some sort promotes these virtues, and that natural talents and practical
training are necessary components of moral education and verbal instruction (Rawson
214).

Development of Rhetoric and Sophistry
The systematic study of rhetoric has uncertain origins but probably originated in Sicily
after the overthrow of the tyrants. Citizens had to learn how to express their defenses and
give formal talks in assemblies and law courts so as to recover, for example, property that
had been usurped by the tyrants (Gagarin 30). More specifically, around 467 B.C.E. in
Syracuse, a tyrant named Hieron died and quarrels over the formerly seized lands
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developed (Herrick 32). Corax, a rhetorician, and later his student Tisias responded to
this need by creating rhetoric, understood as the art of persuasive speech, and teaching it
for a fee. They trained citizens in judicial pleading to help them argue their claims in
court and recover their lands. Corax was also instrumental in the development of
democratic reforms in Syracuse. Corax, Tisias, or both also crafted a written Technē, a
manual or handbook that covered the ―division of speeches, the argument from
likelihood, and perhaps other subjects‖ (Gagarin ―Background‖ 30). Either fellow
Sicilian Gorgias brought their achievements to Athens in 427 or Tisias himself may have
done so and is said to have taught Lysias and Isocrates among others. Aristotle, if not one
of his students, knew the book or books and summarized the contents of numerous early
handbooks in his now lost Synagōgē Technōn, or Collection of Arts, a work that became
the principal source for later scholars of Corax and Tisias (30).
Scholars disagree on the validity of this story, and many of whom either do not
mention it at all or question its legitimacy. For example, Thomas Conley calls it ―old
story . . . probably just another of those stories about ‗first discoveries‘ Greeks were so
fond of‖ (4). Others even question the existence of Corax and Tisias, such as Thomas
Cole, who claims that hard facts about the two figures are lacking (―Who‖ ). Also,
Michael Gagarin claims that ―[h]ard facts about Corax and Tisias are almost entirely
(some would say entirely) lacking‖ (―Background‖ 30). However, Italian authority in
rhetoric, Bice Mortara Garavelli, calls Corax and his student Tisias as ―i fondatori della
retorica [the founders of rhetoric]‖ without question (17). Edward Schiappa also refers to
this story as ―the standard account‖ (4—6, 30—37).
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Whatever the origin, however, teachers and rhetoricians known as Sophists
quickly picked up this systematic approach to teaching rhetoric, carrying it to Athens and
other city-states in Greece where they offered their services for a price (Herrick 32). The
sophists as they came to be known later traveled around the poleis as intellectuals who
taught subjects useful to effective citizen orators, including rhetoric. They fulfilled a
novel need within Hellene society that needed rhetorical skills in order to work together
in peace within the new social organization of city-states, poleis. Through rhetoric, then,
civilization began to form itself in the way that we know it today. Thomas Habinek
argues that rhetoric and oratory come to life when human communities become
recognizable states. Each of these communities created a governing system and ―a sense
of purpose independent of the authority and aspirations of individuals, no matter how
powerful‖ as it began to record a common history that surpasses the limits of any
individual human life (1). Rhetoric becomes, then, the specialized speech of the state.
The sophists answered this call by providing their services for a fee, a fee that elicited
Plato‘s reproaches that caused the negative connotations thereafter associated with
sophistry, as I will discuss later on.
In these years, the democratic regime affirmed itself in the greater part of Greece,
and Athens became with Pericles the cultural and artistic center of the Greek world.
Greece‘s success against the Persians triggered a growth of self-belief. Starting in 478
BCE, a period of approximately half a century, the Pentecontaetia, began and lasted until
the Peloponnesian war (432 BCE). This period of peace allowed great developments and
is considered one of the periods of most magnificence of the Greek spirit and culture—
the Golden Age or the Greek Enlightenment. Daniele Vignali argues that the sophists
23

were children of this time and their thought and pedagogical praxis answered the exact
exigencies of this historical, social, and political moment (25). During this flourishing of
democracy, the art of rhetoric and oratory become absolutely central to move the masses
and determine their political vote. Within a democratic regime, only those able to
persuade listeners and if necessary to dispute interlocutors and opponents in the presence
of the assembly of gathered citizens could manage the newly distributed power (25).
Rhetorical and dialectical ability became essential requisites of the ruling class, and the
sophists dedicated their attention to these skills, presenting themselves as teachers of
these abilities.
Full participation in the life of the city-states, therefore, continued to call for the
mastery of rhetoric because citizens had to be able to resolve issues among themselves
within the flourishing democracy. As a result, rhetoric comes to replace combative
resolve of conflict, even if supporting brutal hierarchies, for example in the maintenance
of a powerful male citizen population (Habinek 6—7). Although rhetoric becomes an
option to violence in conflict resolution, it also serves as a way to exclude others from
power (8). The Hellenes were also extremely preoccupied with excluding tyranny. The
teachings of the sophists had a clear political legitimation and were clearly although not
exclusively offered to those with political prospects, as many scholars show (Vignali 25).
While some scholars argue that the contributions of the sophists to philosophical inquiry
were inconsequential, the philosophical context of their appearance is crucial to our
understanding of their thinking. Werner Jaeger contends that the relevance of the sophists
to their age through the ―searching changes which their new intellectual attitude [made]
in the development of the Greek character‖ significantly contributed to the theories of the
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great natural philosophers in the advancement of philosophical thought (Paideia, Vol. 1,
150). Up until the Presocratics and society, the leader of the people was the poet, as well
as later the law-giver and statesman (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 152).

Teaching of Arête
The teaching of virtue or arête was a central argument between the sophists and
traditional beliefs or orthodoxa. Plato brought this debate to life in one of his most
animated Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates argues that arête cannot be taught,
although Socrates believes that all virtue is a kind of knowledge. Protagoras, on the other
hand, contends that all kinds of virtues can be taught—and are taught especially well by
him—but that they are not forms of knowledge.
The social factors in place when the sophists rose to prominence in Athenian
culture were unprecedented due to unexpected military victories against the Persians, as
well as technological innovations that stressed human rather than divine intervention. At
this time, Athenian democracy, an experiment like no other in direct and participatory
democracy, came to flourish, offering power to any eligible citizen who could persuade
crowds to his point of view. Rhetoric at this time became a necessary tool, as it is still
today, of the right of free speech and a just trial. Being teachers of rhetoric and other
skills useful for civic status, the sophists visited Athens frequently, even taking part in the
cultural reform of Pericles. Furthermore, the growing prosperity of Athens generated a
class of citizens with enough time to devote time to their education, which was largely
lacking at the time and usually complete by one‘s early teens. The sophists offered a
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unique service, previously unseen, providing education in an extensive assortment of
subjects that would have appealed to young men.

Philosophical Context: Presocratics
The Presocratics had concerned themselves with the nature of reality and its relation to
sensible phenomena (Guthrie 4). A shift in interest from natural phenomena to human
affairs occurred around the fifth century BCE. Jaeger believes that scholars should
examine the combination of the ethical, political, and religious thought of Solon and the
Ionian poets and explode the dichotomy between poetry and prose to understand the
development of philosophy in an accurate manner. Only then can scholars begin to see
the shift as a process rather than one system leaving another one behind overnight. Jaeger
maintains that political theory is practical while speculation regarding physis and genesis
is theoretical: only after studying the external world theoretically did the Greeks think of
human nature in those terms as well (Paideia, Vol. 1, 152).
Establishing the precise time in which rational thinking begins in Greece remains
challenging. In the age of the Presocratics the poet was still the unquestioned leader of his
people, slowly being joined by the statesman and law-giver. Jaeger identifies the Ionians
as the first philosophers, a term that, of course, did not gain currency until Plato. Ionian
poets had already been ―voicing their emotions and opinions on human life and their own
age,‖ while the philosophers ―applied pure independent logic to the current conception of
the universe‖ (154—55). Both endeavors centered on the ―growing power of the
individual‖ (155). Around the sixth century, philosophers started probing the origin of the
universe—its physis (Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1, 155). After finding that Egypt and the
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countries in the Near East had disparate creation and divinity myths, the Greeks began
subjecting their own myths of creation to theoretical and causal inquiry (156). They also
incorporated their neighbors‘ technical innovations to study the origin and nature of the
universe, inquiring within nature before human beings. Jaeger marks this moment as the
―origin of scientific thought‖ (156). However, the mythical thinking of the epic and
rational thinking ran parallel for quite some time, with logic appearing within mythology,
as well as Plato and Aristotle still mythologizing (151). The Greeks started thinking of
human nature theoretically when, by studying the external world through medicine and
mathematics, they had created a precise method to study the inner world of humans
(152).
Philosophers also began writing down their thoughts for the first time.
Anaximander was the first one, viewing the world as built up by an orderly rather than a
chaotic system. His, however, was more of a moral than a physical law of nature
regarding the eternal processes of compensation and power of diké ruling over natural
phenomena (160). His idea of dike is ―the first stage in the projection of the life of the
city-state upon the life of the universe‖ (161). The Milesian philosophers used human life
as an example interpreting physis (161). Similarly, Pythagoras, another Ionian
philosopher, although he worked in the south of Italy, founded mathemata, which blends
the science of number, the theory of music, the movement of the stars, known as
geometry at the time, and Milesian natural philosophy (162). Number, for Pythagoras, is
the principle of all things, ruling the entire cosmos and human life, making mathematical
science the new element of Greek culture and connecting mathematics and music with
far-reaching consequences (162—64). The connection created new laws that governed all
27

aspects of existence, and the new inquiry into the structure of music produced knowledge
of harmony and rhythm , concepts that affected all spheres of life in a way that resembled
the doctrine of justice in society of Solon (164—65). Pythagoreans believed that harmony
was the principle of the cosmos (165). Behind harmony lay the concept of proportion,
which affected all forms of culture including sculpture, architecture, poetry, rhetoric,
religion, and morality (165). Like the rule of justice, the Greeks realized that the rules of
fitness and propriety had to be maintained.
In the sixth century, the Orphic movement formulated a new doctrine of the soul.
This doctrine began creating ―a new consciousness of the self and a new feeling for
human life‖ (166). While with Solon, the idea of responsibility meant that each individual
held a social responsibility toward the community, in Orphism it meant a moral
responsibility ―or the religious ideal of the pure life‖ (166). Humans started believing in
their divine destiny, a central innovation in the development of human consciousness of
selfhood. Although the soul has no place in the cosmos of the physicists, in the Orphic
movement, it restores itself within its religious consciousness of selfhood.
Civilization came to be seen as discovered by human beings rather than a gift of
the gods, as in the mythical tradition. Although Anaximander and Anaximenes created
these doctrines of naturalistic explanation of the universe, Xenophanes advocated them
with ardent conviction. This new truth transformed the life and faith of humankind,
making it the foundation of a new culture and the ―metaphysical foundation of city-state
morality‖ (171). Xenophanes also promotes his new conception of arête, holding that
philosophical truth is the guide to true arête, depicting the conflict between ―the old
aristocratic culture and the new philosophical ideal of humanity which now sought to
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eject from its place and power in the social order‖ (173). In the old aristocracy, the
Olympic victor still represented the highest ideal, but Xenophanes first questioned that
traditional ideal of manhood, defending philosophical knowledge and showing a new
conception of arête in the form of intellectual culture. Jaeger identifies Xenophanes‘
ideal as the final phase of ―the development of the political conception of arête: first
came courage, then prudence and justice, and now finally wisdom—the virtues which
Plato retained as the essence of the citizen‘s highest arête‖ (174). While he may not have
been an original thinker, Xenophanes was the first to tell the Greeks that philosophy
could be a cultural force.
In addition to Milesian natural philosophy and the arithmetical theories of the
Pythagoreans, the final element Greek thought to influence human intellectual and
spiritual life was logic. Parmenides, considered by many as one of the greatest
philosophers of all times, altered the guiding force behind the speculations of early
physicists, which were hitherto led by other forms of spiritual activity. His philosophy
revolves around pure reason, making a distinction between thought and perception,
between ―the way of the senses and the way of reason‖ (177). Therefore, whatever is not
known through reason is mere opinion. At this point, religion begins to give way to
philosophy. Like the Milesians, Parmenides had dehumanized the problem of finding an
objective conception of the universe, losing track of human life in the in the immense
design of nature.
Heraclitus humanized philosophy, placing the human soul at the center of all the
energies of the cosmos. While earlier philosophers undertook ―logical reasoning or
intellectually ordered observation of phenomena,‖ Heraclitus showed how a new realm of
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knowledge could be achieved if the soul were to examine herself (180). He transformed
logos from the conceptual thinking of Parmenides to a ―form of knowledge, the origin of
both ‗action and speech‘‖ and viewed life as a griphos, a riddle to be interpreted (18081). Just like the city, the universe appears to have laws of its own for the first time in
human history, and only logos can understand divine law. Logos is the mind that
perceives the meaning of the cosmos. Thinkers before Heraclitus had discerned a new
cosmos; Heraclitus gave the human being his/her place as a cosmic being. Furthermore,
he viewed the process of human existence in an innovative way, seeing both intellectual
and physical activity as made up of dichotomies incessantly replacing one another. For
Heraclitus, human beings are part of the cosmos, subject both to its laws and to the laws
of the city-state; this kind of freedom differs from the freedom of modern individualism
in that human beings are part both of the universal community and the community to
which they belong. Heraclitus created a moral law of the entire cosmos.
The Presocratics started a revolution by applying a scientific approach to the
inquiry into nature. While they cannot be lumped together as having had an identical or
even similar worldview, they do share some commonalities in the form of scientific
attitudes (Waterfield xix). As ―proto-scientists‖ they were the ―first to make and explore
assumptions which is absolutely crucial to the development of science, that the human
rational mind is the correct tool for understanding the world‖ (xix). They endeavored to
provide an orderly explanation of the whole cosmos and all it main characteristics.
Although in the history of ideas one cannot identify exact origins, before the Presocratics,
the world was imbued with sacred meaning, permeated by divinities, gods, goddesses,
nymphs, and local deities in every natural manifestation. Anthropomorphized to an
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extreme in Homeric poetry, the deities controlled every aspect of nature including
humans. The Presocratics found order in the world, an order that can be understood by
the human mind.
The Presocratics diverged both from the foregoing weltanschauung and fullfledged scientism. Although they asked questions similar to those of their predecessors,
the presocratics based their answers in an unorthodox framework: they replaced the
function of the gods with natural phenomena, used logic to rationalize observable facts,
formed general philosophical hypotheses, and held a clear, unrestrained spirit of inquiry.
They differ from scientism by lacking scientific method, building neat but not
demonstrable systems (Waterfield xxiv). Although they were not likely the first and only
ones to base their conclusions on observation and rational argumentation, the way they
expressed their conclusions was different from Hesiod and other predecessors. They
started a revolution that took centuries to complete, centuries in which a substrate of
superstition was still present in the larger part of the population.

Sophists
The sophists do not at first glance appear as direct successors of the presocratics, given
the lack of sophistic interest in scientific issues and metaphysics. The sophists directed
their attention to language and all aspects of logos rather than the origin and nature of the
cosmos. Nevertheless, the sophists were indeed the direct successors of the presocratics
because once the presocratics had opened up the Pandora‘s box making the world at least
potentially intelligible to the human mind, ―a humanist or anthropocentric emphasis on
human beings was inevitable‖ (Waterfield xxvii). The sophists were pioneers in
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broaching questions regarding moral, social, and political philosophy. Further, while
contemporary science has answered the questions raised by the presocratics, those of the
sophists remain debated and largely unanswered.
The term sophist (sophistês) has held varying meanings throughout the millennia
since its first appearance. Originally, it referred to a person of sophia, usually translated
as skill or wisdom. The word derives from the adjective sophos, which in its original
sense applied to people ―skilled in a particular craft, and extended to mean generally
knowledgeable or wise‖ (McKirahan 372). The noun sophist means ―‗one who exercises
wisdom,‘ that is to say, a specialist in wisdom‖ (372). Protagoras was the first to apply
the term to himself although the word dates further back than the fifth century and had
been used on poets, musicians, seers, and sages—those who had special knowledge and
insight, and the gift of communicating it to others,‖ thereby including Homer and Hesiod,
as even Plato‘s Protagoras notes (373). Nevertheless Jacqueline de Romilly interprets it
as ―professionals of intelligence [for] they certainly set out to teach people how to use
their intelligence‖ (1). Unlike sages, sophoi, which indicates a state of being rather than a
profession, the sophists were masters of thinking and talking who made knowledge their
area of expertise. Patricia O‘Grady condenses it to ―‖freelance, mostly non-Athenian,
independent teachers who travelled throughout Ancient Greece from city to city making
their living out of the new demand for education‖ (12). Due to the breadth of the term
sophist, it could be applied to anyone who exercised this profession.
In the strict sense of the word, the sophists were ―itinerant educators who operated
independently and charged fees [who] taught different ranges of subjects, but all taught
rhetoric, the art of constructing and delivering public speeches,‖ the ―key to success in
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public and private life‖ (McKirahan 363). They were also ―professional rivals, competing
for fame, wealth, and pupils‖ and ―their shared interest in rhetoric and related issues led
them to develop philosophical theses, and their rivalry led them to challenge each other‘s
views and formulate competing ones‖ (363). De Romilly notes that the sophists went
from being ―experts in wisdom‖ to practitioners of ―crafty thinking (xiii). Conceivably,
she adds, what ruined the reputation of the sophists may have been their ―all too selfsatisfied disciples . . . were the real, perhaps the only, amoralists,‖ such as Callicles,
Euripides, and Democritus , who may have been influenced by the sophists (xiv).
In ancient times, the term was applied both to individuals still known as sophists today
and those who later rejected and contributed to the downfall of the term. Classical texts
record the term used on people as varied as Prometheus, Homer, Hesiod, Damon, Solon,
Thales, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno, Plato, Socrates, and Isocrates were
called sophists (Schiappa, ―Sophistic‖ 682). Many of these would roll in their graves at
the thought of the term being used on them and some actually contributed to the term‘s
fall from grace.
Today, the people most often referred to as sophists include Protagoras, Gorgias,
Hippias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, Critias, and Antiphon, as well as on occasion Polus,
Euthydemus, Dionysodurus, Callicles, Socrates, Antisthenes, Alcidamas, Lycophron, and
the authors of Dissoi Logoi, the Anonymus Iamblichi, and the Hippocratic Corpus (682).
In I sofisti, Untersteiner discusses Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Antiphon, and Hippias
in depth, as well Thrasymachus and Critias . The meaning of the word sophist changed
between the time of Protagoras and that of Aristotle (McKirahan 372). Garavelli
identifies the sophists‘ system of precepts on the following principle: ―il sembrare vero
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conta più del essere vero; donde la ricerca sistematica delle prove e lo studio delle
techniche atte a dimostrare la verosimiglianza di una tesi‖ (17). On this basis—that
seeming real is more important that being real—the sophists became an easy target for
attacks regarding moral relativism.
The sophistic tradition as such includes a number of theoretical principles
sometimes grouped together under the term ―sophistic rhetoric‖ (Schiappa, ―Sophistic‖
682). The phrase, however, is an anachronism, for it does not appear in any Greek text,
Aristotle‘s and Plato‘s included. Edward Schiappa identifies Edward M. Cope as one of
the pioneers in describing ―‗sophistical‘ rhetoric‖ in the mid-nineteenth century, a
category thereafter often taken for granted, although the sophists often held different,
even contrasting positions on numerous subjects; therefore, ―sophistic rhetorics‖ proves a
more accurate and constructive label for their projects than the monolithic singular term
(682). The term rhetoric, too, was not coined until the early fourth century BCE, and did
not appear in any existing texts by the fifth-century sophists. For this reason, Schiappa
advocates referring to sophistic rhetoric as sophistic theories of discourse or persuasion
or, alternatively, consider such doctrines as ―implicit or incipient theories of rhetoric‖
(684).
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Despite their virtual disappearance for millennia, the sophists lingered within the
scholarly imagination throughout their historical exile, if for no other reason as the
contrast to all that is good, moral and virtuous—the antithesis of idealist philosophy.
Their reputation ruined by Plato—to the point of engendering the negative word,
sophistry—they have been viewed as sketchy thinkers and accused of producing specious
and flawed arguments, a peculiar outcome considering that originally the word sophist
meant wise person, as its root ζoθία—sophia, the Greek work for knowledge—indicates.
Nevertheless, during their 2,500-year exile, these figures have come close to without ever
fully disappearing. Overcoming the negative connotations associated with sophistry has
not proved a simple task. For centuries after the Hellenic period, the sophists were
viewed exclusively through the interpretations of Plato. Having become relatively
irrelevant and over two thousands of years, the sophistic tradition has never the status it
earned in the fifth and fourth century BCE in Athens, particularly in those circles of
people who could enjoy—and afford—their services. In the Webster Unabridged
Dictionary, sophistry denotes ―reasoning that is superficially plausible but actually
fallacious.‖ According the Oxford English Dictionary, sophistry signifies ―Specious but
fallacious reasoning; employment of arguments which are intentionally deceptive,‖ since
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the fourteenth century, appearing in 1340, and even ―Cunning, trickery, craft‖ as used by
Chaucer in 1385. Nevertheless, scholars have been making some progress in
reestablishing the positive contributions the sophists have made to democratic societies in
the past and can make in the present. In the nineteenth century, sophistry began assuming
its meaning as ―The type of learning characteristic of the ancient Sophists; the profession
of a Sophist,‖ starting in 1837 (OED). The same century witnessed the beginning of the
sophists‘ resurgence.

Nineteenth-Century Recovery
The recovery of the sophists has been attributed to different thinkers at various times, but
starting around the middle of the nineteenth century, when Western civilization took a
skeptical turn toward a ―hermeneutics of suspicion,‖ to use Paul Ricoeur‘s phrase,
through the work of Marx, Nietzsche, and subsequently Freud, the sophists came to be
reconsidered. This resurgence of these controversial thinkers would emerge expectedly at
this point in human history given that most foundational pillars of knowledge crumbled,
much in the way that the sophists believed two millennia earlier.
The recovery of the sophists began in the nineteenth century when the sophists
were salvaged from the shadows of history by a number of high profile intellectuals.
Specifically, G. F. Hegel in his Lectures in the History of Philosophy, later published in
1832, takes sophistic relativism as the antithesis of pre-Socratic naturalism in his wellknown dialectical view of history. Despite its negative representation, Sophistic
subjectivism, in this view, was a crucial step in the history of philosophy because
necessary to the movement of thought within Hegel‘s Dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and
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synthesis. The first stage, for Hegel, spans from Thales to Anaxagoras, when thought
appeared in sensory determinations that formulated proto-scientific statements about the
physical world being perceived. Next as the antithesis, the sophists, Socrates, and the
adherents of Socratic thought, strangely grouped together, through skeptical criticism
repudiated this view replacing it with an emphasis on the perceiving subject—what today
would be dubbed subjectivism. From this clash between thesis and antithesis emerged the
synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. The importance of the sophists, then, was merely as a
negative but nonetheless important stage in the history of the dominant idealist
philosophy.
This revival brought sophistry back into the scholarly conversation, allowing it to
be revisited by later historians and reopening the argument between Plato and the
sophists in its various forms, such as the interconnected debate between rhetoric and
philosophy and the one between knowledge and discourse. Nevertheless, as many
scholars have shown, Hegel‘s reintegration of the sophists did little in the way of
improving their reputation as philosophers, for by making them subjectivists and
assigning them the antithesis subdivision of his scheme to the history of Greek
philosophy, Hegel appeared to agree with the inimical estimation of Plato and Aristotle,
and idealist philosophy continued to prevail until the mid-twentieth century, with truth
and reality still viewed as objective. By being considered opposed to objective truth,
especially in the moral realm, the sophists held on to their position as the foes of
philosophy. Despite this far from glorious return, however, the sophists at least reentered
the conversation and continued to be discussed throughout the nineteenth century.
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Among the scholars to revisit the sophists are historian Eduard Zeller in Germany, as
well as George Grote and George Henry Lewes in Britain.
Although Zeller recognizes that the sophists had been misrepresented throughout
history, he ultimately considers them lacking in comparison to Platonic idealism. Zeller
views the sophists as having much in common regardless of individual distinctions,
viewing them as part of the same educational discipline, a view still debated today as I
will discuss below. Following in the lines of Hegel, for the most part, he considers the
sophists as detrimental to the scientific enterprise, holding their rhetoric as dealing with
appearances and condemning their morals as downright perilous. However, he observes
some redeeming qualities, acknowledging the philosophical validity of subjectivity for
the first time. Zeller‘s was the last study to hold an almost completely negative view of
the sophists and their teachings, his conclusions deeming the sophists as making truth as
a matter of personal preference and as an instrument to fulfill selfish needs. Further, in
the sixth edition of Zeller‘s Die Philosophie der Griehes in ihrer geschichtlichen
Entwicklung published in 1920, Willhelm Nestle denied them the title of philosophers,
reestablishing philosophy as exclusively traditional. Despite these efforts in the
nineteenth century, the end of the century had yet to see the rehabilitation of the
following one, and by the last third of the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick sums up
the prevalent estimation of the time as considering the sophists as ―charlatans‖ who
taught ―fallacious discourse‖ and ―hollow rhetoric‖ to credulous Athenians until Socrates
overthrew them (Qtd. in Guthrie 11).
George Grote and George Lewes, on the other hand, were more approving,
particularly of sophistic philosophical skepticism and the sophists‘ knack for creating
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consensus. Grote, in particular, viewed them as exponents of intellectual progress though
not as an organic whole. Further, Grote rejected Plato‘s attacks regarding the sophists‘
purported immoral doctrines on the grounds that not even Plato had attacked the principal
sophists—Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippais, and Gorgias. While defending them against
dismissal based on the views of any individual sophist, however, Grote‘s view did not
allow the sophists to be secured as a class of intellectuals, and despite Grote‘s success
shielding the sophists against the accusations of corrupting the Athenian moral character,
the lack of cohesion in sophistic thought made them difficult to safeguard. George Lewes
followed Grote‘s defense of the sophists.

The Twentieth Century
The sophists have been enjoying increasing and considerable attention in the
scholarship since their revival in the nineteenth century. Their recovery continued in the
twentieth century, which, however, begins in a way that would have pleased Plato and his
followers in the subsequent two millennia. The second half of the twentieth century
witnessed an actual revitalization of their ideas. In the first half of the twentieth century,
however, scholars relegated the sophists to the margins by including and by appealing to
them primarily as predecessors of philosophers proper.
Discussions of the sophists continued to appear regularly in scholarly works until
the mid-twentieth century although minimally. They materialized in scholarly works
under subordinate categories such as presocratic philosophy, humanism, epistemology,
ethics, pragmatism, and nihilism within minor entries in the work of Jean Bordieau,
William James, James H. Tufts, John Dewey, and F.C.S. Schiller, rather than receiving
39

expansive treatments of their own. These revaluations of the sophists still relied on Plato,
reassessing and reappraising his interpretations of the sophists rather than turning to the
work of the sophists themselves. Nevertheless, the primary contributions of the sophists
came to be recognized as less than negative in the first quarter of the first century but
nonetheless remained secondary to other branches of learning. After World War II, a turn
against Plato occurred due to numerous studies tying Nazism to Platonic ideals of a
stratified society.
While not devoted to the sophists as such, Werner Jaeger notes them as making a
significant contribution to the Greek paideia by devoting an entire chapter to them in his
masterful work on the ideals of Greek culture. Jaeger towers among classicists, not only
to the history of the sophists but also to classical paideia in general. A renowned
Aristotelian, he had and continues to have a colossal influence on his generation of
classicists and beyond. I draw on Jaeger throughout this dissertation, so for now suffice it
to say that Jaeger views the sophists as the inventors of intellectual culture, the art of
education, pedagogy, and rhetoric (297—98).
This lack of formal and expansive treatments is nevertheless revealing in itself. It
exposes the absence of an official restoration of the sophists as serious intellectuals and
even philosophers, as the scholarship of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century
scholarship in particular will do. The dearth of comprehensive studies up until the midtwentieth century further indicates that the sophists were yet to be considered as worthy
of intellectual attention in their own right. Up until this stage, the sophists, although
―recovered,‖ were yet to qualify as making an intellectual contribution worthy of
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substantial scrutiny and analysis. This academic phenomenon makes the work of Mario
Untersteiner on the sophists particularly noteworthy.
I Sofisti (The sophists) by Mario Untersteiner, was and remains an authority on
the subject despite the number of scholars who followed him. He offers one of the first
full-scale treatments of the sophists, which was first published in Italy in 1949 and
translated into English by Kathleen Freeman in 1954. Untersteiner‘s powerful, probing,
and comprehensive historical and philosophical reinterpretation of the sophists, whom he
examines primarily as theoretical philosophers more than as rhetoricians. Untersteiner
veers away from presenting an account of their unfavorable history as assailants of
traditional values, squabblers, and spurned paid teachers, as, he states in the opening, do
the textbooks before him. While the conclusions in his study do not diverge greatly from
earlier studies, Untersteiner proposes that the sophists, each of whom he explores in
depth within each chapter, contend with the same issue from which emerge disparate
answers. The issue they deal with is that of humanity. Mario Untersteiner‘s I sofisti
remains among the most extensive treatments of the primary sophist.
In a less developed study of the sophists, Eric Havelock attempts to correct the
history of political theory in his The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, finding that up
until then, it had been ―written in modern times exactly as Plato and Aristotle would have
wished it to be written‖ (18). Havelock, however, views them as leaders of democratic
and liberal thinking in Greece and seeks to resuscitate the liberal pluralism of the sophists
as ―an act of historical justice‖ (18—19).
G.B. Kerferd—whose work I discuss in more detail below—offers a useful
classification of the defenders of the sophists in the twentieth century, placing them into
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two groups: those who view the sophists as ―‗positivists of the Enlightenment‘‖ and those
who were Hegalian (10). While these two classifications are never precise, leanings can
be easily noticed. The positivist view examines what the sophists did and were rather
than what they thought. In this view, the sophists

. . . were inspired above all by the educational ideal of rhetoric . . . the
encyclopoaedists or illuminators of Greece [,] above all teachers of the ideal of
political virtue (or more simply how to succeed in politics) or of the ideal of
virtue or success in life in all its aspects . . or . . . humanists in that they put man
[the human being] and his[/her] values in the central place in the interpretation of
the universe. (10—11)

In this sense the sophists fully embody the paideia as outlined by Werner Jaeger. On the
other hand, Hegalians, such as W.C. Guthrie, situate the sophists within the history of
philosophy. These two camps recreated the ones between the sophists and Plato in
classical Greece. Classicists and historians of rhetoric, such as W.C. Guthrie, G.B.
Kerferd himself, John Poulakos, and Richard Enos, fall into the objectivist group, aiming
to substantiate the sophists as consequential intellectuals. The sophists remained among
the philosophers in the views of many other scholars. W. K. C. Guthrie, for example,
continues the Hegelian tradition. Although his own views seem to lean in favor of the
idealist tradition, he credits the sophists with being an intellectual movement unparalleled
in the ―permanence of its results‖ (3).
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From the early 1960s through the 1970s, works on rhetoric presented a very
limited and negative view of the sophists. George A. Kennedy‘s The Art of Persuasion in
Greece (1963) and Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition form
Ancient to Modern Times (1980), James L. Kinneavy‘s Theory of Discourse (1971),
Corbett‘s first edition of Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (1980) all follow an
Aristotelian episteme, either ignoring or presenting a very negative view of the sophists.
This orientation offers a view of rhetoric that favors what George Kennedy calls
―philosophical rhetoric‖ in his Classical Rhetoric, reinscribing, therefore, the
philosophy/rhetoric dichotomy (16). However, several exceptions surfaced, with
numerous studies now being devoted to the sophists in their own right.
One of the most significant contributions to sophistic scholarship emerged in
Great Britain within the work of G.B. Kerferd, particularly his The Sophistic Movement.
Kerferd seeks to establish the sophists as philosophers, opposing the traditional charges
held against them as unphilosophical and immoral by contending that the sophists not
only continued the philosophical conversation with the presocratics but also propounding
that close to every philosophical issue broached by Socrates and Plato was sparked by the
sophists. The main focus of his germinal study, however, consists of his interpretation of
the key contributions of the sophists to specific fields of inquiry. Outlining the range of
problems formulated and addressed by the sophists, Kerferd deems them incredibly
modern in their scope. The two dominant themes he attributes them are the ―need to
accept relativism in values and elsewhere without reducing all to subjectivism, and the
belief that there is no area of human life or of the world as a whole which should be
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immune from understanding achieved throughout reasoned argument‖ (2). These themes
resonate today as much as they did then.
While Kerferd does not claim to make a dent in the subject, he introduces and
addresses a great number of issues. The philosophical problems in the theory of
knowledge and perception; the nature of truth; the sociology of knowledge; a belief in
progress; the questioning of religious deities, the theoretical and practical problems of life
within society in general and democracy in particular; the meaning of justice; the
problems of punishment; the nature and purpose of education; and the mindboggling
suggestion regarding the ―teachability‖ of virtue. Kerferd rejects the contention that the
sophists were of limited importance and merely served to pave the way for Plato and
argues that rather ―every point in Plato‘s thought has its starting point in his reflection
upon problems raised by the sophists‖ (173). He finds that the sophists not only have
broached all facets of human activity but also did so for the first time. Ultimately,
Kerferd grants the sophists a place among the great achievements of Periclean Athens,
not only in their own right, but also, perhaps surprisingly, in the history of philosophy
(176). While Kerferd makes no attempt to analyze or even survey the fragments left by
the sophists, his The Sophistic Movement makes a well-rounded contribution to sophistic
scholarship.
Susan Jarratt, in Rereading the Sophists, revisits the sophists to explain and offer
an alternative to the Aristotelian orientation still prevalent in the first two thirds of the
twentieth century. Jarratt‘s text aims both to add to our historical backgrounds and bring
new concerns to the field of rhetoric and composition, which in her view discovers its
history in classical tradition, adding the sophists to the commonly discussed Aristotle,
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Cicero, and Quintilian. The book investigates the reasons why the sophists reappeared in
the history of rhetoric and argues for giving them a more prominent role because the
sophists, as the supposed inventors of rhetoric, offered the first systematic instruction in
the arts of speaking and writing in the West. Ultimately, Jarratt posits that ―a more
comprehensive view of ‗the tradition‘ will provide rich antecedents for later rhetorical
developments‖ (xix). Her primary aim is dislodging implicit control of philosophic
thought inherited from Aristotle and Plato by discussing the sophists in terms of history
and historiography, exploring the shift from mythos to logos, adding a feminist
interpretation to the first sophists, and offering a view of sophistic pedagogy, both in
classical Greece and current United States.
Jacqueline de Romilly studies the sophists in relation to the Athenian culture that
they so deeply influenced. By focusing on the dialogue that occurred between the
sophists and the Athenian public opinion, de Romilly considers the sophists in their
myriad roles: teachers, bold thinkers, moral philosophers, and political theorists. A
similar pattern emerges when looking at the sophists; their audacious discoveries aroused
outraged responses and acrimonious criticism merely to reappear and be accepted when
revisited. Despite the harsh criticisms and fragmentary remnants of sophistic writings, the
degree of their innovations proves undeniable, particularly from a postmodern standpoint.
De Romilly finds that their impact upon the history and development of Greek thought
can be assessed ―both by the reactions that they provoked within philosophical circles
and by their legacy to cultural life in general,‖ for no matter Plato‘s criticism, ―the
Sophists certainly played a decisive role in the development of Plato‘s own philosophy—
if only by virtue of the responses that they forced out of him‖ (235). For de Romilly, that
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two completely so utterly contrary forms of thought—―one humanistic and practical, the
other transcendental and idealistic‖— emerged contemporaneously is nothing short of a
miracle (235—36). The victory went to philosophy, of course, and de Romilly concludes
that due to the loss of Athenian independence and the lack of written works left behind,
the role of the sophists lost its import.
Further, their multiple roles, as philosophers, teachers of rhetoric, political
advisers, logicians, stylists, and scholars, were too much to carry and eventually
narrowed down to teachers of rhetoric. Nonetheless, the movement they set into motion
undoubtedly generated novel outlooks in every intellectual field. Basic procedures of
rhetoric, both involving style and composition, as well as reasoning and a sort of logic;
the study of grammar; reflections on human nature, psychology, reactions to different
circumstances, strategy, and politics; comparative studies of different societies; a vast
array of technai or human sciences, ones that the modern age is revisiting and
continuing—all emerged from the sophists.
Much of the recent scholarship takes on individual sophists. Scott Consigny
characterizes this new stage in the scholarship on sophistic rhetoric in his Gorgias:
Sophist and Artist (2001). Considering Gorgias the most elusive sophist, he finds that the
primary issues that scholars have with Gorgias are that 1) his extant texts are far from
complete, 2) his writing is slippery, and 3) our own impossibility in recreating the
historical context. Gorgias‘ primary texts, On Not-Being and Helen, are not only possibly
inaccurately transcribed and paraphrased but also dubiously authored. Even assuming
their authorship and accuracy, the writing itself proves extremely ambiguous through lack
of definition and use of sphinx-like tropes (5). Nevertheless, he identifies former
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scholarship as either ―subjectivist,‖ begun by Hegel and developed by Untersteiner,
Rosenmeyer, Gronbeck, Miller, and White; or ―empiricist,‖ initiated by Grote, and
continued by Loenen, MacDowell, Romilly, Enos, and Schiappa.
His approach to Gorgias differs from these previous studies. Consigny views
Gorgias as an ―antifoundationalist‖ who rejects the ―entire foundational project of his
philosophical predecessors and contemporaries‖ (35, 203). Gorgias, rather, understands
language as ―an array of maneuvers or tropes that people use in various socially
sanctioned agons or games,‖ portrays ―inquiry as a debate between rival rhetors in
sanctioned agons of the culture,‖ and sees truth as ―a label of endorsement awarded by a
community to an account that it finds most persuasive‖ (60). Further rejecting subjectivist
and empiricist readings, Consigny offers a different reading of Gorgias‘ ethical and
political views, which he considers as promoting a Pan-Hellenic community of
individuals who mold themselves and each other by taking part in a variety of agons, and
Gorgias‘ style, which draws attention to the ―rhetoricity, situatedness, and artificiality of
all texts‖ by playing with genre conventions (119—49). Consigny contends that Gorgias‘
On Not-Being contributes both to pre-Socratic philosophy broadly and to Eleatic
ontology and epistemology more specifically, as well as anticipating twentieth-century
views of language, knowledge, and truth of Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein, Ayer,
Rorty, and Fish, while Helen treats a variety of epistemological and ethical issues,
including the ―nature and power of language; the epistemological status of poetry and
science; the limits of free choice in the face of chance, fate, and compulsion; the conflict
between obligations to one‘s family and the pursuit of personal happiness; and the
struggle between Greeks and barbarians‖ (6). Ultimately, Consigny‘s study is an
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apologia that differs from other rehabilitations of Gorgias by taking the middle road
between the historical reconstruction and contemporary interpretation approaches to
Gorgias.
Consigny aims to show the sophist as one who both rejects and embodies logical
and mythic thought, replacing the evolutionary narrative of progress from myth to the
rationality and objectivity of science and logic or of regression with ―an agonal
narrative‖ that shows Greek culture not as an evolution from unreason to reason but as a
struggle between models of rationality (205). The agonal narrative coincides with
contemporary philosophy the likes of Richard Rorty, who views rationality as the faculty
of drawing from existing resources to handle effectively with one‘s contingent situation,
accepting opposing points, and employing persuasion over coercion (205—206). This
view posits the ancient quarrel not as one between ―a mythically minded herd and
enlightened analytical fifth-century individuals,‖ as commonly held, but as a ―struggle
between agonists and dogmatists‖ (206). Therefore, Consigny views Gorgias as
championing neither mythic nor logical thought; rather, Gorgias encourages the
contingent convention of the agon in which individuals propose competing interpretations
to persuade particular audiences within a community. Consigny‘s reading thus considers
Gorgias as an antifoundationalist who plays a considerably more important role than
previously seen as a precursor of contemporary thought.
Numerous studies that cover individual sophists further connect them to
influential modern thinkers. Keith Crome seeks to displace the opposition between
sophistry and philosophy by examining Jean-François Lyotard‘s interpretation of
sophistry. His study reveals that Lyotard sought to establish the originality of thought and
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contribution of the sophists as more than merely contributing to the development of
philosophy. Crome seeks to restore sophistry by reconstructing its complex role in the
constitution, institution, life, and destiny of philosophy thus offering a critical perspective
on its origins and genealogy that can aid in putting the truth of philosophy into question,
a truth which Crome calls ―constitutive of the West itself‖ (41).After an excellent account
of the sophists, Hegel and sophistry, and Heidegger and sophistry, Crome finds that in
Just Gaming Lyotard views intelligences as regulated by diversity and difference of
opinion (121). Therefore, Lyotard considers sophistry as an ―attempt to retrieve or restore
a type of political intelligence that is sophistical, a manner of acting or judging politically
without criteria, and case by case, preserving the heterogeneity of the social‖ (160—61).
Lyotard‘s response intensifies in The Differend, further and more radically redeeming
sophistry, by connecting the sophistic notion of truth to his notion of differend.
The differend, as opposed to litigation, is ―‗a case of conflict between two parties
(at least) that cannot be decided equitably for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to
both arguments‘‖ (Qtd. Crome 123). Crome explains that in such cases, both parties have
equally valid and necessary grounds, giving rise to an antithetic, for neither party has a
justifiable basis for superiority (123). Lyotard casts his account of the differend with
respect to Kant‘s antinomies of pure reason into soul, the world, and God, which Crome
addresses as psychology, cosmology, and theology, all of which can indicate apparent,
unmistakable, overpowering, valid proofs, which Kant calls dogmatic; thus Lyotard
points beyond Kant and toward sophistry (124—25). Lyotard, in this view, is arguing that
―the very possibility of philosophy is itself engaged from out of sophistry and in itself
implies—even if it does not acknowledge it—the idea of the differend‖ (129). In his
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account of Lyotard‘s work, Crome seeks to establish a relation between philosophy and
sophistry different from Plato‘s, one that does not exclude the sophist from truth, by
arguing that Lyotard reveals that sophistry ―comprehends philosophy‖ and is ―the very
condition of philosophy itself‖ (130). Crome‘s reading of On Nature or On Not-Being,
already within the title of Gorgias‘ work, illustrates the concept, for nature or physis and
not-being are opposites.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, scholars have shifted the recovery of
the sophists to Friedrich Nietzsche, in addition to the other major German scholars
recognized as having regenerated a positive interest in the sophists, such as G.W.F.
Hegel. Untersteiner is among the first scholars to take this turn in the first half of the
twentieth century, and in the 1990s Eric White, Victor Vitanza, David Roochnik, E. R.
Dodds, Daniel Shaw, John Poulakos, Joel Mann, and several other scholars follow this
drift, publishing numerous articles regarding the connection between Nietzsche and the
sophists. The last decade of the twentieth century saw a definite trend exploring this
connection.
Contemporary rhetorical theorists draw upon the sophists‘ texts for a variety of
insights that are relevant to current theories of discourse and composition. Scholars
continue to show great interest in the epistemological doctrines of the sophists based on
Protagoras famous dictum that ‗humanity is the measure of all things‘ rather than the
gods, and thus he has been characterized as an early humanist. The twenty-first century
continues to witness the production of studies on the on individual sophists. Protagorean
studies in particular appear in contemporary scholarship. One such study, Edward
Schiappa‘s Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (2003)
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treats Protagoras‘ contributions to rhetorical theory. Schiappa finds that although
Protagoras did not author a techné about rhetoric, he conceived the scope and function of
logos that laid the groundwork for the development of rhetoric. Although a unified
sophistic rhetoric cannot be ascertained due to the sophists‘ varied ideas and practices,
the sophists shared an inclination toward oral prose over poetry, as well as humanistic
logos over mythos. Therefore, Schiappa calls for individual studies of sophists to generate
a recovery of embryonic sophistic theories of rhetoric. Furthermore, this study grants
Protagoras the position as the first professional sophist to examine and critique epic
poetry and identifies Protagoras‘ teaching methods, namely a formal expository style,
dialogic interaction in small groups, and antithetical articulation of public positions.
Schiappa also concedes that Protagorean theory and practice of logos aimed at improving
individuals, thus departing from the traditional view of arête as a matter of noble birth or
wealth. Furthermore, the teachings of Protagoras held the ideological function of
advancing Periclean democracy and disputing aristocratic monism, as well as defending
consensual decision-making and providing a system to assist organized debate.
Nevertheless, Schiappa distinguishes between a theory of rhetoric proper and that of
logos, as evidenced by the title of his work, believing that they are not entirely the same.
Gorgias continues to be discussed. A particularly interesting contribution comes
from Bruce McComiskey‘s Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric (2002). The first part
of the work takes on the task of correcting Platonic misrepresentations of Gorgias and
offers a thorough reading of Gorgias‘ texts. The rest of the work covers ―neosophistic
appropriation,‖ identifying sophistic doctrines of use for contemporary issues in rhetoric
and composition. In the process, he considers the theory of rhetoric‘s epistemic relativism
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as a way to analyze the function of language in shaping of human knowledge. Further, he
identifies similarities in ―sophistic rhetorical traditions and modern philosophical
traditions‖ such as pragmatism, poststructuralism, and public discourse (66). Identifying
a third sophistic, he presents the feminist rhetoric of Susan Jarratt and the ―postmodern
sophistic critical attitude‖ of Victor Vitanza (73—75). McComiskey concludes with a
discussion of the implications of sophistic rhetoric and multiculturalism in the global
village.
Other studies on the sophists in general also continue to be published.
Patricia O‘Grady‘s The Sophists(2008) offers an excellent introduction to sophistry in a
collection of essays that treat the main sophists, as well as the theoretical issues and
historical context surrounding them. One of the contributors, Steven Robinson adds an
interesting take on the historical development of the sophists. Robinson offers an
example directly related to the most common origin story of rhetoric. He quotes Pindar,
who in the second of his Olympian Odes writes the following verses: ―Many swift arrows
have I crooked beneath my elbow in the quiver for speaking to those who understand; but
for the masses interpreters are required. Wise is the man with much inborn knowledge;
while those who learn by study, like a pair of greedy crows, spout indiscriminate chatter
compared to the divine bird of Zeus‖ (qtd. in S. Robinson 23). Robinson glosses Pindar
as claiming for himself ―a kinship in wisdom with his ‗target‘ audience, those who
understand his words (i.e., his ‗arrows‘) by means of their own inborn knowledge‖ (23).
Opposite these voices with ―inborn knowledge‖ we find ―lesser, competing voices,‖ who
should be ignored for they ―acquire their intelligence not by birth but by study (i.e., social
climbers)‖ (23). Compared to Pindar‘s self-appointed status as a ―‗divine‘ eagle,‖ the
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competitors are ―greedy, ugly and chattering . . . ‗crows,‘‖ a direct reference to Corax and
Tisias.

Mario Untersteiner and “Le origini sociali della sofistica”
Mario Untersteiner, a prolific and renowned Italian scholar of literature and history of
philosophy, spent his career publishing on a number of subjects for decades. Along with
Augusto Rostagni and Doro Levi, he ranks among the most authoritative voices of
international rhetoric in general and Italian rhetoric in particular. Although Untersteiner‘s
interests were wide-ranging, varying from religious to literary history and from philology
to philosophy, which became his predominant concern in the last years of his life, his
entire activity as a scholar rotates around a great central theme that constitutes its object
and instrument: reason, intelligence, or, to use the term in his classics, logos (Caizzi 39).
Furthermore, in his studies, the profound connection between myth and philosophy
emerge clearly (41). Despite the almost thirty years since Untersteiner‘s death in 1981,
his name remains cited regularly throughout the last two decades of the twentieth century
and still today. Most significant, his work on the Sophists plays a major role in the
scholarship devoted to this harangued group of individuals, and he ranks among the
authorities in regards to the sophists.
Untersteiner taught and studied the Greek world as a professor and scholar. His
first published interest was Parmenides in 1925. His attention in the 1930s and 1940s
then shifts to the history of literature, particularly Greek tragedy and religion. His studies
on Sophocles, Aeschylus, Pindar, and Plato culminate this phase with two volumes on the
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origins of tragedy and physiology of myth titled Le origini della tragedia (The Origins of
Tragedy, 1942) and La fisiologia del mito (The Physiology of Myth, 1946). In the 1940s,
Untersteiner became interested in the sophists. The first edition of I sofisti appeared in
1949, while the second was published in 1967. In the 50s and 60s, he published two
volumes collecting the fragments of Xenophanes and Paremenides; then his interest
shifted to Aristotle and returns to Plato. Influenced by German neo-humanism,
Untersteiner exulted classical ethics over Christian ones and the incitement to classical
studies as the antidote to every sort of spiritual deadening (Parente 36—37). Within his
own scholarship, I sofisti completes the path begun with La nascita della tragedia (The
Birth of Tragedy) and La fisiologia del mito , three autonomous but homogenous
moments of the progressive establishing of the rationality of logos and the
correspondence of this development with the explanation of the problems faced by the
Greeks in the apprehension of reality (Brancacci 100).
When the first Italian edition of I sofisti appeared in 1949, it did not include ―Le
origini sociali della sofistica,‖ which was added later. Aldo Brancacci explains in his ―I
sofisti di Mario Untersteiner‖ that ―Le origini‖ was conceived as the third and final part
of the work begun with La fisiologia del mito. Scholars agree that I sofisti is most likely
the most influential and famous among Untersteiner‘s works. To this day, it remains
among the most thorough and expansive treatments of the sophists. At the time of its
publication, I sofisti was the first full-scale treatment of the subject; despite the forty or so
years since its second publication, it remains extremely valuable to scholars and
laypeople. The English edition first appeared in 1954, translated by Kathleen Freeman.
To the best of my knowledge, the second Italian edition has never been translated.
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Aldo Brancacci delves into both The Sophists and the ―Le origini sociaili della
sofistica‖ in his ―I sofisti,‖ finding that the latter completes the oeuvre of Untersteiner‘s
scholarly work. Brancacci argues that La fisiologia del mito, published in 1946 confirms
the nexus that, already from these years, connects the studies on tragedy and myth to
sophistry (99). More specifically, the re-elaboration of the notion of myth in the poetry of
Pindar, the tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and the historiography of Herodotus is
succeeded by the epoch of solutions, realized by sophistry, which reinterprets the
mythical forms in light of the rationality of thought and language, bringing the implicit
tensions to bear (99). Brancacci argues that the three stops, La nascita della tragedia, La
fisiologia del mito, and I sofisti, constitute three autonomous but homogenous moments
of a single path turned towards reconstructing the successive stages in the progressive
establishment of the rationality of logos and to indicate, more precisely, the
corresponding of this development to the different modes of explanation of the problems
that the Greek (hu)man poses himself in the apprehension of the reality in front of
him/her (100).
In ―Mario Untersteiner: la fiducia nella ragione‖ (Mario Untersteiner: Faith in
Reason‖), Fernanda Caizzi explains Untersteiner‘s main interest in logos. Logos, one of
the most multifaceted and nuanced terms that contemporary rhetorical studies has
inherited from classical Greek thinking , has shifted in meaning throughout the millennia
since its first appearance. Drawing on the words of Untersteiner himself, Caizzi states
that his interest in the Greek world emerged from the Greek‘s merit in having made the
greatest attempt to justify to themselves and for themselves their own existence in the
world, an attempt that could best be understood by reconstructing the history of the
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emergence of logos in ancient thought (40). This attempt, however, should not be
understood primarily or exclusively as a history of the process of rationalization, even
though it occupies an important role; the studies that Untersteiner dedicates to the ancient
world propose to make evident the various and diverse moments of the exegesis of the
problems that the relation of humans with their reality generates (40). Never adopting a
materialistic interpretation in his explanations of the ancients, the formulation of his
research did not prevent any direction in his inquiries, particularly social and political, as
his essay ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ clearly demonstrates (40).
―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ (―The Social Origins of Sophistry‖) was
originally a lecture presented in Brussels on April 29th, 1949, and later at the Sorbonne,
on May 5th of the same year. The piece was subsequently added to the second edition of
The Sophists, which was also considerably revised from its previous release. As the title
explains, ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ explores those social events that brought
about and facilitated the appearance of sophistry. This supplementary treatment of a
subject Untersteiner explored in such depth adds a social element to rhetoric, the primary
subject taught by the sophists.

56

Chapter 3
Translation: “The Social Origins of Sophistry.”

[A well-known Italian maxim reminds translators, ―Il traduttore è un traditore‖ (―A
translator is a traitor‖). Because of the complications and problematic nature of
translation, I face the dilemma of any translator: fidelity to word translation or fidelity to
capturing the ―spirit‖ of the original. As Peter France clarifies, what matters is ―to
become aware of the way in which the translator, like the orator, negotiates between a
subject and an audience, seeking out a rhetoric adequate to the situation . . .
Communication is inescapably rhetorical; this is as true of translation as it is of public
speaking or letter-writing‖ (267—268). I preserve the original terminology wherever
possible. Nevertheless, certain nuances and connotations, with the aggravating
circumstance of time, will inevitably be lost in translation. ]

1. The Pentecontaetia as the Age of the Problems Posed by Social Life.
With the present research, one [the author] does not want to penetrate within the mystery
of the creative genius of all of the sophists. Their originality can be interpreted but never
completely relived in its mysterious development in anticipation of the insight that
created individual philosophical systems. Nevertheless, in the case of sophistry, it is
legitimate more than other [forms of] philosophy to attempt the discovery of a vision of
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particular movements not even specifically philosophical, but rather social that, which
appearing over the course of a very specific age, have brought forth a grouping of
problems and a wave of spiritual moments, / destined to inevitably lead to speculative
thought. Drawn by an irresistible attraction, the sophists throw a penetrating glance on
the turmoil of complex and various human ―experiences,‖ aiming to grasp the profound
sense of their role in the logical coherence of reality.1
As philosophers of ―experience,‖ the Sophists depend on social phenomena that,
in moments of crisis, impose persistent issues, and they seek out well-defined
resolutionary paradigms, without dismissing opposite interpretations from time to time.
That such a condition may have taken place is understood clearly when one remembers
the manner in which sophistry, more than any other philosophical school, must be
understood as the natural expression of a new consciousness that is ready to inform how
contradictory, and therefore tragic, reality is. One may very well claim that the formation
of sophistry was the consequence, in the speculative domain, also of an historical and
social situation that defined itself as a tangle of crises culminating during the
pentecontaetia and, in part, in the decades that preceded this period. Later, when the
Peloponnesian war erupted, the sense of all these crises became even clearer [538] within
its own terms and, therefore, became exacerbated toward a problematic situation that
might have seemed, and perhaps was, unsolvable.
Hellenic social life—especially the Attic one in which sophistic thought was able
to crystallize—was subjected, from the beginning of the fifth century BCE and with an

1

For the sophists as philosophers of ―experiences,‖ see my present treatment I Sofisti, which will be cited
as Sofisti.
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accelerated movement after the Persian wars, to / continuous subversions due to new
events. If it is true that the Hellenes did not know the modern concept of society, wrapped
up as they were in the constraints of the limitations of a relational contrast between the
―many‖ and the individual,2 and if it is true that, unaware of the idea of history as
evolution, they saw ―within current affairs a social awareness in contrast with the social
state similar to nature,‖3 we must nonetheless recognize that social life, not yet translated
into scientific awareness, precisely in the fifth century began to form as an operating
reality. In fact, the physical barriers between separate tribes and people come to fall
definitely, and more or less directly into the relationships [as they] began forming
between these social entities.4
Imagine: the closed circles of the impenetrable and autonomous unity of the noble
families, whose fracture in Attica had begun with Draco and with Solon, are definitely
torn apart only immediately after the age of the thirty tyrants, when collective
responsibility in terms of penal law is condemned, so as to recognize instead the full
freedom of the individual, who within the new deeper and more human5 social kinship is
united with every other equal citizen.6 However, evidently, over the course of the
century, at the benefit of the critical spirit, the war had continued between the political
solidarity, by now triumphant, and that of the noble families, hard to perish.7 / One must
also think of the commerce that, in this century, ―contributed to overcoming the isolation
2

Cp. M. POHLENZ, Der hellenische Mensch, Göttingen, 1947, p. 107.
CHIAPPELLI, Sof., pp. 18—19.
4
Cp. L. T. HOBHOUSE, Sociology, in J. Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, XI, p. 654 b,
which considers these factors as essential for the study of society.
5
Therefore, the Athenians insistently prided themselves of their θιλανθπωπία: cp. A. CROISET, Les
démocraties antiques, Paris, 1920, p. 133.
6
G. GLOTZ, Histoire grecque, II (1931), pp. 136 ff.; II (1936), p. 72.
7
L. GERNET et A. BOULANGER, Les genie grec dans la religion, Paris, 1932, pp. 289—290.
3
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of the poleis opening the way to the formation of more ample economic unities,‖8 apt to
establish, due to their own depth of relationships, the rise of an attitude of inquiry and
judgment9; furthermore, all this movement, with the enabling of an always greater influx
of Metics, expanded and universalized, through the rich spiritual contribution that they
brought,10 the horizon of culture, even if the Hellenics, more due [538] to national
prejudice than for sentimental repugnance against different origins,11 ended up stalling,
for the most part, in the face of the decisive step of internationalism, too dominated as
they were by the pride of their own spiritual superiority. Also, this limitation established
an ulterior deficiency in the sociology of the Hellenics.12 However, those bastions that in
the political domain were meant to be conserved crumbled rather rapidly due to the
problems of thought.
A political event that occurred over the course of the fifth century had a
determining importance within social life and wielded, as will be clarified later on, a
decisive influence on the laying out of the problems confronted by sophistry. The
aristocracy, as a specific political phenomenon, ends in many areas even though it does
not perish intestate, since it will renew itself / in the oligarchies. However, right around
the middle of the century, the breakdown of the Boeotian independence, at least until
Chaeronea, causes a crisis that sweeps the entire aristocracy and that is particularly
significant because it was suffered by Pindar,13 so that a political event became a spiritual

8

G. DE SANCTIS, Storia dei Greci, Florence, 1939, II, p. 162.
Cp. MÜHL, Mensch., 1928, p. 12; GOMPERZ, Pens., II, pp. 167.
10
Cp. GLOTZ, Hist. gr., note, II, p. 256.
11
A. DILLER, Race, Mixture among the Greeks before Alexander, University of Illinois, 1937, p. 157.
9

12

Op. cit., p. 18.

13

Cp. SCHMID, Lit., I, pp. 573—574, and H. GUNDERT, Pindar und sein Dichterberuf, Frankfurt a. M.,
1935, p. 48. It is good to keep in mind that, if the crumbling of the aristocracy in Boeotia has a

60

problem.14 The Homeric ideal is no longer current if not through a critical and dramatic
transformation that, glimpsed by Pindar, inclined to interpret the past profoundly, and is
driven to extreme consequences by the open-mindedness of the sophists, whose glance
wants to comprehend in a primary way the present turmoil.
When one world sets and another one rises, souls are lost not only in thought but
also in action. The spiritual unity of a Solon or a Peisistratus is over forever. One need
only recall the Thucydidean representation of the pentecontaetia, during the development
of which, with respect to society, two moments mark themselves as decisive: the problem
of the human character and that of constitutions, a sign of a typical attitude of
correspondent people.
In the first place, the two figures of Pausanias and of Themistocles fill the scene
of the pentecontaetia much more than what Thucydides materially renders. To Pausanias
[539], the historian informs us, ―it was by now insufferable to adapt his life to the brakes
of tradition,‖15 / so he plotted to accomplish something that had to surpass the normal
political categories of the Hellenics.16 Therefore, his collusion with Persia became
without a doubt a fault, although it corresponded to a political plan later carried out by
Lysander,17 and analogously Themistocles, who went to Persia to the new king Ardashir
I, [and] was tried, evidently for anti-Spartan politics that had to be carried out later by

paradigmatic value for us, the political phenomenon is not isolated since, even earlier, it had manifested
itself in the western Greece and in the Peloponnesian, especially in Argos and Ilia: cp. GLOTZ, Hist. gr,
cit., II, p. 123, and H. SCHAEFER, Staatsform und Politik, Leipzig, 1932, p. 152.
14
Cp. JAEGER, Paid., I, pp. 291—294, 317—318.
15
THUC., I, 130 (transl. Sgroi).
16
THUC., I, 130, 2: …ά ηη γνώμη μειζόνωρ ερ έπειηα έμελλε παξειν. For the interpretation of μειζόνωρ, see
THUKYDIDES erkl. Von J. Classen, I. Bd. Bearb. Von J. Steup, Berlin, 1919, ad. L.
17
G. DE SANCTIS, St. gr. Cit., II, pp. 54—55.
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Conon.18 Thucydides, despite not being able to defend Themistocles, nonetheless
foresees this in full clarity: ―by natural intuition . . . with very brief reflection penetrated
deeply the contemporary events, and commendably divined the consequence of the
distant future.‖19 However, from the entire narration of Thucydides we feel, more than an
exhaustive historical judgment, the agonizing and astonished impression that the
Hellenics felt in the face of those two so enigmatic characters. After all, even though
Thucydides does not confront the problem, the figure of Cimon must not have appeared
less complex, even according to those who admired him.20 One might say that in this
epoch all the great characters had to have appeared as hardly understandable as they
submitted themselves to the judgment of the crowd, because in the new age the human
spirit took on much more complex attitudes than in the past.21 / This was the effect none
other than of a social life so rich of elements that had to have repercussions upon the
inner being of the single individuals.
The two opposing speeches—that pronounced by the Corinthians on the occasion
of the Congress of Sparta, held immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War, and that
of the Athenians unfolding before the Spartans22— meant especially that, by this point,
the constitution and social impact of a people, mutually influencing each other, resolve

18

G. DE SANCTIS, ΑΣΘΙ, Storia della republica ateniese, Turin, 1912, pp. 396—397.
THUC., I, 138. 3.
20
Critias DK 88 B 8 and 52
21
This can be said, for example, also of Aristides (cp. DE SANCTIS, ΑΣΘΙ, cit., p. 390 and previous
pages) and especially Pericles: recall the contrasting judgments that his contemporaries formulated of him.
To have an overall view, apt to feel the problematic of the great figures of the pentecontaetia, one can see
in Plato‘s Gorgias, where they presented themselves in their hardly resolvable complexity, which transpires
also within the words of Plato, who, though condemning these men of the past, appears to be almost
obsessed by them: cp. PLAT., Gorg., 503 C, 515 C, 519 C.
22
THUC., I, 67—71; 72—78. An interesting passage should be recalled from the VIII letter of Plato (355
D), which states that having saved Hellas from the barbarians brought, as a result, to the possibility of
constitutional discussions.
19
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themselves in spiritual unity. But, in addition, the socio-political organism turns out to be
the fruit of complex encounters brought about by a more lively dramatic existence of the
Hellenic ―city‖ so that it [the socio-political organism], taken in itself, forms an
unsolvable problem in view of every other. [540]
One must, therefore, recognize in the age of the pentecontaetia a perennially
renovated encounter of social events that, already because often for the first time they
become apparent with such decisiveness, they soon transform themselves into problems
that bring about the formulation of new ideas, new political and philosophical systems
with the aim of suggesting possible solutions simultaneously.23

2. The Crisis of the Aristocracy Determines a New Spirituality in the Hellenic
World.24
A. The Idea of Community and its Gnoseological Consequences.
Even the Hellenic aristocracy, as all the great human manifestations, fixed their thought
in the most systematic and durable way, when the time of its decline had already been
marked. The same would happen, one century later, for the polis that found in Plato and
Demosthenes its most comprehensive interpreters.
The commemoration of certain ideas, that have established the eternal power of
the aristocracy, will turn out to be particularly important in light of determining the main
23

Regarding the fifth century as an epoch that poses problems, and having posed them, resolves them, see
also what I had occasion to clarify in Mito, pp. 240—242; 300.
24
CORBATO, Sof. pol., p.3: ―a confirmation to what we have believed to find regarding the relationship
between Sophists and the aristocracy, we believe can be found in the . . . ―Social origins of sophistry‖ by
Untesteiner, which seems exactly of great importance for the clarification of these connections and to
highlight the genesis of some ideas of the sophists.‖ Corbato has, moreover, had the credit of confirming
my thesis, observing, with rich documentation, how there had been a close and continuous relationship
between oligarchs and sophists: these were often the teachers of those (cp. op. cit., pp. 4, 15—16; 20, 36—
37).
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causes for the formation of that social substrate, from which came a necessary orientation
for sophistry.
In the figure of the aristocratic person and in his relationship with \ the
community one establishes a completely unusual gnoseological situation. In fact, one can
say that, on the one hand, the aristocrat requires the envy expressed from those below
him to highlight his autonomous happiness,25 while on the other, bound as he is to the
judgment of his fellow citizens, he finds difficulty to ―transcend too extensively the
normal limits of existence.‖26 This fluctuation of man between creative autonomy and
submission to a collective entity is truly decisive: the regulated life, the by now firmly
definite customs establish the limits on desire / and, therefore, to the free self-actualizing
of individuals.27 When the aristocracy began to lose energy and finally crumble, man as
gnoseological and ethical entity became a problem. Sappho, when she sings: [541] ―some
say a army of horsemen / some say a host of foot-soldiers on the black / earth, is the most
beautiful thing, I say / whatever one loves,‖28 displays how a type of loss had pervaded,
in Mytilene, the aristocratic world, when it felt the vanishment of the ―ancient social
order, that was based on solid values, free from any doubt,‖ so that man found himself
swept away by a kind of relativism,29 in nearly a renunciation of proudly dominating the
whole world, according to a sound principle. When the noble truths of aristocratic ethics,
which imposed a course of action, vanish, then, in front of the possibility of setting out to
attain and attaining any goal, the will goes wild, free by now of restraints: so Solon,
25

Cp. PIND., Ol., VI, 6—7; Phyth., I, 85, VII, 19 ff. Ecc., AESCH., Ag., 937—939.
MAX WUNDT, Geschichte der griechischen Ethik, Leipzig, 1908, I, p. 82. Cp. EUR., Ion, 602—604.
27
Op. cit., I, p. 86.
28
Fr. 27 a, 1—4 D (transl. Romagnoli).
29
Cp. HERMANN FRÄNKEL, Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentum, München 1962, pp.
211—213.
26
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Pindar, and Aeschylus create the theodicies,30 so that, as in the case of public opinion,
individual liberty contrasted the barrier of a universal concept. This problem of the
constructive will presents itself as hardly solvable: so states implicitly the aristocratic
Theognis when he cites this epigram from Delos making it his own: ―The loveliest thing
is justice. Of everything health is most valuable, / the happiest is to win one‘s love.‖31
Against the barrier of the justice, which / the aristocracy attempts to elevate to give unity
to the manifold manifestations of existence, the author of these verses uncovers, without
stating it explicitly, the power of the will that comes to be arranged on the same level of
the absolute, normative principle. Man, therefore, during the crisis of the aristocratic age
vacillates between the seduction of the individual impulse and the ambition towards a
universal ethical principle, so that the conquest of personal originality represents a
slippery problem within a conscious achievement.
For the aristocratic world, especially at the time of the decline, the most
immediate ambition vibrates in the awareness of efficacy that emanates from eternal
ideas.32 First of all, the two fundamental political principles, αιδώρ [aidos,
reverence/respect] and δικη, [dike, justice/theodicy], generic concepts more than
anything, constitute the basis of aristocratic society,33 as appears clearly from Theognis
that opposes them to the laws, to the νόμοι, [nomoi, laws/customs],34 both of which had

30

Cp. SCHMID, Lit., IV, p. 458.
This Δηλιακόν έπίγπαμμα, cited by ARIST., Eth. N., 1, 9, 1099 to 25, is in THEOGN., 255—256 (transl.
Romagnoli).
32
Recall D. M. ROBINSON, Pindar a Poet of Eternal Ideas, Baltimore, 1936.
33
Cp. SCHMID, Lit., IV, pp. 524, 531, 557, 559, 560, note 2. For αίδώρ, cp. also G. GLTOZ, Études
socials et juridiques sur l’antiquité grecque, Paris, 1906, p. 21.
34
THEOGN., 291-292; cp. vv. 937—938. Citing Theognis, one disregards, in the present research, the
matter of authenticity, importing only the testimony of a certain current of thought. After all, it was
observed, almost all the elegies of the anthology ―date back to a rather ancient age, that is to say none
31
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become the password of the common people.35 [542] Far richer is the concept of
―harmony,‖ insistently proclaimed in the aristocratic society, which abhors war,36 to rise
towards the Pan-Hellenic idea, that Pindar heard from his earliest years, as appears in the
tenth Pythian Ode of 498 BCE, and / that he continually affirmed,37 in conformity, after
all, with the spirit of Hellenic aristocratic families, that—still at the time of Thucydides—
felt so connected to one other, in order to exceed the limits of the polis.38 Not
surprisingly, then, in the domain of aristocratic ideas one encounters the spiritual
motivation and attitude of the θιλανθπωπία [philanthropia, philanthropy/love of honor],
destined to hold great importance in the Attic world.39 In the legislation of Charondas
(around the middle of the sixth century), that was of aristocratic character,40 one notices
the imprinted disposition of θιλανθπωπία, as noted in ancient sources.41 One must, then,
recognize a certain value to the Theognidean testimonies, which exhort to forgive the
errors of others,42 according to the spirit of θιλανθπωπία.
The social foundation of these ideas can be considered their distinguishing note
insofar as they implant themselves on the premise of a collective experience that becomes
an abstract concept. The constitution of Charondas seems to offer ulterior proof with
established law so that all the citizens would learn to read and write with paid teachers of

appears very much earlier than the fifth century‖ (THÉOGNIS, Poèmes élégiaques, texte établi et traduit
par Jean Carrière, Paris, 1948, p. 13).
35
V. EHRENBERG, Recht., p. 117.
36
Cp. THEOGN., 761 ff., 755 ff.; PIND., frr. 109-110 = 120 Turyn.
37
G. CURTIUS, Storia greca (Italian transl.), II, p. 53; cp. GUNDERT, op. cit., pp. 77, 85.
38
Cp. H. BERVE, Thukydides, Frankfurt a. M., pp. 3—4, 41, 53; cp. U. WILAMOWITZ, Glaube, II, p.
129.
39
Cp. G. GLOTZ, Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminal en Grèce, Paris, 1904, p. 423.
40
E. CIACERI, Storia della Magna Grecia, Milano ecc., Vol. II, 1927, p. 42.
41
DIOD., XII, 16, 1—2. For the historicity of the norm within the cited passage, cp. G. BUSOLT,
Griechische Geschichte, Gota, 1893, I, p. 428.
42
THEOGN., 323—328.
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the city.43 The measure corresponds perfectly to that of Lycurgus, / who had wanted an
education of the state and not that of privates44: it was ―an education for the state and by
the state; it was a principle into agreement with the general tendency of aristocratic
society‖ and, undoubtedly, in opposition to individualism.45
The recognition seems granted, then, namely that in the aristocratic society there
was a spiritual structuring that brought to the definition of a collective entity, expressing
the eternal—and therefore ideal—essence of man.
Such a ―collective entity‖ that, as a positive act, belongs, certainly, to all the
epochs and all the locations, for the Hellenics of this age, makes up an element of great
significance, [543] because it subsists as a creative force and, at a time, as limit: it is a
point of inspiration for the thought that perceives the possibility of transferring it [the
collective entity] in the domain of the universal; it [the collective entity] is nonetheless a
restraint to the freedom of the individual, who wants to establish himself in absolute
autonomy and originality of the person. The community appears, then, as a spiritual fact
that awaits interpretation.

43

DIOD., XII, 112, 5; for the interpretation of the passage and for the plausibility of the information, see
Ciaceri, op. cit., II, pp. 42—44.
44
XEN, Resp. Lac., II, 2; PLUT., Lyc,. 17.
45
J. LUCCIONI, Les idées politiques et socials dé Xénophon, Ophrys s. a. (ma 1948), p. 145. The character
of Hellenic teaching, greatly less individualistic compared to the modern one, was elucidated very well by
NESTLE, Eur., p. 188: ―the student learns from the teacher, welcomes from him the artistic and poetic
technique and therefore certain forms of representation constitute themselves, in which the individual does
not have to take on changes and can introduce very little of his individuality. . . This is in relation with the
fact that the Greek gives immense value to theoretical knowledge: that which was recognized as just, the
form, in which the representation found a satisfactory expression, is conserved, and subsequently does not
concern itself as much with new creations as with reproductions certainly surely perfected by an already
conquered type.‖
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After all, one can observe that the aristocracy provided a decisive contribution, as
evidenced by its religiosity, to the consciousness of the community, although it is a
phenomenon, as will be shown later, / not limited to the aristocracy. Well-known is that
the god particularly close to Pindar was the Delphic oracle,46 the god who, for the period
under study—the end of the sixth century and beginning of the fifth—, becomes the
representative, through its oracle, of the conservative and antidemocratic currents.47 One
comprehends how the Theban poet, interpreter of the political and ethical ideal of the
aristocracy, was persuaded to impress the seal of Apollonism upon its entire thought.48
The god of Delphi always operated with an eye on peace among men and gods, attainable
when the former act according to justice,49 so that the latter become ethical powers.50
However, next to this universalistic conception of religion, according to which the single
gods have a tendency to become ethical concepts of all-encompassing validity, one must
note the Delphic idea of the hero51 directed in the same sense. The interpretation that
Pindar gives of it corresponds to the clarification of a religious idea, particularly
widespread among Hellenics. The poet, proclaiming that the gods and men draw life and
breath from the same mother (Ne., VI, 1 ff.), does not signify anything other than that the
gods are the archetypes of men, although different. In the consciousness of the separation
that intercedes between the ideal world and its reflection in the perceivable kind, man
comes to comprehend how ―the crowning of life, that even the mortal / being can earn, is
the memory of his virtues. Not his person, but, what is more, the spirit of his perfections
46

Cp. L. R. FARNELL, The Works of Pindar, London, 1932, II, p. 462.
Cp. C. LANZANI, L’Oracolo delfico, Genoa etc., 1940, p. 36.
48
Op. cit., p. 38.
49
MARTIN P. NILSSON., Griech. Rel., pp. 617—618.
50
M. POHLENZ, Der hellenische Mensh, Göttingen, 1947, pp. 54—55.
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and creations wins death and from generation to generation flies eternally young in [544]
singing, since only form belongs to the reign of the eternal.‖52 The figures of the winners
in the agons celebrated by Pindar end up being, in reality, no longer persons but ―types‖
that would represent a particular aspect of human life;53 so from this Apollonian
religiosity, emanation of aristocratic society, that very ―type‖ that ―is at one time a
universal beyond the individual and a detail among other types‖54comes to be exalted as
an eternal value. That which counts for the men of the age of the poet, still enlightened by
the aristocratic ideal, is true also for the heroes of myth.55 This perpetuity of the idea, by
which the individual can perfect himself in the universality of the type, since his
immortal being will actualize in the eternal glory of the surname and, therefore, in his
descendents,56 corresponds, precisely, ―to the faith of society, for which Pindar wrote his
poems and to which he belongs, and of the families that we can say detain the power in
all the Doric cities and even in Athens really govern public matters, at the time in which
he spent the period of his studies.‖57 That universal that is the aristocratic parentage
(γένορ, bloodline/patronage) / reveals itself as an idea, in which, moreover, hums the
dichotomy—felt in the Theognidian verses quoted above—of the individual and of that
community seen as a general entity. But, in the spirituality of the political life of the
aristocracy, the latter prevailed, for its nature brought to break every barrier and embrace
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multiplicity into unity,58 as is evident even by the inclination that this society
demonstrated toward pan-Hellenism.
However, Pindar—despite the universality of this ―type,‖ despite the absolute
ideas that circulated at his time such as αιδώρ (aidos, reverence), δίκη (dike, justice),
θιλανθπωπια (philanthropia, philanthropy), and ομονια (omonia, harmony of mind/onemindedness) and others, with which one sought to hamper, by means of ideas, the
indomitable natural complexity of experiences59—perceives notwithstanding something
crucial in the essence of human personality. Man, according to his Pindar‘s thought, must
perform the ability not exactly of seeming good, but of knowing how to impose being
good with undisputed vividness: that which matters for man is πειπα (peira or
experience) (cp., for example, Ne., III, 70, etc), and πόνορ (ponos or effort) (for example,
Ol., XI, 4; Pyth., [545] VIII, 73), so that he can, up against anything and depending on
the various occasions, enact his own dominion (μέηπον [measure, due measure,
proportion]: cp. Ol., XIII, 47—48; Pyth., II, 24; Isth., VI, 71) .60 Therefore, one could
say, and with good reason, that [the] ―arête,‖ according to this conception of the poet,
could not be enacted until it remained within the confines of the aristocratic world, since
the individual, / to be, must act on his own, ―even without the support of a community.‖61
This structuring of a huge social problem, which had formulated itself as the
antithesis community-individual, whose terms interfere among each other with reciprocal
critical aggressiveness, manifests itself truly definitively throughout the entire fifth
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century, during which, the two moments, in the process of clarifying themselves to
maintain their supremacy at the end of the dialectic scale of the real, struggle with
evermore intense drama.
Perhaps one may be surprised that the aristocratic world starts the dominant note
of a civilization—that of the fifth century—which in Athens, where it must converge and
centralize itself, takes on the character of a democratic light that often projects itself
beyond the narrow confines of Attica. However, this appears completely logical. Only
beginning in the age of Marathon a new civilization slowly begins to form,62 one that has
to create its own values and interpret the already existing ones. One cannot, of course,
imagine that a world of original imprint can develop out of nothing, especially in Greece,
that reached its most daring accomplishments rising above tradition. After all, through
representatives such as Theognis and Pindar, it has been possible to ascertain the power
of thought within a politically won social milieu. However, this is the typical way of
defeat: to prompt violent reactionary comebacks, as occurred in Greece, there where the
aristocracy managed to conserve itself,63 or to stir up fertile reflection. Not surprisingly,
despite the innovative currents, the population was inclined to loyalty toward ancient
traditions and to recognize the superiority and the ability of the aristocracy as guides for
the people.64 The idea of equality, despite its seductiveness, did not appear commensurate
to reality; the power [546] of capital, though significant, did not have the same value as
the ancient classes. For this reason, ―the aristocracy conserved its influence for a long
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time, even when its rights had been eliminated.‖65 One reached, then, a paradoxical
situation, so that the aristocrats on one side became the heads of the democracy,66 while
on the other they continued to operate as an official party and in secret societies.67 The
observation seems accurate, then, that the rising democracy ―does not democratize an
ousted aristocracy, but rather, on the contrary, feudalizes itself; that is to say that with its
political advent it identifies itself with the full mindset and in all the forms of life of the
ousted aristocracy. The new society is . . . aristocratic with an expanded circle of
privileged individuals.‖68
The concept of ―community,‖ with all the gnoseological consequences, conserves
and expands itself from the aristocratic spirituality, in the experience of the democratic
epoch.
The conception of unity, in blood, of all the members of a lineage (γένορ [genos,
bloodline/patronage]) persists, despite the political decline of the aristocracy, but
undergoes a transformation: the relationship of man with his γένορ extends to the entire
population, in which one blood lives: ―the community to which one belongs / by birth,
gives the content of life. One is what one is by birth‖; the physis is the primal essence of
man. ―The conception of aristocratic ethics survives, even if birth, as the origin of a
certain γένορ, loses its significance.‖69 The universal condition replaces the universal
Delphic and aristocratic ethics.70
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The upper classes and the political privileges, even under the influence of the
Peloponnesian war, gradually disappear in favor of the vaster unity of the polis.71 The
Athenian population feels that it constitutes a homogenous and—therefore—universal
entity: it preoccupies itself with making prevail that which corresponds to the common
utility72: all together the citizens ―have a fair amount of common sense; and, men of
judgment being among these, under their influence act well and benefit thus to the city . .
. But the individuals, taken each for himself, are not [547] able to judge righteously.‖73
To an historian, such as Aristotle, both the universal value of community and the problem
of the individual possibilities appear clearly in the polis. During the pentecontaetia—and
especially in the period in which Athens prepares to conquer its empire—―one could say
that only one will animates Athens foreign policy . . . The collective ambition of the
population is sufficiently vast so as not to be surpassed by any individual conception‖74;
in the age Pericles ―neither the state will have / to fear individual selfishness nor the
individual protected by the constitution will have to fear the will of the state.‖75 The law
is an expression of the collective reason,76 which gives it [the law] validity,77 and—then
again—from it receives the mark of universality.78 For this reason, Thucydides often cites
speeches of a community—the Corinthians, the Corcyrians, the Athenians, the Melians,
etc—that are certainly not among the least important of his history.79 For Thucydides the
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community is a physis80 that suggests to its own activity a purpose with logic as much
subjective as objective,81 and in which it finds exactly the guarantee of its own
universality.
Less vast collective entities establish themselves, such as are the activities of
those who exercise a trade, the common voice of the many, and many judges of the Elis,
or Eleia, etc., within this community, fastened by a lively sense of universal religiosity82
that no longer distinguishes between national gods and those of foreigners, as
demonstrated also by the attitude of the Delphic oracle.83
In exchange for this preeminence of the ―common interest,‖ one perceives that it
ends up toning down individualism.84 But the bitterness of the political struggles and the
violence of the passions once again pose / the difficult problem of individualism that, by
another way, found a difficulty, a shadow laid by a universal idea to impede every
autonomous gesture.85 The antithesis community-individual represents itself in all of its
urgency in the age of democracy.
The war—a particularly effective social phenomenon as stimulus of ideas (more
on this later)—at [548] the time of the Persian battles, presented the problem of the
responsibility of the individual toward his / her people, without coming to an open
contrast between state and individual; this [the individual], even though truly odd, was
rejected once again the universality of that [the state].86 Nevertheless the individual
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existed in all of its original autonomy: I have already mentioned how all those men
characteristic of the medical wars were problematic.87 One feels the complexity of being
human and, in the past, influenced by that universal which is the community of the polis,
one preferred submerging the individual in an intimate versatility but an almost
anonymous one; a versatility that would be a general attribute of man. Aeschylus, for
example, completely dominated by the idea of the polis, is not interested in knowing and
enabling others to know the name of the Hellenic hero or heroes that were glorious at
Salamis, while he worries about emphasizing the power of human astuteness (Pers., 355
ff.), the figure of the πολύηποπορ, [polutropos, broadly a cunning person or one who
knows many ways of expressing the same thing], that, immediately after Homer, was felt
as something specifically Hellenic, as the essence of this ―type.‖88 Therefore, / that which
the social phenomenon ―war‖ allows to break in within life, comes to be dominated and
diminished by the socio-political phenomenon which blocks the individual impulse
stretched out toward a constructive freedom in order to absorb it in its own generic
universality. In this way the individual stops himself at the limitation of the ―type.‖ Even
in the second half of the fifth century, Athenian democracy, in defense of the principle of
equality, suspects prominent people,89 whose marked individualism comes to be aimed at
by comic poets, such as Phrynichus and Aristophanes.90 If one then fixes his/her gaze on
a few decisive moments of the Peloponnesian war, s/he will see that these [moments], for
their universal aspect, had to bring in the masses, absorbed by the monotony of a
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problem, to the creation of collective states of mind that ended up concretizing
themselves in typical characters. The plague of Athens raises from the mystery of
consciousness the amoral selfish type; the facts of Corcyra identify the ambitious and
unbridled passionate type; the episode of the vandalizing of the hermai delineates the
superstitious type. In general, the game of personal interests, of [549] partisan or class
grudges, breaks the moral unity of the homeland, which had been enacted at the time of
the Persian wars,91 and creates those typical characters that, venting in impulses, halt the
free conquest of the character.
It has been said that the ―type‖ corresponds to one of the essential manifestations
of the aristocratic spirituality. We can specify and complete this historical element noting
the way in which the more intense and exasperated the turmoil of the political conflict,
the more easily it ends up in the creation of certain typical and characteristic figures. One
can say that this corresponds to a necessary social law. If, in fact, it was observed,
sociology suggests friendship and cooperation, which in effect take place in relationships
between men; in reality, then, these ―are mixed with hostile or indifferent processes and
feelings.‖ Even these are social facts. Therefore, ―envy, enmity, spite, and every lack of
good will—the social and antisocial elements in the strict sense of the word—
unfortunately pertain to the study of social facts in the broadest sense.‖92 Social life
attracts, therefore, all the interest on human typology because through its aspects, the
principal forces that act in the complex world of humanity define themselves. And,
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specifically, these forces are dominated by the conflicting polarity of good and evil,
which manifested itself particularly effectively in the Greece of the end of the century.93
In this way, from the social typology of the aristocratic environment,94 which
formed out of the crash between good and evil (recall the contrast between κακοί [kakoi,
lowborn] and αγαθοί [agathoi, aristocrat] right in the political thought of Theognis and
his fellow party-members), one moves on to an analogous typology that had to define
itself within the turmoil of the political struggles of the second half of the fifth century,
without substantial / psychological and gnoseological differences, even if the historical
terms had transformed themselves or even reversed compared to what had occurred
during the course of the age of Theognis. The intrusiveness of the social fact with its
natural laws at the expense of the unrepeatable originality of the individual reflects itself
remarkably precisely on the literary manifestations that place individuals as themes of
their own representation. Therefore, one [550] has been able to see a ―virtual identity of
every will‖ as characteristic in the characters of Herodotus95; an idea or a type in those of
Sophocles;96 and something analogous for those in Euripides97 so in this age the overall
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concept of ‗character‖ does not seem to have been reached, even if the elements that
constitute it are identified.98
To philosophy ―the infinite variety of beings and of individual phenomena,
coexistent in space and succeeding one another in time,‖ the ―live awareness . . . of the
indomitableness of every single being and of every single conclusion to any other‖ had
appeared so certain that they had to draw out of this statement ―the concept of the infinite
number,‖ the idea ―of the infinite quantities of the differentiations.‖99 However, the social
experience, so urgent in such an age of wars and internal contrasts, did not grant the
possibility of a corresponding and constructive close examination. The universal and the
individual both misfire, so as to / have to truly conclude that the issues of spirituality
according the aristocratic world are, yes, clarified, but still not surpassed.

B. Community and Individual in the Theories of the Sophists.
The philosophy of the sophists can be considered as the speculative mirror of these social
forms of the human spirit, for which it demonstrates a particular historical sensibility and
in front of which it creates a philosophic and systematic interpretation.
One should take a look at the doctrine of Protagoras100: for this sophist the
persistent experience of the contradictions between type and individual, between
universal man and particular man correspond to a fact which constitutes a problem that
needs to be resolved urgently. He, always so sensitive to the social and political
phenomenon, as is evidenced in his relations with Pericles, by his activity as legislator,
98
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by the particular accent given to the πολιηική απεηή [politike arête, political virtue],
intended as virtue par excellence, ends up establishing a dialectic of human gnoseology
[551] according to the terms laid down by social reality. Man, he says, insofar as ―ruler of
all experience‖ πάνηων σπημάηων μέηπον [measure of all things] (80 B 1), manages to
gain for himself individually the knowableness of the real, which can also be
contradictory. This rift, which is always possible in the entanglement of phenomena and
brings about immense differences between one individual and another, can be placated,
by means of a release of the relativistic phenomenalism of the individual. This occurs
when the wise person succeeds in transforming experiences lacking in / value for the
individual into others that result and are endowed with value,101 since he knows how to
―reduce the minor opportunity of knowledge into a major opportunity of knowledge.‖102
This wise person who, depending on the case, can be a physician, farmer, orator, sophist,
etc., because he provokes such a gnoseological process, becomes the representative of
that interest of the community,103 sum of individuals of a certain category, that finds itself
unified, gnoseologically speaking, by a coincidence of relative knowableness of a
determinate experience. Therefore, only collective man, man in general—the ―type‖—is
able to perfect the knowableness of the experiences in the interest of the single
individual. Hence, in the evolution of civilization, the condition of perfection is reached
when the life of the polis is held up by δίκη [dike, justice] and αιδώρ [aidos, respect]
101
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(ethical motivations also of the aristocratic spirituality!),104 which consists of the
universal πολιηική ήπεηή [politke arête, political virtue] and that reduces to unity the
single individuals. Therefore, all the manifestations of life, for Protagoras, are
constrained in the pattern of a universal leveling concept.
As for the aristocratic situation, transformed by the contemporary socio-political
activity, Protagoras innovates because he reduces to an organic system that which was
earlier a compound of scattered and instinctive experiences,105 translating into a
philosophic concept defined as ―major possibility for knowledge‖ ([κπείηηων λόγορ
Regarding or About Loss]) that which /was a social phenomenon: the annihilation of the
individual interest into the collective one.106
One can say that the philosophic and rationalistic idea of community constitutes
the fundamental problem also for many [552] other sophists: here we find ομόνοια
[omonoia, like-mindedness], the ―concord‖ of Antiphon; the cosmopolitanism of the very
Antiphon and that of Hippias, even more profound in the theorizing of the unity of
individuals, whose concrete actions resolve themselves in the universality of κοινοί νόμοι
[koinoi nomoi, common traditions/laws]107; the conception of the laws as universal fact
and, therefore, identical for everyone, evident in the moment in which the individual
physis recognizes itself an essential and a universal physis,108 according to the author of

104

PLAT, Prot., 320 C – 322 D = DK 80 C 1.
The coherence, dialectically constructed, of the Protagorean system may more fully emerge from the
whole chapter regarding Protagoras more than from the present ideas.
106
Cp. PARETO, op. cit., § 572, p. 241; see also § 253, p. 119.
107
An. Iambl., 7, 15 (= DK 89). The Anonymus Iamblichi is to be identified with Hippias; see MARIO
UNTERSTEINER, An. I. Accepting my interpretation C. DEL GRANDE Hybris, Naples 1947, p. 524.
108
For all this, see Sophists, ch. XVIII, § 5.
105

80

the anonymous treatise Περί νόμων [About Traditions/Laws/Customs].109 This
rationalistic solution, naturally, had to have been in conflict with all the difficulties that
universal concepts entail and, given its origin, against the reality that did let itself be
reduced to such a conceptual uniformity: this is perceived particularly by Lycophron,
who had to have reliably critiqued the idea so as to disown every possible ethics;
therefore the collective unity of men is an ideal, more than a reality.110
Similarly, for sophistry the individual appears as a type rather than an individual /
passable to infinite differentiations: therefore sophistry deals with typical characterology
that, in reality, is always a manifestation of the universal: the ambitious,111 the envious,112
the slanderer,113 etc. And particularly noteworthy is the fact that Hippias, who seems to
have deliberately confronted the problem of character,114 has been able to disentangle it
from the constant and dialectical polarity of good and evil,115 as after all does Prodicus,
whose Heracles forms himself spiritually between the contrast of the opposite tendencies
of good and evil.116 Of particular importance, the circumstance that the genetic process of
the character-type according to the two sophists is provoked precisely by that antithesis
good and evil, from whose turmoil, even if under a distinctly political type, had sprouted
the typology of the aristocratic spirituality.
109
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Nevertheless, one can say, for all sophists it is the will factor that determines the
character of the individual. Of course, this [will factor] happens in the most disparate
ways: according to Protagoras the greater possibility for knowledge, the κπείηηων λόγορ
[kreitton logos, stronger/better argument], shapes, with an act of universal will, the
ethical values for human community; for Gorgias the moment of decision confirms the
[553] culminating point of individual action; the same is to be said for Prodicus; Critias,
then, characterizes the individual who, / with an overturn of Protagoras‘ position,
imposes social ethicality upon the universality of the law, which conforms to its will. In
the clash between the most contrasting solutions one is the presence of the will, of which
political life had sensed the effectiveness, but it is also an arduous and insoluble problem:
necessary for the setting up of the universal, both in the name of a community and in the
name of the individual, it is nevertheless problematic. Gorgias gave rigorous proof of it.
A fundamental attitude of aristocratic thought—which hinges on the problem of a
fluctuating community-individual alternative and, therefore, upon the typical
characterology of the individual, owing to his persistence in the social and political
praxis—had to dominate speculative thought. Sophistry welcomed it and created a
universal concept, whose abstraction is not transcendent—as Platonic idealism will
become, for example—but inspired by a social and political experience; and, moreover,
represented those single human attitudes, valid as typical and immutable paradigms for
individuals who, in order to operate in social life, have to define themselves according to
characteristics that are readily recognizable and, therefore, schematic.
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C. The Relativistic Experience of Aristocratic Society in the Effort for the
Reconstruction of Proper Ideals
Other characteristic influences have been established by the complex experience
of the aristocratic society on the formation of sophistry, which derived singular aspects
from them.
It is well known that one of the attitudes of thought that gives a tone of uniformity
to sophistry can be recognized in the relativistic dissolution of values. The age of
Hellenic humanism arrived at such a conclusion following many routes: not last among
these was the experience of travelers who, comparing / Hellenic folk customs and laws
with those of Barbarians (the most sensational and significant is the one narrated by
Herodotus III 38), could not infer anything other than that which had been believed
eternal, indestructible due to the power of a safe tradition, in reality lost value in any
other environment: Herodotus and the logographers present numerous facts that bring us
to this necessary observation. But such an influence, though crucial, interests us less
because it is a prevalent cultural fact, imposed from above, rather than sprung from the
immediate power of a social phenomenon.
The tragedy of the aristocracy, which, at the time of its decline, does not give up
believing and proclaiming its ideals, makes clear, for an internal impetus, that relativism
which, at first glance, seems so contradictory with the persistent traditionalism of this
society.
The social events resulted in catastrophes, felt to be serious in the judgment of the
interested interpreter, had to have appeared even to Pindar, representative of the
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aristocracy, as something ―suprarational,‖ that is as the manifestation of a tremendum.117
The concept is explained in clear political terms by Theognis: ―that you will learn good
things from the good: mixing with sad people | you will remain bereft of judgment that
you have of your own (ηον εόνηα νόον [ton eonta noon, the true/existing mind, the
wisdom one has].‖118 The νοςρ [nous, mind/intent], that is reason,119 becomes
problematic under the pressure of political contrasts: the νοςρ will no longer be εών [eon,
existing/real/true], consistent and absolute: the advent of the new democratic order will
cause one to notice / that ―between good and evil no difference exists‖ (ούηε κακων
γνώμαρ120 ειδοηερ ούη αγαθων [oute kakon gnomas eidotes out agathon, knowing neither
the opinions of neither evil nor good men])121: we no longer have a rational possibility of
determining the truth of things in the domain of political experience, as Pindar also
states122: one will see a subversion of the very concept of the ―just,‖ a κακωρ ηα δίκαια
νομίζειν [kakos ta dikaia nomisdein, to think about just things faultily] .123 The positive
law does not have, therefore, any value: this is the desperate but not completely
disinterested conclusion of the aristocratic world.
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The consequences of this theoretical position developed in two ways. One should
remember that law, that inflexible and unitary νόμορ [nomos, law/custom/tradition], on
whose power the democratic war against the Persians had hinged, that met the proudest
[555] oppositions of the aristocratic world. So, this very world casts doubt in regards to
the validity of the new law rising from the ruins of its class. Thus expressing its thinking,
the aristocracy, in order to devalue the democratic nomos, was preparing the way to
renewed possible attacks, which actually, by a return of an oligarchic flame, exploded in
Athens in 411 and at the time of the thirty tyrants. The aristocrats had made the law under
their will, because / from time to time, under the pressure of circumstances, they had
molded it according to their immediate and selfish necessities,124 though claiming that it
was the expression of divine will.125 Now, complying in its own way to every reactionary
movement, the aristocracy tend to use the arms of the adversary for their own aims: the
law, mutable by approval of the popular assembly had to actually favor the notorious
pluralism of Attic law.126 But this, in reality, could coincide, because its sanction was
different, with pluralism—arbitrary as it was—of the aristocratic regimes. Those who had
belonged or still belonged to it waited for nothing other than the propitious occasion to
be able to impose, even in the new era, now one law then another. Within the passion of
this spiritual turmoil the famous verses of Pindar take on a very definite sense, in my
opinion: ―(νόμορ127 [nomos, law/custom/tradition]), | the king of all |of mortals and
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immortals | carries everything with a sovereign | hand, justifying the extreme
violence.‖128 The relativism of the customs129 and, therefore, of the laws inherent within
them, can be accepted, Pindar seems to say, since contemporary revolutions confirm it,130
on the condition that, under this instability, one always recognizes the divine131: Pindar
transfers that relativism of the laws, which Theognis had denounced, in vexation , within
the new democratic order, to the aristocratic spirituality, without full awareness of the use
that would have been made of it, in the second half of the century. But in the meantime
that aristocracy that had suffered the damage of the new concept of the law contributes to
deepening the criticism of the law in abstract, independently of its aristocratic or
democratic foundation. It will not seem [556] odd then, that, exactly in the aristocratic
Critias, one can encounter a felt sensitivity for the rifts of the law.132
The discovery of the relativism of the law, so acutely sensed and accentuated by
the aristocratic, brought an ulterior consequence. In fact, if a law is mutable within a
population and variable from population to population, a / foundation of that ethics,
which human conscience postulates as immutable, became elusive.133 So, to fulfill this
requirement, the concept of ―the unwritten laws‖ came to be elaborated; these can be the
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sacred aristocratic laws134 as much as—with an extension, favored by the
cosmopolitanism of the aristocracy—those laws that are valid for all the people, founded
on the universality of nature. Once again, the refuge of the aristocracy against the written
laws transforms itself from the start for a revolutionary interpretation of these unwritten
laws, to which conservatism attaches itself, as appears clearly in Spartan activity.135 The
problem formulated according to the aristocratic need for salvation, by necessity had to
be often recovered, with variously nuanced interpretations, by sophistry itself, as attest
the doctrines of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Antiphon.136 Among the ways in which
the ―unwritten laws‖ in the age of sophistry had the chance to materialize, one should not
forget that anxiety of a return to the ―constitution of the fathers‖ (πάηπιορ πολιηεία
[patrios politeia, inherited/ancestral polity or constitution]), that is welcomed by
Thrasymachus 137 and that is proclaimed as absolutely valid, by virtue of that divine
nature guaranteed by the goodness demonstrated over the course of time.138 With this
recent constitutional formula, the Sophistic age, in its moments of spiritual return / to the
aristocratic world translates, according an antidemocratic politico-social plan,139 the
ancient idea of the unwritten law.
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The relativism and the attempts to resolve it in a spiritual manifestation, free of
disagreements, find their primordial patterns in the anguish of readjustment of the
aristocratic conscience and ideals.140 [557]

D. The Aporias of the Aristocrats in the Problem of the Teachability of Virtue.
Among the most demanding problems of the sophistic age one should remember that of
the possibility of teaching virtue. One can say that such a question had also been posed
by the aristocracy in the moment of its crisis. Of course, the possibility of teaching virtue
opposes itself anti-ethically to the aristocratic idea that it be ―by nature,‖ as Pindar141
more than once proclaims: an explicit polemic against this conception becomes
noticeable in Hippias.142 However, despite the profound conviction that natural
endowments constitute that which is decisive in the teachings of virtue, nevertheless
under the blow of reality, on one hand one recognizes that the company of wicked people
may bring the moral ruin,143 on the other that education does not manage to render people
wise144: the aristocratic, viewing the dispersion of the educational values that / were dear
to him, ends up noticing that good natures easily becomes evil as much as that it is not
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possible to educate those who lack strong and natural ethical bases145: so one can see, in
terms of education, the most contradictory results.146 The undermining in the assessment
of the social classes is such that the aristocratic feels dragged into doubting the bases of
the απεηή [arête, excellence/virtue], placing in this way an authentic dramatic agony the
problem of its teachability, even if then one does not want to admit its possibility, since,
in the case of its occurring—imposed after all by the new history to the reluctant
aristocrats— the aristocracy would have had to renounce its own conception of it.147
The political drama of an entire society becomes a tough gnoseological problem
in the mind of the sophists.148 But one should not forget that, nevertheless, this sophistic
education presupposes the development of individual qualities rather than those inherited
from one‘s lineage,149 applied to the leaders above all, rather than the population at large,
since the old aristocratic problem returns under new guise,150 as in general the type of
education in vogue in the fifth century was directed ―towards the life of the nobles.‖151
The social rather than cultural urgency of the educational [558] problem naturally
determined a conflict between / an aristocratic education and a political-democratic
conception, which was one of the determining causes of the contrast between nomos and
physis,152 whose theoretical roots had already been perceived by Pindar.153
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E. Influence of the Aristocratic Crisis on the Constitutional Conceptions of
Sophistry.
Seemingly surprising, the numerous ideas of the social drama of the aristocracy placed
before the speculative thought, which, almost without noticing, is under the stimulus of a
world that is politically overcome154 and that, however, forms itself according to original
and necessarily ambivalent shapes. In fact it draws its meaning from a problematic given
by the loss of a disintegration that does not want to crystallize as it is forced to travel
many roads for the regeneration.
The aristocracy gave sophistry not only the themes that its own social drama
postulated but also the themes of thought already elaborated by a particular social,
political, and philosophical experience at one time. Numerous influences come from
Pythagoreanism,155 whose politics was definitely aristocratic.156 One will more easily
comprehend the reasons for these relationships between Pythagoreanism and sophistry, to
which Augusto Rostagni has already called attention in a decisive study.157
Therefore, the anomaly that had troubled—due to the contradictory presence of sophists
with oligarchic tendencies right next to those flatly democratic, so that a considerable
confusion and entanglement of ideas came to be, with the further aggravating
circumstances that one can encounter conservative oligarchs and enlightened oligarchs,
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capable, overall, to demonstrate a truly effective freedom of spirit and a rationalistic
attitude—will lose all its strangeness.158 If sophistic speculation exercises its precise
influence on the oligarchic-aristocratic constitution of 411159 and on the thirty tyrants,
one must, in the opposite direction, remember just how driven the enlightenment of the
same aristocrats must have been [559], as evidenced by the attitude of an Aristophanes160
or a Critias vis-à-vis religion.
All the constitutional drama of the second half of the fifth century is dictated by
the very power of the political aristocratic ethos,161 so sophistry, in the ambivalence of
values that it more or less proclaims through its representatives, suffers an enigmatic
agony of the polarities tyranny (or aristocracy)-democracy162; therefore, especially the
more recent sophists fluctuate between one and the other of these two political
conceptions.163 The attack of a democratic Cleon against the minds, which govern the
state less well compared to bunglers, 164 was launched, in reality, against sophistry and is
entirely understandable if one bears in mind the complex and solid substance that this
current of thought found itself placed opposite the aristocratic civilization almost
naturally.
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3. Origins of Sophistic Problems in the Political Wars of the Fifth Century.
The themes of the political and social life can be said to have been founded by the drama
of the aristocracy, insofar as it has to set certain goals for itself in regards to the problem
of a law to recognize the citizens, one that did not always flow logically from the
traditions of that society.165 Naturally, original possibilities remain influenced by the new
forms that constitute themselves from past turmoil.
The problem of the individual was urgent in an era of political struggles and
revolutions, that offer a clear path to the ingeniousness ready for a complete
development, also because the choice of a party requires an analysis of reasons that
justify an autonomous decision166: the democratic constitution favors θςμόρ [thumos,
emotional impulses], that is the drive to independence, as recognize by Hippocrates in the
De aere acquis et logicis.167 /
The individual element, even if constrained in the limits already clarified, takes
part with a constructive awareness [560] (one should remember, rather, the resigned
disdain of Hesiod) in the face of a problem of the state: the favored form of constitution
is that which most benefits, and the criterion of the useful may lead even to the
indifference toward the subject168: one can, therefore, foresee, through these current ideas
in Athens in the last ten years of the fifth century and the first few years of the century
that followed, the beginning of law conceived as ―defense . . . of a certain self-interest,‖
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in a way that it appears reduced to economy.169 Therefore the constitutional problem is an
outcome of social life; the interest of everyone, consequently, turns to this for the
practical repercussions that concern the individual citizens.
The practical and theoretical sensibility for the value of the constitutions had been
aroused following a compound of concomitant phenomena. Notably, especially in the
aristocratic environment, which needs to position itself within the political renewal, the
constitutional problem stands out, almost under the scourge of an irritating agony: one
might think of Pindar, a convinced aristocrat but who, at one time, was judged by the
public opinion of his fellow citizens as a friend of the tyrants, while next to Hieron was
accused of conflicting with them [the tyrants].170 The episode goes beyond the person of
the poet: it especially means that clear ideas are still missing regarding the constitutional
problem.
Only at the dawn of the democracy of Cleisthenes, which settled once and for all
the principle of ιζονομία [isonomia, equal application of customs/law],171 the notion / of
constitution began to define itself in its possible varieties,172 when from the appeased
contradictions one reached the transition toward new forms.173 But these constitutional
forms, finally defined, did not immediately pose the specific problem of political
programs and parties.174 In fact, immediately following the ordeal of the Persian wars,
which functioned as a barrier against every centrifugal force, the Athenian democracy,
only once that the already problematic but nevertheless dominant figures of Themistocles
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and Cimon had been eliminated, was shaken by ―that turbulent, unequal, unstable trend‖
that was ―characteristic until the middle of the fourth century.‖175 This situation, that
went maturing and provoked upheavals [561] or concerns in the social environment, had
to set, in peremptory terms, the problem of the relativism of government forms: what is
each type of constitution worth? Should one return to the idealized constitution of the
father or build one conforming to the postulates of reason?
The political struggles intensified: the contrast of factions causes the necessity for
political doctrines and, in the conflict between the two, the practical insolubility
concerning the problem of the best form of government176 ends up being felt: the concept
of profit dispels every theoretical essentialness inherent in any constitution.177
All the controversies that, starting at the time of the Peloponnesian War, were raised
around the / problem of the forms of constitution,178 both in terms of their essence and in
relation to their genesis, have always been imposed by a condition of social life, that the
serious external events had rendered particularly delicate. If the sophists place the study
of the political fact, of the validity of laws, of the significance of constitutions, as
unavoidable, this is due to the constitutional drama of Athens that, after the victory over
Persia, had broadened the play of forces that moved its destiny. The incursion of new
exigencies—for example, maritime politics179—seems to contribute in constituting,
almost as though it were a natural organization, a particular type of government. The
author of Constitution of Athenians, when, despite hating democracy, discovers its
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coherence, founded on effective reality, resolves a political event in a phenomenon of
social origin. Sociality, then, insofar as it becomes a decisive factor that is pressing on the
consciousnesses, even though they did not have, at the time, full awareness, became a
political fact, that solicits a practice as much as a theory.
If, then, the sophists not only theorize upon the forms of government, in keeping
with the demands of the social turmoil but also give answers in contrast among
themselves, this creates an implicit proof that reality is contradictory: otherwise an
identical intention would not have reached opposite conclusions. The [562] play of
political factions relativizes , in time and space, the concept of truth and error180; so the
struggle between Hellenics and Hellenics is seen in the dazzling light of its absurdity in
the Lysistrata of Aristophanes and in the The Phoenician Women (also known by the
Greek title, Phoenissae) of Euripedes (cp. vs. 535 ff.). /

4. The War.
The problem of utility determines clearly by now the meaning of the war,181 so with good
reason one could say that, for the first time, during the Peloponnesian War, the economy
constituted the generative power for this social phenomenon182 and, we can add, from this
was reduced to an acute state: it became a matter suffered by all and, therefore, to
interpret. Sophistry that, for the most part, carried out its activity during this dramatic
historical period, could not fail to notice the influence caused by the social life in its
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pathologic event of an armed conflict. And the problem attracted the attention of the
sophists even more insofar as, for the most part, they were opposed to wars.183
When human conduct must feel determined by profit, then sooner or later it will
become aware of becoming problematic, due to the relativism that the concept easily
entails, and this occurs every time that it is of an economic sort. But utility is not the only
origin for the dissolution of value caused by wars.
That justice, which, before the Persian wars, was founded on control over oneself
and, therefore, was the ―consequence of the individual temperament of each,‖ so that its
violation ―does not avoid the formidable measures on the part of the gods,‖184 begins to
lose that / foundation which resulted from the political spirituality of the aristocrats185
after the great national ordeal. I have already re-evoked, at the beginning of this inquiry,
the problematic nature of the great political figures of the era, who operate according to
criteria fleeting the traditional norms of right and wrong: this means that the war had
[563] cast the premises for a reversal of values, so the ancient principles found
themselves destined to the unavoidable doubts of a courageous discussion. The struggles
of the parties had become a power that acted harshly in the internal politics and
international relations, entailing that play of interests, which ended up coming to the
formulation of new ideas. A little at a time these contrasts became more acute and, during
the new war of the Peloponnesian, reached a spasm. This [circumstance] occurred
especially in the Attica where the events of the military operations, as appears even in
Aristophanes, created the clash between the inhabitants of the countryside, particularly
183
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damaged by the war, and the inhabitants of the city: the former being conservatives while
the latter progressives, were equally pushed by the bitterness of the war to radical
positions: therefore the war can be considered responsible for that spirit of class and of
party186 that had to lead to necessary opposite political theories, of which the sophists
made themselves representatives. The most immediate almost abstract contrast between
laws and laws, uses and uses, dramatized itself in a social reality where the antithesis
appears as the fundamental norm of everything and is brought to an exacerbated evidence
of the narrow space of the polis,187 favorable terrain to pinpoint opposites and indicate
their incompatibility. / This class war that had inevitably exploded within the aristocratic
regimes188 had brought, with Pericles, to the triumph of the proletariat,189 which had to
provoke even the most paradoxical reactions within the adversaries.190 In these conditions
of high social tension that stirred itself on the axis of an unstable equilibrium, the theory
presented itself spontaneously until reaching the ideal of Antiphon, who wanted the class
wars to be appeased and abolished and also the clash between lineages to be eliminated,
as the fatal one between the Hellenics and the barbarians.191
Therefore this anxiety of the universal, that reaches cosmopolitanism, seems to
flow from the dramatic anguish of the war of the Peloponnesian.
The cosmopolitanism, which is in the very nature of sophistic mindset and that
was theorized especially by Hippias and Antiphon, illustrates, due to the social demands
of the Hellenics, a [564] very complex moment, to the point that not all the sophists could
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comprehend its greatness.192 The antithesis Hellenics-Barbarians, which emerged with
the founding of the empire of Darius,193 had materialized with the Persian wars (490—
479), definitely not earlier,194 and a political problem had come with it, that is the
opposition of tyranny, subjugated by Persia, and Hellenic democracy.195 One can see,
then, / how in Antiphon, under examination of the law that did not respond to the
demands of a consequent ιζονομία [isonomia, equality before the law] where the
contrasts were overcome without any remainder, the problem of cosmopolitanism had to
insert itself: the sophist seems to say that exactly the ιζονομία in its absolute value,
instead of causing the opposition Hellenics-Barbarians, as had actually occurred, had the
contrary duty of appeasing it. The ιζονομία has become the elimination of all the laws in
order to recreate the spontaneous physis that, in human terms and universal sociality, is
actually called cosmopolitanism.
A particular situation that had matured in the conscience of the Hellenic people, even
with the contention of other social facts—such as ―mercenarismo,‖ the mimicry of the
Hellenics especially in foreign lands,196 the society of the Metics, who caused a lively
exchange of ideas,197 the internationalism and the lack of concern for class differences, in
the Eleusina religion,198 the Delphic tolerance in front of foreign cults199—had to raise a
social problem that reconnected to that κοινή [koine, common/shared/general] cultural
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micrasiatic owed to the collaboration of Greeks and non-Greeks in the age of Aoidoi and
in that which followed until Darius.200 This κοινή [koine, common/general/shared],
relived now as a new problem put forth by the social conditions caused by the
Peloponnesian war which, exacerbating the class war, strives for the internal pacification
and, consequently, the external one (one might think of the relationships which, during
the war, on both sides were tied with the / Persia itself), sets itself up as a great idea that
found its practical implementation as a consequence to the feat of Alexander.201
However, the problem of the Hellenic–Barbarian antithesis is to be thought [565]
as dramatic in the cultural and social world of the whole fifth century, even if the
demands of patriotism have lifted an uproar that rendered scarcely audible contrary
voices. Nevertheless, when one re-listens to The Persians of Aeschylus, that from the
clash have also offered an exact political and not racial interpretation, one will obtain the
certainty that for an enlightened Greek such as Aeschylus, precursor of the sophistic
διζζορ λόγορ [dissoi logos, double argument/double logic],202 Europe and Asia are a unit
established by nature. But this union, in order to become true, requires the renunciation of
the freedom of the individual.203 One may, then, say that the cosmopolitanism that
became a theoretical fact in the age of the sophists, who were determined by the social
imperative of the class war, answered a problem that extended back to the time of the
Persian wars. While the Hellenic patriotism celebrated its triumph, so much that in The
Persians one can still hear the clear ring, in the same tragedy and before the Athenian
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public, the insoluble difficulties of patriotism and cosmopolitanism,204 of the individual
and the universal, are discovered within the tragic consciousness of Xerxes.
But, even under another facet, the class war entailed, as its consequence,
cosmopolitanism: the aristocrats, desiring not to participate in public / life, where the
δήμορ [demos, the people] prevailed, abstained themselves from attending the
assembly,205 so with this abstaining they contributed in preparing cosmopolitanism.206
Once more we encounter the aristocratic turmoil, which adds its particular mark to a
complex social pattern.
The problems, which the war expresses with its agony and that sophistry picks up,
entail a critical disintegration of values, from which, among others, visions of universal
social experiences form themselves. Sophistry, despite its orderly relativism, as a rule
flows into an empirical universal, which Protagoras had fixed in his καινή δόξαν [kaine
doxan, common opinion/general or commonly accepted opinion).

5. Problems Posed by the Social Elements of Religion.
The Persian wars unsettled traditional religiosity and as a result made it totally
problematic. The sacred organization of the polis207 faded when the wars saw that
―religion and the gods had to subordinate themselves to the ideas of the human spirit‖ so
as to favor ―the freedom of the human spirit‖ and to completely fix the attention of the
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people on the physical world208: religion became, then, a political event,209 so that, for
example, the Athenians made use of it on their Pan-Hellenic plan210: religiosity, under a
political / point of view, colored itself then of rationalism211 and started the process of its
own disintegration.212
The denial of the transcendent was the material result of this critical movement in
the area of religiosity that does not concern itself with the afterlife; which, according to
the thought of Pericles, in a profane way conceives divine forms under aesthetic type213;
which does not see, in the course of things, a secure stance of divine action in the face of
sudden shifts of historical events (one might recall the doubts that Theognis already
had)214; which no longer responds to the new needs and demands placed by the collapse
of the ancient social and political order,215 so as to not coincide with the postulates of an
autonomous ethics.216 During the pentecontaetia a true desecration of the sacred and,
therefore, its resolution in the world of relativism, spreads.
However, even in an internal way, the religious phenomenon contradicts and
dissolves itself. Be it sufficient to think about the double value of the sacred, which as a
power can indeed operate for good as well as evil, without, moreover, having this
duplicitous determination be at the root of the religious phenomenon217: this indifference
of value, precisely in the religious phenomenon in its becoming, involved a peculiar
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tragic moment of human knowledge that, in the face of such ambivalence, will never be
able to decide. The dramatic Gorgian critique of knowledge takes off precisely from the
anti-ethical ambiguity of reasons / that are also [567] sacred but transported in the
atmosphere of analytic thought.218
The reason of an inextricable antithesis is, then, characteristic of the sacred and
can be pursued in a yet more significant domain. The law is recognized as duplicitous in
appearance: on one hand it is proclaimed as ―holy and immutable,‖ while on the other as
―a human work—secular, one could say—and consequently subject to change,‖ and the
two opposites in practice appeared more or less confused.219 This ambivalence, which
constitutes the basis from which the relativism of the concepts lights up, draws one of its
origins also from the double sense that θεζμόρ [thesmos, institution] as much as νόμορ
[nomos, law] can take of sacred law and secular law.220 One can say that Greek
experiences, in general, are always sacred and profane at one time: think of physis, a
philosophical concept so important also in the sophistic age: and here, according to the
testimony of Hellanicus,221 Physis is identified with Adrasteia, the ancient pre-Hellenic
goddess mother, determinant of the inflexible laws of existence.222 The problematics of
nomos and physis, in the mystery of the social conscience of the religious man, fluctuate
vibrating towards those opposite poles, that sophistry had to make its own in the
alternating inclinations, now in one sense, now in another.
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However, especially in the second half of the fifth century, / another religious fact
contributed in positing urgent problems to thought. Greek religion now absorbs foreign
religions that penetrate it starting in the age immediately following that of the Persian
wars223 and that are welcomed by the masses, while ―the cultured social classes tend
towards a rationalization and an elaboration of more universal concepts.‖ Both thus
demonstrate ―an unease and dissatisfaction for the old forms,‖ a ―search for new
arrangements.‖224 But, in the meantime, traditional values, even for this comparison of
two forms of religiosity, undergo decisive blows, since the concepts of right, of true, etc.,
turn out to be, once again, problematic. The most direct resonance of such a religious
movement, which could easily slide in aberrant forms of superstition, comes together in
the Interpretation of Dreams by Antiphon [568] which is an expression of relativistic and
rationalist mentality, at one time, in opposition with every aphilosophical way of
thinking. We, however, care to point out how Antiphon, even in this case, feels the
imperiousness of a problem posed by a social experience.
After all, the individualistic attitude of sophistry, which detached man from his
ties to the polis, concurred with a social need to the point that, exactly
contemporaneously, in Greek society the cult of Asclepius and that of Zeus Philios arise,
so timely to satisfy the demands of the single individual isolated and indifferent to the
gods of the polis.225 / In general, one can say that Hellenic religion, in many ways, posed
the problem of the individual: already the Homeric man ―similar to a god‖ rises high
223

NILSSON, Gr. Rel., I, pp. 787---789; GLOTZ, Hist. gr. cit., pp. 423 ff.; WILAMOWITZ, Glaube, II, p.
222.
224
ZELL.-MOND., I, p. 152.
225
NILSSON, Gr. Rel., I, pp. 762—767 and Reflexe von dem Durchbruch des Individualismus in der
griechischen religion um die Wende des 5. Und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. ―Mélanges Cumont,‖ Brussels,
1936, pp. 369, 371—372; KAERST, Hell., II, p. 80 ff.

103

above with his admirable creation in a free society226: personal initiative is crucial in the
mysterious beliefs227 so these, on Greek land, convert themselves in exaltations of man
and in expression of intellectualism.228
The forms of religiosity in which the passionate stimulus constitutes that essence
which is antiethical to reason have to say the least favored the elaboration of rhetoric and
sophistic gnoseology. Rhetoric, in fact, owes a great deal, for the clarification of its
stylistic forms (figures), to sacred poetry,229 which had transformed them in the hands of
the Hellenic religious society, ready, therefore, to transfer them in the sovereign domain
of art. Analogously the pathetic impetus of the eloquence of some sophists may depend
on the ecstatic passion of orgiastic cults.230
The above is as far as rhetoric goes. In addition, Hellenic religion implied a
gnoseological theme. Already for the Hellenics and especially in the more ancient age
―every word, once expressed, could become divinity.‖231 In fact language, ―as the only
mediator between god and men,‖ entails that ―immediacy, which is worth as a premise of
a genuine revelation. Language . . .is nothing other than the primordial / discovery by
means of logos, which ―has revealed the divine to humanity, since it gave the possibility
of divinely [569] expressing the divine.‖ But for the Hellenics, ―not the logos became
meat, but the logoi,‖ and the gods were manifold.232 The significance of logos was
therefore given and developed in two senses: in the rationalistic way, which caused the
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contrast between unity and plurality that the logos implied to spring up to the speculative
conscience of the Hellenics, so that it established itself in its own ambivalence; and in the
naturalistic and metaphysical way, which made logos the gathering place of the most
radical reality of things, and here the philosophical-religious etymology of the Greeks,
who considering the word θύζει [phusei, by nature] believe that it expresses something
on the essence, of which it pretends to be the name, as appears especially in Heraclitus
and Aeschylus.233 From the refractions of the many possibilities embedded in the nature
of logos, what fixes itself in the speculation of the sophists is, on one hand, the Gorgian
doctrine of logos, in its ambivalence, according to the developments of the Helen and the
treaty On Nature or On Non-Being, that had to determine its persuasive effectiveness,
conformant to the irrational way proper even of religious experience234; and on the other,
the logical in-depth study of the word that, starting with its physis (etymology), resolves
itself in the nomos, which should be recognized within it in its every single manifestation
(synonymy): this the oeuvre of Prodicus.235 /
The contradictory nature of words, under the gnoseological respect, was
conquered also in the intensity of the political wars, which reversed the current sense that
they demanded: this is lamented by Theognis (305—308) and, then, by Thucydides (III,
82, 4), who refers to the facts of Korkyra, that had reached a frenzy in that very year 427,
during which Gorgias came to Athens for the first time. The political fact coincides, then,
with the religious one to confirm the natural antitheses of logos.
233

Cp. HAOFFMANN, Logik, p. 16 and PORZIG, op. cit., p. 74.
Cp. DUPRÉEL, op. cit., pp. 161, 242.
235
Cp. UNTERSTEINER, Prod., pp. 121—122 and Sophists, ch. XI, § 2. Cp, also PARETO, op. cit., §
290, p. 136. For the development of the synonymic, a considerable influence was given also by the3
evolution of democratic life, which calls for a more exact knowledge of the value of speech (E.
SCHWYZER, Griech. Grammatik. München, 1939, p. 33)
234

105

Hellenic religiosity wielded its influence on sophistry also following the decisive
intermediary way of the tragedy, a social phenomenon236 in its origins as much as in its
expressions of the high Attic poetry. The Dionysian character of the tragedy, already in
its most ancient form, had to ensure that its climax brought to the feeling of the [570]
tragic and insoluble dissension inherent in the very gods and in men, since Dionysian
religion reveals exactly the knowledge of the contradictions of the world.237 From tragedy
and from its religious-popular origins, the sense of the tragedy, typical of existence, had
infiltrated itself in the awareness of the Hellenics: a problem, this one, essentially
sophistic, to the point that the treatise of Gorgias On Nature or On Not-Being is to be
considered and felt as the social experience of tragedy and of its poets, translated in
ontological and gnoseological terms.238 /
Another social phenomenon with a religious backdrop that had a noteworthy
repercussion for sophistry is to be caught precisely in religion, insofar as it is the
interpreter of the principle of authority that aims to obtain obedience and discipline from
the people. Therefore, according to this system of thought, the state, which has to have
had a genesis, represents itself as established by the Gods and demigods or heroes,
representatives of the very first social revolutions, carried out in reality by men.239 Thus
are explained the different myths: of Protagoras, who in the genesis of the society sees
the intervention of heroes and gods (even though, in the final analysis, his construction is
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substantially anthropological240) and of Critias, who gives an unscrupulously explicit
view if the phenomenon, understood as resulting from a human intervention, with the
most contradictory consequences.241 While accepting the religious idea of a civilized life
established by a superior being, in reality sophistry resolves it in an act of the human
mind.
Sophistry has, therefore, been able to give a secular interpretation of certain
religious phenomena, that draw their raison d’être from social life.

6. The Problem of Techné.
I believe it appropriate to keep in mind yet another social fact that exercises considerable
influences on the theoretical thought of sophistry. I want to allude to that widespread and
certain establishment of the technai, that had had its beginning already in the sixth [571]
century,242 but that belongs exactly to the age of sophistry: in it workers are valued to the
point that, precisely in this environment, in defiance of an aristocrat as Aristophanes,
political men such as Cleon and Hyperbolus, who originate precisely from the world of
the δημιοςπγοί [demiourgoi, craftsmen], can come forward and assert themselves..
This fact, sign of a tacit social revolution, had to create a gnoseological problem
perceived by the sensitivity of those who stood amazed before this unprecedented event.
In the mind of the aristocrat, a popular assembly composed of shoemakers, carpenters,
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farmers, etc. had to appear as absolutely inept in judging political questions, if not even
misunderstood.243
Thus was posed the problem of the gnoseological value of the arts: which one?
How would their representatives be judged?
Even in this domain the answers of sophistry are anti-ethical. On one hand the
devaluation of the arts is insinuated, as occurs in Protagoras, who demolishes its
theoretical foundation, at least in the area of the individual experience.244 Similarly, in /
Antiphon, techne represent the human world of the relative vis-à-vis the absolute
physis.245
But, on the other hand, the arts could have appeared so connected by a rational
orderliness that they were judged the directive norm of all of life246 and mark of progress,
dependent upon their becoming: for this reason, Prodicus renders the history of
civilization as founded on the steady discovery of the arts,247 Hippias is the corypheus
[chorus lead] of such an exaltation of them and, finally, Critias takes care of knowing the
origin of the inventions.248
This social fact fully sweeps over the speculative zeal of the sophists, who foresee
a theoretical problem in it, differently outlined for a solution. And in the contrast between
those who glorified the arts and those who raised the aporias against them to limit their
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absoluteness, the thoughtful and disconcerted voice of Sophocles rises unable to judge
them.249

7. Conclusion
The search of an exterior, not philosophical genesis of sophistry has been able to
demonstrate that this current of thought truly marks the expression of a specific historical
climate, the character of which is determined precisely by social facts. By this, one does
not intend to deny the existence of relationships with former and contemporaneous
philosophical schools: we know, for example, that the treatise of Gorgias On Nature or
On Not-Being is completely a fabric of argumentations aimed at reducing ad absurdum
the principles of the most significant pre-sophistic schools. /
However the rigorously philosophical reasons often correspond to aspects of
social life. And this is felt as much in the negative, relativistic part of sophistic thought as
in the constructive, theoretical, and practical results. If one cannot talk of a systematic
unity, that brings together the sophists, because, in reality, they are often in antithesis, or
even in polemic among themselves, it is nevertheless natural to think of them as an
emanation of a particular historical moment that was in crisis and, consequently,
fragmentary in its complexity.
It has seemed that one of the exceptionally fruitful seeds of this crisis was to be
discovered in the birth of the spirit of the Hellenic aristocracy, precisely in the moment in
which its material splendor faded or, depending on the locations, extinguished itself
forever. However, this contrast between reality and ideal dramatized aristocratic thought,
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making it multifaceted and sensitive to all the exigencies of social man. When suffering,
man learns and comes to know himself; thinks and rises at times to a metaphysic, devoid
of abstraction, because it proceeds parallel to particular and concrete human experiences.
Humanism has prevented sophistry from abstracting itself into pure dialectic. Even the
most universal forms of sophistic thought, even the most keen critical analyses always
find themselves face to face with a specific social event, from which the sophists,
however differently, have inferred an idea or an argumentation or have proceeded at the
same time as this event.
The sophists, without meaning to be, were philosophers of [573] the history of
their age, which they interpreted with a perfect accuracy.

I have not suggested to be carrying out an exhaustive investigation relative to
every detail of the question. There are problems that I left out because their
treatment would have excessively enlarged the present essay. My only intent was
to pose the question in all its validity and track, particularly, the relationship
between the social life of the aristocracy and the problematic of sophistry. The
nucleus of this essay is constituted by a conference held at the ―Institute des
Hautes Etudes‖ of Brussels, and repeated at the Sorbonne respectively on April
29th and May 5th 1949. The present study was published for the first time in the
Studi di filosofia antica in onore di Rodolfo Mondolfo, by V. E. Alfieri and M.
Untersteiner, Bari, Laterza, 1950, pp. 121—180. Now it is republished by kind
and cordial concession of the Laterza Editors.
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Chapter Four
Analysis of Translation

In ―Le origini sociali della sofistica‖ Untersteiner considers the social events in fifthcentury Athens and the ways in which these enabled sophistry to develop. Although he
briefly mentions some sophistic responses to the issues, the main thrust of his essay is the
social component of the events that aroused sophistic speculation and answers.
Untersteiner identifies six main social issues—as evidenced by his detailed headings and
subheadings—that contributed to the development of sophistry although the first serves
more as an introduction and overview. The remaining five parts identify the crisis of the
aristocracy, which receives the most expansive treatment in the essay, the war, religion,
political struggles, and the problem of techné as the main issues sparking sophistic
interpretation. First, I introduce each one in a brief summary of the thread running
through his overall argument, allowing the reader a broader view of his discussion before
delving into each part separately. Second, I review and contextualize the main facets of
each section separately as it occurs. Third, I discuss the contribution that each of
Untertersteiner‘s points makes, as well as their relevance, significance, and contribution
to classical rhetorical theory. I also address key terms as they emerge.
Untersteiner begins the essay with ―La pentecontaetia come età dei problemi posti
dalla vita sociale‖ by pondering the pentecontaetia, Greek for ―the period of fifty years,‖
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as the age that in which Hellenic social life presented the social issues that the sophists
will undertake. The pentecontaetia refers to a phase within the Classical Period that
spanned between the second Persian invasion of Greece in 480 and the beginning of the
Peloponnesian War in 433 BCE. Although the designation is not common in English,
Thucydides first used it to describe this age in which Athens dominated the
Mediterranean and democracy flourished. I remain faithful to Untersteiner‘s use of the
term. This opening part sets up his discussion by briefly touching on the events prior to
the pentecontaetia and premises the core of his argument: namely, the events of the
pentecontaetia were unprecedented and powerful to the point of requiring new ideas and
solutions within politics and philosophy.
The crisis of the aristocracy appears as the most substantial component of
Untersteiner‘s argument regarding the origins of sophistry. ―La crisi dell’aristocrazia
determina una nuova spiritualità nel mondo ellenico‖ markedly appears as the largest
section of the essay, receiving more attention than any other by being further subdivided
into five parts and discusses the crisis of the aristocracy as a leading factor in establishing
a new sensibility in the Hellenic world. In this part, Untersteiner argues that this crisis
was at the core of the changes that stimulated the emergence of sophistry. The issue of
community plays a major role in this part of his argument, taking up the first two sections
of this part. The first, ―Idea di collettività e sue conseguenze gnoseologiche,‖ expounds
on the idea of community and the gnoseological consequences that emerged from it. In
the second section, ―Colletivitvà e individuo nelle teorie dei sofisti,‖ he explores the
concepts of community and the individual within the theories of the sophists. In
―L’esperienza relativistica della società aristocratica, nel travaglio per la ricostruzione
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dei propri ideali” Untersteiner looks at the relativistic experience of aristocratic societies
as they seek to reconstruct their ideals. The fourth section, ―Le aporie degli aristocratici
nel problema dell’insegnabilità della virtú‖ examines the difficulties faced by the
aristocratic when the teachableness of virtue came into question. Untersteiner concludes
the second part of the essay by analyzing the influence of these aristocratic crises on the
constitutional conception of sophistry in ―Influsso della crisi aristocratica sulle
concezioni costituzionali della sofistica.‖
The next two main sections discuss the various conflicts that occurred during the
pentecontaetia and their significance to the development of sophistry. ―Spunti di problemi
sofistici nelle lotte politiche del V secolo,‖ examines the political struggles of the time as
stimuli for sophistic concerns, while the next part looks at the more violent struggles of
war in general, ―La guerra.‖ The fifth part ―I problemi posti dagli aspetti della religione‖
examines the issues that emerged from the social elements of religion, Finally, in Part
Six, ―Il problema della tecnica‖ deliberates on the issue of techné. This question is at the
heart of discussions at the time, and can be seen as an intellectual struggle to which I will
devote substantial room in my analysis below. The seventh and final part of the essay,
―Conclusione,‖ offers a brief conclusion, as its title indicates. These issues comprise what
Untersteiner views as instigating the rise and expansion of sophistry. I now turn to
analyzing them in depth and discussing their implications for classical rhetorical theory.
Untersteiner begins his essay by positing that the work of the sophists was
sparked by a number of social and historical events that occurred before and culminated
during the pentecontaetia. The crises before, during, and after the fifth century BCE
continually destabilized Hellenic social life. Untersteiner argues that these predicaments
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imposed by social life were so numerous and momentous that they had an incredible
influence on the Hellenes. These events prompted the poignant realization that reality is
contradictory in a world that was formerly stable under the guises of tradition and myth.
The variety of these crises vexed the Hellenes and had to be explained in order to be
surpassed. These social shifts in the organization of Hellenic life altered the social
dynamics in such a way as to have actively promoted the emergence of the sophists who
answered the social needs of the Hellenes.
Untersteiner bases his argument on certain premises in place at the time. The
Hellenics had a different view than the current concept of society. For one, they were
deeply involved within the relational play between the ―many‖ and the individual, an
aspect that he discusses in depth in Sections A and B of Part Two. Also, the Hellenes,
who had not viewed history as evolutionary, now saw the current affairs in contrast with
social conventions as being next to nature.
Here Untersteiner addresses the very frequently discussed topic of nomos versus
physis, although he does not refer to it as such and mentions it only in passing. The
question of these two contrasting terms and their relationship did not originate with the
sophists but receives persistent intellectual interest from the beginning of philosophic
inquiry. Physis rather safely translates to nature, while nomos has no single English
corresponding term and refers to laws, customs, and conventions. Related to the verb
nomizo, which can mean to think, believe, or practice, nomos originally meant ―what
people (or a people) believe or practice—their customs, which, especially in early times,
had the force of laws. . . . Nomos has a prescriptive force: it is not simply what is
believed, but what is believed to be right, not just the ways of life a people practices, but
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what it practices as the right way of life‖ (McKirahan 391). Before the existence of
written law codes, custom and law were hardly distinct. The meaning of the word then
broadened to cover official laws that were enforced by the state, retaining its prescriptive
force (391). W.K.C. Guthrie devotes considerable attention to sophistic conceptions of
nomos and physis, observing that ―[n]aturally . . . different people had different nomoi,
but, so long as religion remained an effective force, the devising mind could be the god‘s,
and so there could be nomoi that were applicable to all mankind‖ (55). Untersteiner
touches on this issue because, around this time, law, customs, and conventions ceased to
be considered as part of the fixed order of things. At this point in Hellenic history,
―people wanted to know what made the law legitimate‖ (Shortridge 198). The sophists
fulfilled this need.
Untersteiner continues his introductory premises by remarking that society also
began to establish itself as an operating reality, though still lacking a scientific awareness.
The crumbling of physical barriers among tribes, in addition, enables relationships of
various types between social groups, relationships that make possible the sharing of new
ideas. At this time, the unity of noble families weakened, and the full responsibility of
individuals, as well as the struggle between political solidarity and the nobility and the
expansion of commerce, produced economic unities and an inclination towards inquiry
and judgment. The influx of metics further broadens this already rich cultural milieu.
These basic premises created fertile ground for the appearance and flourishing of the
sophists, who supplied answers for the myriad queries that appeared thereof. The
fracturing of the noble families, introduced in this first part, is among the most decisive
events of the issues which the sophists tackled.
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Untersteiner argues that, while not perishing altogether, the aristocracy as a sociopolitical phenomenon ends in its former manifestation. After the collapse of Boeotian
independence, a crisis sweeps over the aristocracy at least until the Battle of Chaeronea in
338BCE. What made this crisis particularly significant was the treatment it received from
Pindar, who made it a spiritual matter by addressing the superseding of the Homeric idea.
Werner Jaeger discusses this issue in depth, positing that Pindar, or the ―voice of
aristocracy,‖ tackles the ―difficult problem‖ of deciding ―how it sometimes happens that
after a long succession of famous men the areta of a family disappears‖ (Paideia, Vol I,
215). While still set in the world of myth, the heroes of Pindar ―lived and struggled in the
immediate present‖ (216). The importance of this poet‘s queries lies in the opening up of
the new question of whether ―the true virtue of man can be learnt, or only inherited by
blood . . . thrust on him by the conflict of the aristocratic educational tradition with the
new rational spirit‖ (218). His answer is that ―[e]ducation cannot act unless there is
inborn areta for it to act upon,‖ demonstrating ―the deliberate resolve of the aristocracy
to preserve its position at a time of crisis‖ (218—19). Untersteiner underscores this view
by conceiving of it as a social foundation for the development of sophistry. I discuss the
subject in more depth below, when Untersteiner addresses the issue in detail. Suffice here
to say that Pindar expresses the ―last agony of the aristocratic culture of Greece‖ (222).
Untersteiner emphasizes this position.
Untersteiner continues Part One of his essay by addressing two decisive social
issues in particular as having a bearing on the appearance of sophistry: the problem of
human personality and that of constitutions, as he finds explained by Thucydides.
Untersteiner suggests that two figures, in particular, demonstrate the issue of human
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character: that of Pausinias, who was crucial during the Battle of Platea and the Greek
victory over the Persians, as well as the head of the Hellenic League, and that of
Themistocles, a new type of Athenian politician and general who distinguished himself
during the initial years of Athenian democracy and was a populist supported by the
Athenian lower classes, as well as conflicting with the nobility. He was not an aristocrat
but an outsider who prided himself with his lack of polish and was instrumental in the
second defeat of the Persians by anticipating their return and preparing the Athenians by
building an unprecedented navy and strategizing the decisive victory in the straits of
Salamis, without which, Greek civilization and values would unlikely have been reached.
Jaeger identifies him as being the first to use the term foreign politics (390).
By calling attention to these two figures, Untersteiner mounts his case for the
importance of the development of human character, for these two figures rose above the
traditional roles permitted to individuals who were not of noble birth. Furthermore, he
calls attention to two speeches: a speech given at the Congress of Sparta by the
Corinthians and delegates of Athens in Sparta for other purposes that though speaking of
Corinth with the outward purpose of dissuading Sparta from declaring war causes turmoil
among her allies. Peter John Rhodes argues that this speech ―stresses the Athenians‘
ambition and contrasts their energy with Sparta‘s slowness‖ (85). These two speeches
had the effect of sparking the Peloponnesian War.
Untersteiner focuses on these two speeches to support his contention that they
enabled the constitution and the social impact of a people influencing each other. This
shift has an indelible distinguishing effect on the social intercourse of individuals,
affecting the way they associate with one another and form social groups. Thus
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individuals began to stipulate their social conditions, deciding them in a spiritual unity.
This steady renewal of social affairs, many of which appeared for the first time, created
problems that originated new ideas, political systems, and philosophical methods that
stimulate new solutions.
The power of oratory and rhetoric thus becomes evident, for it provides the only
way for individuals to manage the social experience they share and that affects them. One
can clearly see, then, that the predicaments produced by the new organization of social
existence necessitate novel methods of handling the necessities demanded in this period.
This new need called for new measures provided by the sophists.

Crisis of the Aristocracy.
Divided into five parts, the largest section of Untersteiner‘s essay presents the crisis of
the aristocracy as providing a definite direction toward a new awareness in the Hellenic
world. This section opens up one of the main points that Untersteiner formulates
regarding the community-individual dichotomy. Here Untersteiner focuses in particular
on the gnoseological consequences of community on the aristocracy. The term
gnoseology, not common in English parlance, must be clarified in order to explicate this
part of Untersteiner‘s argument.
More common in Italian rhetoric than in its English counterpart, gnoseology
appears in place of epistemology. The definitions of both concepts as found in two
leading dictionaries offer a good starting point for the discussion of the differences
between the two terms. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as ―philosophy of
cognition or the cognitive faculties.‖ The Unabridged Merriam-Webster ―the philosophic
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theory of knowledge: inquiry into the basis, nature, validity, and limits of knowledge.‖
By contrast, the OED defines epistemology as ―The theory or science of the method or
grounds of knowledge,‖ while the Unabridged Merriam-Webster had it as ―the study of
the method and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity;
broadly :the theory of knowledge.‖ In Italian, according to DeMauro Paravia dictionary,
gnoseologia denotes ―parte della filosofia che si occupa della natura e dei limiti della
conoscenza umana | dottrina, teoria della conoscenza enunciata da un dato filosofo o da
una determinata corrente di pensiero: g. empiristica, g. kantiana,‖ meaning the part of
philosophy that deals with nature and the limits of human knowledge, as well as the
doctrine or theory of knowledge as stated by a particular current of thought, for example
empiristic gnoseology, Kantian gnoseology. These definitions identify the basic shades of
meaning between the two words.
Although both concepts denote philosophical theories of knowledge, the terms
differ in the scope of their meaning. The basic distinction, I believe, lies in the grounds of
knowledge covered by each term: epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge that
deals with episteme, 1 which, according to the OED denotes ―Scientific knowledge, a
system of understanding,‖ and to The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and
Cultural Criticism, indicates ―scientific or philosophical knowledge—wisdom‖ (Childers
(97). Gnosis, on the other hand, means knowledge in a more general sense, and that is the
area of gnoseology. Therefore, gnoseology includes epistemology under its broader
definition, much like romanticism includes transcendentalism and Gothicism, so that not
1

In contemporary critical theory, particularly structuralist and poststructuralist, episteme has acquired a
more expansive and complex meaning, which I do not explore because it is not relevant to the context
being discussed here.

119

all gnoseology is epistemology in the same way that not all Romanticism is
transcendentalism or Gothicism. This difference shows the realm of analysis of sophistry
versus that of philosophy. However, although arguably for philosophy in traditional
terms, epistemology is a kind of gnoseology. Another way of looking at this gradation is
to think of it in these terms: gnoseology is to epistemology as enthymeme is to syllogism.
While the premises of the syllogism are certain, those of the enthymeme, a rhetorical
syllogism popularized by Aristotle, are not. Ultimately, the distinction lies specifically in
Italy, where epistemology refers exclusively to that branch of gnoseology that addresses
scientific knowledge, or even more distinctively, the philosophy of science. This
differentiation also calls attention to the subtle nuances not only of different languages
but also of the theories of knowledge of various cultures; I believe that the English
speaking world would benefit from such a distinction and will develop this notion in
Chapter Five.
In terms of the use that Untersteiner makes of the word, the relationship between
the aristocratic man and his relationship with the community creates an idiosyncratic
gnoseological situation. A regulated life with firm customs delimits the desires of
individuals and, therefore, to the their self-actualization; however, individuals began to
question tradition based on the social events that saw those of noble birth as fluctuating
between innovatory self-determination and a yielding to community traditional roles. As
the aristocrats lost their place as the sole members of the community, the role of the
individual as a gnoseological and ethical entity became a problem. Werner Jaeger
explains,
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The Athenian state . . . made every free-born citizen of Athenian descent consider
himself a member of the Attic community, and qualified him to serve it. This was
simply an extension of the idea of kinship through blood, but now the community
was composed of the members of one city, not the members of a few noble
families. That was the only possible basis for the city-state . . . [placing] a new
emphasis on individual personality. (287)

Because it comes into question, the social condition of individuals in this period can more
accurately be described, or perhaps more accurately in Italy, as falling within the realm of
gnoseology, occurring within the cognition of the individuals involved, who began
questioning the aristocratic position as divinely ordained through lineage.
This challenging of tradition proves crucial to Untersteiner‘s argument because
compliance with community beliefs gave way to a pioneering autonomy during this time.
Relativism inevitably unleashed itself over the Hellenic world, for beliefs held onto for
centuries were now being disputed, opening up a space for individual will, a space that
proved threatening to and accelerated the degeneration of the aristocracy, as individual
freedom diverged from the confines set by a universal concept.
As a result of the pervasive relativism, the aristocracy latched on to eternal ideas
in a desperate attempt to retain its power. The values that the aristocracy recovered and
exhorted do not translate easily in modern terms. Two fundamental political principles
are the concepts of αιδώρ, or aidos, and δίκη or dike. Αιδώρ translates as reverence or
respect for others; its meaning emerges from the personification of the goddess of shame,
modesty, and humility. Albrecht Dihle explains that it can be defined as ―a collective or
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prospective conscience which persuades [hu]man to apply the moral standards of
his[/her] society to a situation where he [or she] has to act‖ (23). This function can make
it ―the principal obstacle for any action whatsoever, since it makes a [hu]man aware and,
perhaps, afraid of the ensuing reactions to his[/her] deed and of other discomforts that
may possibly result from it‖ (23—24). Therefore, αιδώρ may prevent individuals from
acting at all, despite their being obliged to do so, for it offers appealing justifications to
remain inactive, supporting the ―indolence and timidity of human nature‖ (24). Δίκη or
dike loosely translated as justice, is usually considered the leading Greek virtue. Again,
expressing the full worth of the concept proves beyond the scope of this dissertation and
has been the subject of many studies in itself, among which Eric Havelock‘s The Greek
Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato. These concepts,
nevertheless, represent the basis of aristocratic society in opposition to νόμοι (nomoi),
which can translate as law but that the Greeks used for ―traditional customs‖ (Woodruff
114). The concept of νόμοι became the codeword for the common people. Broader still,
the concepts of harmony and philanthropy were attitudes and motivations of great
importance in aristocratic thought. Untersteiner assumes knowledge of these terms in his
audience so he does not define them nor transliterate them. Harmonia expresses ―the
principle of natural division into ruling and ruled‖ (Wood and Wood 163). Untersteiner
points out that these concepts share a social foundation based on a collective experience
that evolves into an abstraction.
By expressing an eternal and therefore ideal essence of the human being, the
aristocratic society generates a collective entity that serves as a creative force and a limit,
both an inspiration and a constraint. Jaeger again explains,
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Only at this stage of spiritual development are such problems as those of freedom
and authority, or education for citizenship and education for leadership, conceived
and answered, and only at this stage do they acquire their full urgency as
moulders of men‘s destiny. They do not arise in primitive societies, in herdcommunities, or family-communities where there is no conception of the power of
the human mind. (288)

The community, therefore, is a social phenomenon in need of interpretation, an
interpretation that the sophists alone would offer. The aristocracy latched on to anything
at this point as a desperate attempt to retain its power.
Religiosity is one of the ways in which the aristocracy contributes to the
consciousness of the community. Untersteiner points to Pindar once again, who as the
champion of the political and ethical ideals of the aristocracy, was apt to imbue his work
with Apollonism. This uncommon term refers to a one of two instincts, the other being
Dyonisism, and denotes a ―state of the human mind,‖ as Maximillian Mügge explains, on
which the development of art, a ―pure and direct [state] of Art,‖ depends: ―The
Apollonian instinct is a sort of dream of beauty‖ (105). Michael Haar explains that it
appeared in the ―Greek post-Socratic decadence after Homer‖ (168). Haar develops this
concept further and explains that in these states, art takes hold of the individual ―as a
force of nature,‖ further adding that ―the idea that Apollonism as ‗will to measure, to
simplicity, to submission to rule and concept‘ imposed itself on the Greeks after a long
struggle: it had to be conquered and secured by them ‗in the struggle against their own
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Asiaticism,‘ against the ‗taste for the measureless, for the complex, for the uncertain, for
the horrible‖ (163). This notion fits naturally with Untersteiner‘s contention that gods and
heroes become ethical concepts of universal validity to which individuals should aspire
and with which the aristocrats are naturally endowed. The individual can perfect himself
within the universality of a type, yet Pindar proclaims that the universal is the aristocratic
γένορ (genos), the bloodline. This universal aristocratic γένορ subsumed the many within
unity, despite the dichotomy of the individual versus the community. However, under this
conception, arête could not be carried out for it remained within the limits of the
aristocratic world since the individual would have to act even without the support of the
community.
The shift took time, for, as Untersteiner argues, the decline of the aristocracy was
merely apparent. In fact, despite these innovative currents, the population was inclined
towards ancient traditions that granted the aristocracy superiority and competence as the
leaders of the people. The idea of equality, though alluring, did not seem to fall within the
realm of the possible. Therefore, the aristocrats, by grasping onto certain eternal ideas,
retained their power, reaching a paradoxical situation in which they effectively became
the leaders of democracy on one hand while continuing to operate both as the official
party and in secret societies on the other. Ian Worthington supports this view, stating that
―[a]ristocratic families continued to use their family ties and friendships to gain
influence, and thus continued to dominate politics‖ (256). The aristocracy, then,
assimilates democracy in a new society that has a broadened circle of privileged
individuals. However, the concept of community remains and expands from the
aristocratic spirituality within the democratic epoch.
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This notion of unity in the bloodline of a γένορ survives notwithstanding the
decline of the aristocracy due to a transformation. The relationship between human
beings and their γένορ extended to all people within a community, and the universal state
replaces the Delphic and aristocratic universal. Physis becomes the primordial essence of
human beings. The universal value of the community and the problem of individual
abilities remain apparent to historians, such as Aristotle, but the collective ambition is
wide enough not to be surpassed by any individual conception. The collective, then, ends
up dimming individualism, although political struggles and the intensity of passions
revive the issue which is hindered by the universal idea.
Untersteiner then touches on the role of war, to which he will devote an entire
section later on in the essay, in presenting the problem of individual responsibility before
the people, yet no open controversy emerged, for the individual remained within the
universality of the community. Still in the second half of the fifth century, the aristocracy
is suspicious of prominent characters, whose individualism is targeted by poets such as
Phrynichus and Aristophanes and who are still conceived as ―types.‖ Jaeger explains,

Greek reflection on the nature of education lays great stress on the concepts of
ηςπορ [tupos, type] and ηςποςν [tupoun, types], even when the spontaneous
individual factor in this process is strongly felt, as by the sophists or by Plato.
This concept is the heritage of the early aristocratic ideal of education. Needless
to say, the content of the later Platonic ideal type of human personality differed
greatly from that of the early aristocratic world; but the education process as such
was still visualized in the same terms of moulding. (422)
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Social life, then, for Untersteiner, fuels an interest in human typology, for features of this
typology define the main forces that act in the complex world of humanity. Therefore,
this age does not reach the overall concept of ―character‖ although it identifies the
elements that constitute it. The universal and the individual flounder, and aristocratic
spirituality remains to be surpassed.
Untersteiner‘s argument then points toward the shaping of individual autonomy
that occurs at the origins of democratic thinking and, by extension, sophistry. This novel
and explicitly political conception of the social order raised doubts and questions.
Cynthia Farrar elaborates on this point, arguing that, ―All personal qualities and aims
were politicized and converted into properties of—or seen in relation to—the community
as a whole. Aristocratic influence and values were expressed in democratic terms‖ (28).
This gradual shift calls to mind the mythological types of human character that were
being left behind at this point but that continued to live on in a more humanistic
interpretation of social life. Untersteiner argues that sophistry developed because the
sophists had to explain to the people what was happening, so this process played a huge
role in the formation of the social foundation from which the sophistic movement
emerged. Nevertheless, despite the apparent changes in historical terms, Untersteiner
does not find significant psychological and gnoseological differences in the typology of
Greek human existence.
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Sophistical Theories Regarding Community and Individual
Untersteiner explores the theories of the sophists regarding community and individual in
the second section of his discussion of the crisis of the aristocracy. In this view,
Protagoras tackles the contradictory between type and individual, between universal and
particular human being, as a problem that needs to be resolved urgently by constructing a
dialectic of human gnoseology based on the terms posed by social reality. As ―the
measure of all things,‖ the human being masters for him/herself the knowableness of
reality contradictory as it may be. This gap can be closed through a relativistic
phenomenalism of the individual when the knower transforms experiences free of value
into experiences with value. Therefore, the individual knower becomes the representative
of the interest of the community, which is the total sum of individuals of certain
category—doctors, farmers, orators, sophists, and others—united, gnoseologically
speaking, by the coherence of relative knowableness of a definite experience. This
revolutionary view posits that only the collective human being, the human being in
general, the type is able to perfect the experiences of individual welfare.
As a result, in the evolution of civilization, the state of perfection is achieved
when the life of the polis is held up by δίκη (dike, justice) and αιδώρ (aidos, mutual
respect), ethical motivations that also make up the πολιηική απεηή (politke arête, political
virtue) of the aristocracy, that bring individuals to unity. For Protagoras, then, all the
expressions of life are contained within the paradigm of a universalizing leveling
concept. Compared to the aristocratic position that had renewed the socio-political
practice, Protagoras innovates because he transposes a compound of scattered and
instinctive experiences into a coherent system, translating the social phenomenon of the
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annihilation of individual for collective interest into a philosophical concept defined as
the ―major possibility for knowledge.‖
The philosophical and rationalistic idea of community is a fundamental issue for
other sophists such as Antiphon and Hippias. They theorize that the concrete actions of
individuals become the universality of κοινοί νόμοι (koinoi nomoi, common laws). This
conception of universal laws, identical for everyone, is clear when the individual physis
recognizes a universal and essential physis above itself, according to an anonymous
treatise Περι νόμωι (About Laws). Such a rationalistic solution had to clash with all the
difficulties of universal concepts and with reality that could not be reduced to conceptual
uniformity, as felt by Lycophron in particular who must have critiqued the idea to deny it
any possible ethics. As a result, the collective unity of individuals is an ideal more than a
reality.
Sophistry concerns itself with typical characterology, which is always an
expression of the universal. The OED defines characterology as ―The science of
character, esp. of its development, types, and individual differences.‖ Hippias, who took
on the problem of character, extricates it from the good/evil antithesis, as does Prodicus
with Heracles, which illustrates the education of Heracles (Ramelli 62). According to
these two sophists, the character-type is created by that very antithesis, from which
emerges the distinctly political typology of aristocratic spirituality.
For the sophists, however, the will determines the character of the individual,
though in different ways. Albrecht Dihle examines the ideas that the Greeks held about
human action, explaining that according to the Greeks,
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. . . moral freedom is guaranteed by the free intellectual activity of the human
mind, which leads, however, to a proper insight into the immutable laws that
determine the whole of reality. On the other hand, awareness of one‘s own
intellectual deficiency as well as of one‘s inescapable duty towards human affairs
seems to be essential in free and responsible human activities. Apparently, man
has to rely on the rational order of being and on his intellect, which is supposed to
be able to evaluate, according to that order, the means and end of action. On the
other hand, man has to be fully conscious of his own intellectual deficiencies, for
he is doomed to become a part of that order through his action despite his inability
to perceive the whole of reality. This universal dilemma was particularly strongly
felt in Greece. (47)

Untersteiner points to Protagoras for an elaboration of this concept. For Protagoras, the
stronger logos constructs, through an act of will, the ethical values of human community.
This view appears in a recent treatment of this sophist. In Protagoras and the
Challenge of Relativism, Ugo Zilioli, fellow of the University of Parma, underscores the
autonomy of the individual in the ethical life of the polis, arguing that ―In the light of the
understanding of Protagoras‘ perceptual relativism . . . the individual should be taken to
be fully autonomous in his own relativistic knowledge‖ (103). Nevertheless, ultimately
Protagoras views ethical rules as being ―the mediated expression (through a communal
discussion)‖ of the reaction of a group of people taking part in the debating process of an
ethical matter (105). The will, to continue with Untersteiner, in the moment of decision,
bolsters the high point of individual action for Gorgias, as well as Prodicus. Finally,
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Critias renders the individual, according to his will, as imposing social ethics upon the
universality of law. Therefore, despite their mixed solutions, the bearing of the will factor
is common to all the sophists, political life having perceived its effectiveness, but it is
also a difficult problem, necessary for the dictation of the universal both in the name of
the community and of the individual.
Untersteiner concludes this section by stating that the fundamental attitude of
aristocratic thought hinged on the community-individual alternative and therefore on its
typical characterology. Due to its persistence within social and political practice, this
attitude had to force itself on the speculative thought of the sophists, who created a
universal concept of socio-political experience and rendered individual human attitudes
effective as typical paradigms for individuals to function within social life.

Relativistic Experience of an Aristocratic Society Seeking to Reconstruct Its Ideals.
One of the primary areas of congruity within sophistic thought lies within the relativistic
dissolution of values. Hellenic humanism reached this conclusion in different ways.
Untersteiner touches on the relations of travelers who comparing Hellenic with barbarian
laws and customs could not but reach the conclusion that what were once considered
eternal and indestructible traditions held no value in any other place. Nevertheless, he
considers this crucial influence to be a predominantly cultural rather than social
phenomenon.
Untersteiner considers the social events, which caused great upheaval, to have
been overwhelming, even to Pindar. Reason or the νοςρ (nous) becomes a problem under
the thrust of political contrasts, ceasing to be absolute. With the advent of the democratic
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order, the rational possibility of determining the truth of things within the realm of
political experience disappears. As a result, positive law has no value.
The consequences of this theoretical position developed in two ways. The
inflexible and unitary νόμορ (nomos), on which the democratic struggle against the
Persians had hinged and had met the fiercest opposition from the aristocracy, raised the
doubt regarding the validity of aristocratic laws. According to Josiah Ober in his Mass
and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People, this
event promoted the development of democracy. While no single cause can be provided,
he asserts that experience of the Persian Wars ―helped to hasten the evolution of the
democratic order‖ (83). Furthermore, Untersteiner continues, the aristocrats were altering
laws arbitrarily, molding them according to necessity yet claiming these laws as
expressions of divine will. The relativism of customs and, by extension, the laws inherent
within them, can be accepted, according to Pindar, since the revolutions of the time
confirm it, as long as the divine continues to be recognized.
The discovery of the relativism of the law, so acutely felt and accentuated by the
aristocrats, produced an additional result. If a law was variable within a people and
between peoples, ethics also lost its foundation that human beings considered
indisputable. W.K.C. Guthrie describes this time as one when people

. . . are entering a world in which not only sweet and bitter, hot and cold, exist
merely in belief, or by convention, but also justice and injustice, right and wrong.
Doubts about the order and stability of the physical world as a whole, and the
dethronement of divinity in favour of chance and natural necessity as causes, were
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seized upon by upholders of the relativity of ethical conceptions and became part
of the base of their case. (59)
To grapple this difficulty, the aristocracy elaborates the concept of ―unwritten laws,‖
which can be aristocratic laws of sacral origin as much as those laws valid for all people,
founded on the universality of nature, as extended by the favored cosmopolitanism of the
aristocracy. Untersteiner views this move against the relativism of the written laws as yet
another attempt of the aristocracy to grasp on to conservative currents.
The sophists retrieved and offered nuanced interpretations for this social problem
formulated by an aristocracy attempting to save itself, as evidenced in the doctrines of
Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Antiphon. In particular, Untersteiner calls attention to
the anxiety of a return to ―the ancestral constitution‖ (πάηπιορ πολιηεία or patrios
politeia) welcomed by Thrasymachus and proclaimed as valid by virtue of the divine
nature. The sophistic age, in its moments of spiritual return to the aristocratic world,
translates the ancient idea of unwritten laws according to an antidemocratic sociopolitical program. The relativism and the attempts to resolve it in a spiritual manifestation
free of quarrels find their primordial schemes within the struggle of rearranging the
aristocratic consciousness and ideals.

The Aristocrats and the Problem of Teaching Virtue.
The teachableness of virtue is among the most demanding social problems faced by the
sophistic age. This question was also raised by the aristocracy in crisis. The possibility of
teaching virtue is antithetical to the aristocratic idea that virtue be ―by nature,‖ as Pindar
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often proclaims. Hippias offers an explicit polemic to this conception. Nevertheless,
despite the deep conviction that natural abilities are decisive within the teaching of virtue,
the recognition that bad company can bring to moral ruin and that instruction cannot
make someone wise once again leads to the dispersion of educational values so dear to
the aristocrats. The subversion of the value of social classes is such that the aristocrat
began doubting the very foundation of απεηή (arête or virtue), placing, therefore, the
problem of its teachableness in genuine dramatic turmoil, for admitting its possibility
would place in question the very conception of aristocracy.
The political drama of an entire segment of society becomes a challenging
gnoseological problem in the thought of the sophists. However, Untersteiner reminds the
reader that sophistic education, while based on the development of individual rather than
inherited abilities, nonetheless applies primarily to the leaders of rather than the common
people, so the former aristocratic problem returns in a new form, as, in general, the kind
of education in vogue in the fifth century BCE was directed towards the life of the
nobles. Catherine Osborne discusses this paradox, arguing that ―the Sophists offered an
expensive private education, yet the market for it thrived best in a democratic culture;
they presented themselves as great facilitators of democratic procedures, yet their effect
was to secure advantages for the well-to-do‖ (113). The social pressure of the educational
problem caused a clash between aristocratic education and a politico-democratic
conception, one of the shaping causes of the nomos-physis controversy.
The reaction to this controversy emerges as one of the most prominent
contributions of the sophists, who according to Jaeger all taught political arête and were
―the inventors of intellectual culture and of the art of education which aims at producing
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it‖ (293). The role of the development of democracy once again emerges as crucial in the
emergence of sophistry. The debates about whether virtue could be taught ―were
implicitly debates about whether the upper classes should have to share political power
with lower classes‖ (Rawson 218). The way to political power in a democracy was based
on rhetorical abilities.

The Aristocratic Crisis and Constitutional Conceptions of Sophistry.
The stimuli provided by the social drama of the aristocracy within a politically won world
are indeed numerous. The aristocracy supplied themes proposed not only by its social
drama but also of thought already elaborated by a particular social, political, and
philosophical experience of a former time. These influences emerge in Pythagoreanism,
which was of sharply aristocratic politics. Thus, the contradictory presence of both
oligarchic and democratic sophists loses its peculiarity.
Untersteiner considers the constitutional drama of the second half of the fifth
century BCE to be fully driven by the power of the aristocratic political ethos, so
sophistry suffers under the dichotomy tyranny (or aristocracy) versus democracy and
especially the more recent sophists fluctuate between these two political conceptions.

Sophistic Problems in the Political Struggles of the Fifth Century
Untersteiner finds that the social and political themes were set by the aristocracy because
it had to deal with the problem of granting citizens rights that did not flow logically from
the traditions of their society. Original possibilities remain, influenced by new forms
established on the unrest of the past. The problem of the individual was pressing at the
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time of political struggles and revolutions, which stimulate the inventiveness ready to
evolve fully, also because political choices call for analytical consideration to warrant an
autonomous decision. Democracy favors θςμοόρ [thumos, emotional impulses, soul],
which is the catalyst to independence, as Untersteiner finds in Hippocrates‘ De aere aquis
et locis, which is often considered the earliest occurrence of the nomos/physis distinction.
Untersteiner points once again to the problem of the individual, this time in
relation to the state. The favored constitutional form is the one that benefits the most, and
the criterion of utility may lead to indifference. Here Untersteiner finds the beginning of
legal principles conceived as benefitting a particular self-interest so that it appears
reduced to economy. Therefore, the constitutional problem is an effect of social life that
concerns all citizens. The notion of constitution began defining itself in its potential types
only with the democracy of Cleisthenes, who definitively determined the principle of
ιζοννμία or isonomia.
Isonomia denotes equality in front of the law. Wood and Wood identify this
concept as ―the principle of political equality‖ (179). Josiah Ober calls it the ―political
slogan of Cleisthenes‘ reform‖ (74). Possibly coined by Athenian aristocrats as an antityrannical catchphrase, the term denotes ―equality of participation in making decisions
(laws) that will maintain and promote equality and that will bind all citizens equally‖
(75). Isonomia can be considered as the opposite of the political principle harmonia,
which I defined above, and became the ―expressive symbol of a democratic constitution‖
(Wood and Wood 163—64).
However, Untersteiner continues, these constitutional forms, though finally
defined, did not immediately pose the specific problem of political programs and parties.
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Sure enough, immediately after the Persian wars, the Athenian democracy was stirred
once again by an unstable, agitated, and unequal trend until the second half of the fourth
century. This situation presented the problem of the relativism of forms of government.
The political struggles intensified. The contrast between political factions caused the need
for political doctrines. Within their clashes, however, the problem of the best form of
government found no solution, causing the perception of the practical insolubility
regarding the best form of government. The concept of profit, utility, or usefulness
thereby dissipated every theoretical essential inherent in any constitution.
All the discussions that, starting at the time of the Peloponnesian war, were raised
regarding the problem of the forms of constitutions, both in terms of their essence and in
relation to their genesis, were imposed by social conditions. The sophists take on as
unavoidable the study of the political event, the validity of law, and the meaning of
constitutions because of the constitutional drama of Athens, which, after its victory over
Persia, had amplified the play of forces that affected its fate. The incursion of new needs,
such as maritime politics, works to create a particular type of government, almost as
though it were a natural organization. The author of the Constitution of Athenians
resolves a political circumstance when he discovers the coherence of democracy despite
hating it, according to Untersteiner. Because it turns into a decisive factor urging on
consciousness, sociality becomes a political phenomenon that solicits a practice as much
as a theory.
Untersteiner views not only the theorizing on the forms of governments but also
their giving of contrasting answers of the sophists as implicit proof of the contradictory
nature of reality. Otherwise, an identical intention would not have reached conflicting
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conclusions. The play of political parties relativized the concept of truth and error.
Untersteiner points towards Aristophanes and Euripides.

War
The problem of profit or utility clearly demonstrates the meaning of war, so that for the
first time during the Peloponnesian war, the economy formed the generative force of this
social phenomenon, which also brought the economy to a critical condition—a matter
suffered by all and therefore to be interpreted. Sophistry, which carried out most of its
activity during this dramatic historical period, noticed the action produced by social life
in its pathological expression of an armed conflict. The problem attracted the sophists all
the more because they were, usually, opposed to wars.
When induced by profit, human conduct will at some point become problematic
due to the relativism that the concept entails and that occurs when seen in economic
terms. However, profit is not the only element of the dissolution of values due to wars.
The justness that, before the Persian wars, was founded on self-control and was therefore
the consequence of individual temperament, began to lose that base that originated from
the political spirituality of the aristocrats. As he mentions earlier, Untersteiner recalls the
problematic of great political figures of the time who act according to criteria that shun
traditional norms of right and wrong. Further, the war had laid the premises for an
inversion of values, and the struggles between parties had become a power that behaved
harshly both in internal politics and international relations. This play of interests ended up
resulting in new ideas. The culmination of these contrasts occurred during the
Peloponnesian war, especially in Attica, where the military operations caused a clash
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between the conservative people of the countryside and the progressive ones of the cities.
Therefore, Untersteiner views the war as responsible for class spirit and party that led to
opposite political theories, of which the sophists became the representatives.
Furthermore, the immediate, almost abstract, contrast among laws and among
customs dramatized within a social reality in which antithesis appears as the fundamental
norm, brought to an exacerbated obviousness by the narrow confines of the polis, an ideal
location to pinpoint opposites and signal their incompatibility. With Pericles, the class
war that had exploded fatally within aristocratic regimes had led to the triumph of the
proletariat, which caused the most paradoxical reactions from the adversaries. In these
conditions of high social tension and an unstable balance, theory appeared spontaneously
until reaching the ideal of Antiphon, who wanted to see the class war to end, as well as
the clash between lineages, such as the fatal one between Hellenics and barbarians.
Untersteiner views this universal anxiety that reached cosmopolitanism as
emerging from the dramatic anguish of the Peloponnesian war. Cosmopolitanism—which
is in the very nature of the sophistic mindset and that was theorized by Hippias and
Antiphon—conveys a very complex moment for the Hellenics and their social needs, to
the point that not all sophists were able to comprehend its importance. To support this
view, Untersteiner points toward the Hellenic/barbarian antithesis that had originated
under Darius with the founding of the Persian Empire and materialized with the Persian
wars between 490 and 479 BCE. A political problem had emerged from this antithesis:
the opposition between tyranny, which was subjugated by Persia, and Hellenic
democracy. Untersteiner finds the issue of cosmopolitanism in Antiphon, who notes that
the law did not correspond to the requirements of ιζοννμία or isonomia. Isonomia, which
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Guthrie renders as ―equality before the law‖ (126), required contrasts to be surpassed
without residuals. The sophist seems to say that the absolute value of isonomia rather
than cause the Hellenic-barbarian opposition, which had in fact happened, had actually
assuaged it. Isonomia became the abolishment of all law to restore the natural physis, in
terms of human and universal sociality, and can thus be called cosmopolitanism.
The implications of Untersteiner‘s argument are still open to debate. While some
scholars, such as Nestle, Havelock, and Guthrie, credit Antiphon with a full-blown theory
of the unity, equality, and even brotherhood of all humankind, others stress the biological
emphasis of Antiphon‘s argument and are unconvinced of its cosmopolitanism
implications. Gerard Pendrick, however, finds the cosmopolitanism of Antiphon‘s
argument hard to deny, for the argument ―affirms the natural similarity of all human
beings, while simultaneously devaluing the importance of cultural differences among
them‖ (355). Therefore, Pendrick deems Antiphon‘s Fragment 44 as ―evidence for an
embryonic form of cosmopolitanism in the later fifth century‖ (355). Untersteiner also
holds this view.
A particular situation evolved in the consciousness of the Hellenics, despite the
concurrence of other social events,2 causing a social problem that reconnected to the
cultural κοινή (koine: common or shared), due to the collaboration of Greeks and nonGreeks in the age of rhapsodes and following until Darius. Κοινή refers to the cultural
popular form of Greek that appeared in the fifth century BCE when Attic and Ionic
started approximating each other and was not surprising given the power of Athens over
the Ionians (Andrados 177). Untersteiner proposes that this κοινή, now relived as a
2

See Translation ―The War‖ section.
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question posed by social conditions caused by the Peloponnesian war—which intensified
the class wars—aspired to internal, as well as external, peace, and established itself as a
great idea that actualized only after Alexander.
However, Untersteiner views the Hellenic-barbarian antithesis as dramatic in the
cultural and social world of the fifth century, even while patriotism caused an uproar that
stifled contrary views. Cosmopolitanism amounted to a problem that occurred during the
Persian wars and became a theoretical issue at the time of the sophists, who were
determined by the social imperative of the class war. While celebrating the triumph of
Hellenic patriotism, Aeschylus‘ The Persians also presents the unsolvable controversy of
patriotism and cosmopolitanism, of the individual and the universal.
The class war entailed cosmopolitanism also in another way. The aristocrats
refrained from attending the assembly, not wanting to participate in public life where the
demos predominated, contributing to cosmopolitism by means of this abstentionism.
Once again, the aristocratic turmoil contributes to a complex social circumstance.
Untersteiner concludes that the problems brought on by the war and picked up by the
sophists cause a critical dissolution of values which create universal social experiences.

Problems Raised by Religion.
The Persian wars unsettled traditional religion, making it utterly problematic. The
religious organization of the polis faded when the wars made religion subordinate to the
ideas of state so as to favor the freedom of the human spirit and fix the attention of the
people on the physical world. Religion thus became a social issue, so, for example, the
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Athenians used it in terms of their pan-Hellenic project. From the political point of view,
religion becomes tinged with rationalism, beginning its dissolution.
The denial of the transcendent was the critical movement within religion that 1)
does not concern itself with afterlife, 2) conceives divine forms in an aesthetic way, 3)
faced with sudden mutations within historical events, does not see a safe divine line of
action in the order of things, and 4) does not respond to the new needs that appeared after
the collapse of the ancient social and political order. A true corruption of the sacred and,
therefore, its outcome in the realm of relativism spread during the pentecontaetia.
Even internally, the religious phenomenon contradicts and dissolves itself.
Untersteiner points to the double value of the sacred, which can certainly operate in both
good and evil without making this twofold conclusion the foundation of the religious
phenomenon. This lack of a standpoint toward religious values indicates a distinct
moment in human knowledge. Gorgias‘ dramatic critique of knowledge starts in the
antithetical ambiguity of reasons that are also sacred though transferred in the analytical
sphere.
The circumstance of an unsolvable antithesis is characteristic of the sacred, but
Untersteiner pursues it in what he considers to be an even more significant domain. The
law is recognized as duplicitous: proclaimed as sacred and immutable on one hand, yet
viewed as human or even secular on the other and therefore subject to change. These
opposites were thus confounded in practice. This ambivalence, which forms the
foundation of the concept‘s relativism, derives from the twofold meaning that both
θεζμόρ (thesmos: institution) and νομόρ (nomos: law) can take of sacred and secular law.
Drawing on Ostwald, Ian Morris elucidates that thesmos “implied ‗something imposed
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by an external agency, conceived as standing apart and on a higher plane than the
ordinary,‘ while the fifth-century word, nomos, implied something ‗motivated less by the
authority of the agent who imposed it than by the fact that it is regarded and accepted as
valid by those who live under it‘‖ (53). Untersteiner states the Greek experiences in
general have always been sacred and secular in the past, illustrating with the account of
Hellanicus, who identifies Physis with Adrasteia, the ancient pre-Hellenic goddess and
mother, ordainer of the inflexible laws of existence. Sophistry took on the problematic
nomos and physis that fluctuated within the social consciousness of the religious human
being.
Particularly in the second half of the fifth century, another religious occurrence
contributed in presenting urgent problems for sophistic thinking. Greek religion absorbed
the foreign religions that percolated right after the Persian wars and which are welcomed
by the masses while the upper classes were inclined to a more universal rationalization
and elaboration. Both displayed dissatisfaction with old forms and a search for new
resolution. Traditional values, however, due to this comparison of religious forms,
suffered decisive blows, so the concepts of just, true, and others, once again proved
problematic. Untersteiner finds the most direct reverberation of this religious movement,
which could have easily slid into aberrant forms of superstition, in Antiphon‘s
Interpretation of Dreams, which is an expression of a relativistic and rationalistic
mindset, once again demonstrating the imperative that the sophists felt towards problems
within social life.
Generally, Hellenic religion posed the problem of the individual in many ways.
The Homeric human similar to a god soared high with his marvelous creations within a
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free society. Because individual initiative is crucial in foreign beliefs, these convert to
exultation of human beings and manifestations of intellectualism within Greek land.
The forms of religion, whose impassioned impetus created the antithesis to
reason, to say the least favored the elaboration of rhetoric and sophistic gnoseology.
Untersteiner asserts that rhetoric is indebted to sacred poetry in terms of the elaboration
of its stylistic forms and rhetorical figures, transforming them within Hellenic religious
society and transferring them into the supreme realm of art. Similarly, he attributes the
pathetic impetus of eloquence of some sophists to the ecstatic passion of orgiastic cults.
Hellenic religion also suggested a gnoseological theme. Hellenics believed that
every word could become a divinity, for language was viewed as the primordial
revelation by means of the logos, which revealed the divine to humanity by giving
humans the ability to express it. For the Hellenes, the logoi and the gods were many. The
significance of logos thus developed in two ways: 1) the rationalistic way, which brought
to the fore the contrast between unity and plurality implied by logos, so that its
ambivalence became apparent; and 2) the naturalistic and metaphysical way, which made
it the receptacle of the most radical reality of things. Here Greek philosophical-religious
etymology, when considering the word physis, thinks it expresses essence, of which it
claims to be the name, as seen in Heraclitus and Aeschylus. From the reflections of the
multiple possibilities within the nature of logos, Untersteiner identifies two sophistic
speculations. For one, the Gorgian doctrine of logos, in its ambivalence according to the
developments in Helen and the treaty On Nature or On Non-Being, determined the
persuasive effectiveness of logos in keeping with the irrational ways of religious
experience. Scott Consigny addresses this very issue in Gorgias: Sophist and Artist,
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stating that ―Gorgias repudiates the project of apprehending the truth in On Not-Being
though the artificial categories of the Eleatics. Insofar as we accept these categories as
real, we will remain separated from true experience, for every rational account of
objective truth is false or deceptive‖ (46). Untersteiner‘s other example is the rationalistic
close examination of Prodicus, which starting with the etymology of the word, its physis,
turns logos into nomos, to be found in its every manifestation, read synonym. Schiappa
develops this point, writing that ―Prodicus emphasized correct speech (orthoepeia)—a
clear example of the new rationalistic approach to logos‖ (Protagoras 79).
Hellenic religiosity, then, exerted considerable influence on sophistry, also by
way of tragedy, a social phenomenon in its origins as much as in its manifestation within
high Attic poetry, which brought to the suffering of the tragic and the unsolvable
dissension between human beings and the gods, since Dionysian religion displays the
contradictions of the world. Swartz comments on this connection, stating that art
―contributed to the spiritual and political life of the community,‖ an example of which is
Greek tragedy, and that the purpose of catharsis was ―to purge the emotion of an audience
of its socially unhealthy elements and to reconnect the audience to the human condition,
as defined by the status quo of the community‖ (25). To Untersteiner, however, tragedy
and its religious-popular origins gave the Hellenes a tragic sense of existence, an
essentially sophistic problem, and he considers Gorgias‘ On Not-Being as the social
experience of tragedy and of the poets in ontological and gnoseological terms.
Another social phenomenon with religious undertones is religion itself. As the
interpreter of authority, religion aims to achieve obedience and discipline from the
people. According to sophistic thought, the state, which had to have had a genesis,
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presented itself as created by gods and demigods or heroes, representatives of the very
first social revolutions but actually operated by human beings, as explained by Protagoras
and Critias, who gives an unscrupulously explicit view of the religion, understood as a
human intervention with the most contradictory consequences. Sophistry, then, has
provided secular interpretations of religious phenomena derived from social life.

The Problem of Techné
The last issue that Untersteiner considers is the issue of techné, which exerted
considerable influence on the speculative thought of the sophists. The widespread and
certain spread of the technai had begun already in the sixth century BCE but that properly
belongs to the sophistic age. At this time, workers were valued to the point that they
could come forward and assert themselves as political men, as did Cleon and Hyperbolos,
who are from the world of δημιοπγοί or demorgoi, which means craftsmen, or literally
someone who works for the people, as indicated by its root demo-.
This event is a sign of a tacit social revolution, causing a gnoseological problem
for those who stood astonished by this unprecedented occurrence. An assembly made up
of shoemakers, carpenters, farmers, and the like, to the aristocrats appeared as completely
incapable of judging political matters. Therefore, the question of the gnoseological value
of the technai was raised, and in this domain the answers of sophistry are once again
antithetical. Protagoras implies the devaluation of the technai by demolishing their
theoretical foundation, at least in regards to personal experience. Similarly, in Antiphon,
technai corresponds to the relativistic human world before absolute physis.
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On the other hand, the technai may have appeared so connected by a rational
orderliness that they were judged the governing guidelines of life and a sign of progress;
therefore, Prodicus renders the history of civilization as founded on the progressive
discovery of the arts, Hippias follows in kind exalting them, and Critias concerns himself
with knowing the origin of inventions. The social situation takes over the speculative zeal
of the sophists, who see a theoretical problem and once again tackle it in different ways.

Conclusion
Untersteiner concludes that sophistry articulated the social conditions of its specific
historical moment. While he acknowledges that the sophists offered contrasting
interpretations, he considers them humanists and philosophers of their age, although their
very humanism kept their way of thinking from becoming dialectic. Ultimately, he views
the crisis of the aristocracy as most significant, offering the most fruitful site for sophistic
thought. His closing sentence, in which he calls attention to the philosophical nature of
the sophistic enterprise, is a distinct challenge to the early and middle—but not late—
Plato. In Phaedrus, Plato‘s last dialogue, Plato gives the sophists some credit, especially
Isocrates, who is sometimes included among the sophists, stating that, ―There is
something of philosophy in him.‖ Untersteiner is advancing the same argument.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

―Whoever does not study rhetoric will be a victim of it.‖
Ancient Greek wall inscription.

The general misrepresentation of the concept of sophistry and of the ideas undergirding
the movement holds foreboding consequences for Western societies because they not
only incorrectly represent the cultural and social role of sophistry but also do not
acknowledge the power that sophistry and its main subject of instruction rhetoric provide
to societies that deem themselves democratic. By definition, democracy calls on the
people, the demos, to rule or at least contribute to ruling themselves through rhetorical
participation. Not acknowledging the (proper) role of sophistry and the importance of
rhetoric in contemporary social contexts denies citizens both the knowledge and the tools
needed to participate actively within a democratic society. In this chapter I offer my view
of sophistry in terms of its rhetorical and pedagogical value, including its implications for
contemporary society, the university, and relevance to the composition classroom in
particular. Untersteiner‘s ―new‖ chapter suggests that social conditions are a primary
cause of human agency and the creation of social formations. Drawing on Untersteiner, I
question current social conditions and the way in which contemporary rhetorical theory
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and composition practice relate to these issues. Finally, I argue for a reintegration of
selected sophistic practices in contemporary composition theory. In the process, I
speculate upon the connections I see between sophistry and rhetoric and composition,
positing the composition instructor as a potential modern-day sophist, or what remains
possible after millennia of scorn begun by Plato.

Pedagogical and Rhetorical Value of Sophistry
The sophistic movement suggests numerous distinguishing characteristics although it was
never a coherent and organized movement as such. Despite the numerous differences
among individual sophists, the sophists shared a number of characteristics that allow a
modern day definition to be elaborated. Naturally, a distinction between ―good‖ and
―bad‖ sophists exists today as it did in antiquity. I address this differentiation before
turning to the similarities that I deem valuable among the sophists.
Most human matters can be expressed and practiced in positive and negative
ways. For example, drugs, food, knowledge, rhetoric, advertising, even water can be used
or abused to produce positive or negative results. The work practiced by the sophists is no
exception. Plato himself has Gorgias state, ―[i]t is not the teachers who are bad, nor does
this mean that the art is responsible or bad, but rather, I think, those who use it
incorrectly. The argument would be the same in the case of rhetoric‖ (Dillon 61). The
sophists put their techné to positive and negative uses. Gorgias, for instance, persuaded
Athens to help his hometown, Leontini in Sicily, against its belligerent neighbor
Syracuse, leading to the war that eventually weakened Athens. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce
Herzberg suggest that, ―Perhaps this linkage of Sophistic rhetoric with dangerous
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statecraft helped to discredit it in the eyes of later thinkers such as Plato, Isocrates, and
Aristotle, who lived amid the social and political turmoil that followed Athens‘s golden
age, in which the sophists had dominated‖ (23). Aside from specifics, the sophists
instructed anyone who could pay their high fees,1 thereby positioning themselves as not
distinguishing between those who would put sophistic techné to good or bad use. In
addition, their epistemological relativism may be read as disregard for good practice.
Nevertheless, the sophists also shared qualities, principles, and goals that can hold great
value for the composition classroom today.
The sophists and sophistic rhetoric, as such, however, are neither formal nor
definitive classifications. Then again, classifications in general are always somewhat
suspect and often reconstructed upon reexamination. One scholar in particular has argued
against the notion of sophistic rhetoric, calling it ―a mirage.‖ In this early argument,
Edward Schiappa calls attention to the lack of unifying traits needed to form a sophistic
coherent whole and the use of the word rhetoric as never having been used by the
sophists, concluding that it is a ―fiction . . . we can do without‖ (Schiappa ―Oasis‖ 7—
16). Although well-argued, this view did not take account of the similarities between and
the pioneering contributions of the sophists. Schiappa himself has revised his position
since, now positing ―sophistic rhetorics‖ as a more useful and accurate denomination for
the diversity of projects labeled sophistic (Enos 683). Andrea Greenbaum commends
such ―creative imaginings [for] allow[ing] contemporary scholars to critique certain
notions of disciplinarity, since the discursive nature of sophistic discourse makes it a

1

Hakan Tell disputes this view in his recent article ―Wisdom for Sale?‖ and contends that ―factual details
regarding fees and monetary rewards for instruction is very scant‖ (30).
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creative theoretical tool in which to redefine and explore the epistemological boundaries
of disciplinary structures‖ (2). These ―creative imaginings‖ that are human categories,
classifications, and constructs could all be called ―fictions‖ created by communities of
like-minded peers. Most philosophers, Richard Rorty among them, however, agree that
we are manipulated by phenomenological forces that are quite ―real.‖ For my purpose, I
presuppose both human shared realities and a series of shared goals, qualities, and
congruous objectives in the sophists‘ teachings.
The most important issue for many sophists was their common goal of
encouraging arête by sustaining certain practices and methods, which I explore below.
Most scholars agree that the sophists created the conditions that may lead to virtuous
results. The English rendition of this concept is virtue or excellence in political affairs.
One of the primary requirements of political arête is rhetorical dexterity, by which I
mean the ability to speak/write, think, and read critically, analytically, and evaluatively.
Although the sophists did not use the word rhetoric to describe what they were teaching,
they inevitably imparted rhetorical skills, regardless of the appellation used, for these are
essential components of political arête. In order to be successful in political affairs, an
individual must be skilled in arguing, have a sound understanding of, and think critically
about political issues. The sophists teaching methods covered all these requirements, by
focusing on helping students ―to analyze cases, to think on their feet, to ask probing
questions, to speak eloquently, and to pose counterarguments to an opponent‘s case‖
(Herrick 37). All of these skills are part of rhetorical power. I use the word power
deliberately to indicate the stakes that are at play in acquiring and having mastery of
rhetoric, as I discuss below.
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Other qualities shared by all sophists emerge clearly in numerous more accounts.
These commonalities appear when one looks at those contributions that the sophists were
the first to introduce. Werner Jaeger, in his seminal work on Greek paideia, for example,
declares that sophists were the first to give ―wide publicity and influence to the claim that
arête should be founded on knowledge‖ (Paideia, Vol I, 289). Furthermore, Jaeger calls
Isocrates, one if not the greatest educator in Western humanism, a sophist, asserting that
Isocrates ―defended sophistic education‖ and ―was really a genuine sophist: indeed, it
was he who brought the sophistic movement in education to its culminating point‖
(Paideia, Vol. III, 48). The Cambridge Ancient History includes a section on sophistic
rhetoric, further judging the lectures and declamations of the most prominent sophists ―as
the most important single distinguishing mark of the Greek culture of this period‖
(Bowman et al 900). Even the authors of a traditional work as this one identify shared
qualities among the sophists, identifying them as their status as public teachers, their feecharging, and their public declamations (900—01). Omar Swartz offers a useful list of
the commonalities among the sophist, identifying the following six qualities as being
shared by all the sophists: the teaching of arête, the emphasis on rhetoric, the charging
for their services, the eristic tendency of their teaching, the tendency to engage in
displays of epideictic oratory, and their ability to ability to perorate on any subject (68—
69). Apart from the charging for their services, these qualities are all necessary for a
citizen to engage fully in the political life of a democratic society. As I see it, the sophists
encouraged political arête through rhetorical practice, the great forerunners of Isocrates.
The rhetorical value of sophistry is manifold but becomes of primary importance
in a free society. A democracy entails free speech which requires rhetoric. That the
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sophists, as teachers of rhetoric, appeared at the same time that democracy developed is
no surprise, for the driving force of democracy, at least in theory, is the inclusion of all
people in the political process. In order to participate, people must have the skills
necessary to understand rhetorical power, for whether anyone likes it or not, rhetoric is
omnipresent and pervasive, affecting every aspect of human interaction, particularly
those aspects that can control the means of access. I contend that no aspect of human life
and interaction is free of rhetoric. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his On Rhetoric and Language,
advocates this position, proffering that,

[i]t is not difficult to prove that what is called ‗rhetorical,‘ as a means of
conscious art, had been active as a means of unconscious art in language and its
development. . . . There is obviously no unrhetorical ‗naturalness‘ of language to
which one could appeal; language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts. The
power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with
respect to each thing . . . is, at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is
based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of
things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective
impulse and its acceptance. (21)

Rhetoric, then, is, consciously or unconsciously, a fact of human life, in which
communication is in effect rhetoric. As Kenneth Burke has noted, rhetoric ―is rooted in
an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is
continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation
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in beings that by nature respond to symbols‖ (Rhetoric 43). In a tyranny or any other
form of repressive political system, rhetoric, while still existing, becomes subjected to
coercive force.
Every eligible individual began taking part in the political process when
democracy emerged. To this end, G. B. Kerferd credits the sophists with―[producing] for
the first time in history a theoretical basis for participatory democracy‖ (Kerferd 144).
Several scholars consider democracy as a utopia, having never been realized, neither in
its birthplace 2,500 years ago nor in the United States today, for now as then access to
democracy restricts those who participate. Nevertheless, democracy is the current
political organization of this country and does offer considerable opportunities, providing
individuals with the possibility of self-determination, independence, and personal
development. The challenge, then, lies in enabling individuals, particularly students, to
recognize and employ these opportunities. Sophistry offers an approach for the
epistemological—or gnoseological, to use Untersteiner‘s terminology—questioning that
could lead to transformation and innovation needed to take advantage of democratic
opportunities more fully. Untersteiner‘s essay addresses the continual questioning despite
the different conclusions of the sophists on social issues as part of what makes them
similar.
Historically, the value of sophistry in terms of pedagogy lies in its universalizing
of education and leveling of human ability. Education before the sophists did not go
beyond what in today‘s terms would be primary school (Marrou 76). The sophists were
the first to recognize the importance of higher education and human development, ―the
great forerunners . . . the first teachers of advanced education, appearing at a time when
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Greece had known nothing but sports-trainers, foremen, and, in the academic field,
humble school masters‖ (79). In fact, Marrou believes that the only thing the sophists had
in common was their profession as teachers, the ―first teachers of advanced education‖
(79). Jaeger goes as far as recognizing them as having founded pedagogy, indicating that
―intellectual culture largely follows the path they marked out‖ (298). They did indeed
revolutionize the way in which human beings in Western civilization viewed education
by recognizing the power of each individual in shaping him/herself. ―La rivoluzione
pedagogica,‖ in Daniele Vignali‘s words, ―del movimento sofistico, si origina quindi da
una rivalutazione assoluta dell’educazione, a cui si riconoosce, per la prima volta nella
storia del pensiero occidentale, la possibilitá di far nascere in individuo la virtù‖ (57).
Vignali presents the sophistic movement as a pedagogical revolution that stems from the
absolute revaluation of education, which recognizes, for the first time in the history of
Western thought, the possibility of inducing virtue within individuals. Education and the
fostering of arête, therefore, run parallel in the contributions of the sophists.
Furthermore, their questioning of reality, which caused them to be maligned and
calumniated by Plato and others with claims to absolute truth, resurface in postmodernist
views of the last century or so. In terms of their ontological relativism, they were
thousands of years ahead of their time. Two basic tenets of their thought, therefore, are
the possibility of teaching arête and relativism. Even though the sophists conceived of
arête as markedly political, as explicitly claimed by Protagoras, Vignali finds another
equally important element in their education, asserting that while the majority of scholars
agree in considering sophistic education to be almost exclusively political, he views it as
having a twofold value: political and ethical (58—59). The ethical component of their
154

pedagogical practice relates to contemporary rhetorical and composition theory. Vignali
and others make a cogent case for this added dimension to sophistic pedagogy.
In terms of pedagogical practice, the sophists added essential and concrete
modifications to the revolutionary novelty of the possibility of teaching arête. Vignali
lists four subjects at the heart of sophistic education: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, and
general culture (62). These subjects, however, do not comprise the entire educational
system of the sophists. According to Luigi Gallinari, all the teachings of the sophists
aimed at the formation of two main human types: 1) the successful individual, able to
excel in society and reach elevated political positions, and 2) the new sophist (30). The
sophists sought to form an individual constantly striving towards self-improvement and
socio-political achievement, an individual able to determine, by way of his/her capacities,
the course of his/her life through intellect and words—in Vignali‘s words, an individual
―dotato di criticità di pensiero, antidogmatico, uno spirito libero abile nel parlare e
quindi nel pensare e nell’agire‖ (75). In other words, the sophists sought to create an
anti-dogmatic individual equipped with critical thinking, a free spirit skillful in thinking
and taking action. To do so, they aimed to instill a critical awareness and a sense of
radical doubt toward knowledge and traditional values, clearing the way for their
pedagogical practice, by refuting the rooted and dogmatic beliefs of their students
(Vignali 74). These practices have a clear political relevance and importance within a
democratic system. To add ethical dimension to arête, Vignali maintains that the sophists
believed in an exact correspondence existed between thought, speech, and action, based
on the "Anonymous Iamblichi" (77). Lastly, these pedagogical goals can be reached only
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if the student has some sort of natural predisposition and a passion toward learning.
Therefore, the sophists had to be able to foster a desire for learning in the student.
Achieving these goals, however, remains challenging. Untersteiner‘s essay
explores the social conditions that initiated sophistic inquiry in classical Greece.
Untersteiner argues that the critical social conditions created issues and raised questions
so pressing that they had to be addressed in order to be surpassed. These conditions were
groundbreaking and unprecedented to the point that they sparked an innovative
consciousness which introduced an inquisitive mindset. The social conditions in twentyfirst-century United States do not seem less urgent and pressing that did those in classical
Athens. I now turn to the major issues that Untersteiner identifies during the
pentecontaetia and how these may relate to current social conditions.

Current Social Conditions and the (Sophistic) Composition Classroom
One of the primary objectives of education in general and composition in particular
should be to promote a questioning mindset within students—a kind of epistemological,
gnoseological even, to use Untersteiner‘s term, self-reflexive turn. This kind of thinking
enables individuals not only to question their social conditions but also to promote
beneficial effects in terms of our multicultural postmodern condition. Bruce McComiskey
speaks of Gorgias as an ―ontological skeptic‖ and an ―epistemological relativist‖ (34—
35). These gnoseological concepts may help students achieve a questioning outlook
toward social conditions and by extension writing. In terms of education, a questioning
mindset helps students become critical citizens who can participate in the political
process and perhaps enact change. In terms of composition, such a mindset is necessary
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for critical thinking and analytical writing. Of the sophists‘ primary contributions to
Western thought and pedagogy, a speculative attitude toward knowledge and the existing
state of affairs ranks among the most revolutionary and useful approaches in a global
social reality of the 21st century. One way of fostering a questioning mindset within
students is to examine the basic premises of Western civilization as a means of
understanding both the current social conditions and the import of rhetoric and
composition.
The ideas that appeared and circulated in Ancient Greece are by and large the
bedrock of Western civilization, informing and characterizing their contemporary
Western social manifestations in terms of science, politics, philosophy, literature, drama,
art, and architecture. The achievements of our Greek progenitors continue to shape our
Western world as paradigms we aspire to equal to this day. Although origins are
inherently suspect, for they presuppose a particular view of the world, certain
developments in Ancient Greece mark both a definite shift from former ways of viewing
the world and the institution of the principles, values, and ideals still very much in place
today. In line with this thinking, David Fleming states that teachers of composition
―would do better to reconnect the word with its pedagogical past, where it referred to a
complex and rewarding course of study whose end was the competent and sensitive
rhetor‖ (173). Returning to these origins, therefore, can facilitate understanding and
questioning of contemporary social situations while serving as a pedagogical tool within
the composition classroom.
The study of the origins of Western civilization fits naturally within the
composition classroom curriculum. For one, composition can be considered the modern157

day incarnation of rhetoric, which also originates as a systematic field of study in Ancient
Greece. As with any field of study, revisiting the history of the subject helps the
pedagogical process by contextualizing the present materialization of the subject. In
particular, studying the inception of classical rhetoric serves the dual purpose of 1)
exposing students to the historical events and circumstances that inaugurated Western
civilization and 2) introducing the concept of rhetoric and its bearings upon human
existence. That students are largely unaware of Greek history is to be expected; however,
I find it curious, to say the least, that most students, and indeed most individuals, do not
even know the basic meaning of the word rhetoric, except perhaps in a vague way and in
its negative connotation, despite the intrinsic role of rhetoric within a democratic political
system and the pervasiveness of rhetoric within human communities, particularly in those
based on freedom of speech.
Indeed, I believe that this very unawareness lies at the root of the lack of
questioning and examination of the social. By exploring the beginning of Western
civilization particularly in relation to rhetoric, students can discover the roots of current
social conditions and the power of rhetoric within society. These roots can expose
themselves as assumptions that underlie the present. The importance of historical
knowledge for the understanding of the present hardly needs explanation. Exposing
students to the historical events of Ancient Greece favors the understanding of not only
the circumstances that gave rise to rhetoric and but also the conditions that initiated many
of the values and aspirations in place today, such as individualism and political equality.
More importantly, perhaps, revisiting the historical social conditions can play a role in
determining what is at stake in knowing rhetoric and its power. In order to understand
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and question their social conditions, individuals in general and students in particular must
be aware of the derivation of the present social organization. Because the ideas that
developed at this time influence current social dynamics, I believe that exploring these
historical origins of Western civilization particularly in terms of rhetoric should be part of
the composition curriculum. This historical introduction and basic premise of rhetorical
education includes the sophists and the role ascribed to them in Untersteiner‘s ―Le
origini‖ as questioners of social issues. Revisiting the social issues of Ancient Greece and
the sophists‘ questioning of them may promote a similar approach to contemporary issues
without inciting the common student resistance to composition.
Student resistance to writing instruction is a well-known phenomenon. Karen
Kopelson calls attention to this tendency, arguing that ―[a]s composition theorizing and
teaching have evolved in more cultural-studies-based or ‗critical‘ directions, student
resistance has evolved from a rudimentary resistance to the writing course per se into
resistance to the writing course as ‗inappropriately‘ politicized‖ (116—117).
Composition, more than any other course, she continues, ―is expected by students to be
without content, to involve little more than impartial instruction in the transferable and
neutral skill of writing ‗correctly‘‖ (117). A composition course without content,
however, in addition to being unattainable since rhetoric necessarily includes content, is
also ineffective in terms of encouraging the type of civic engagement, or political arête
that I am proposing. Kopelson argues that ―overtly ‗critical‘ pedagogical approaches may
be especially ineffective, and even counterproductive, for the teacher-subject who is
immediately read by students as belonging to any . . .marginalized constituenc[y]‖ (118).
Although Kopelson discusses student resistance particularly in terms of ―marginalized‖
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teachers, I extend her argument to include composition instructors calling for social
questioning because many students consider instructors, especially composition ones, as
bookish academics promoting their own liberal views.
Kopelson theorizes ―an alternative critical pedagogy‖ that draws on the Ancient
Greek ―concept of ‗cunning,‘ what the Greeks called mêtis‖ as a countermeasure for
resistance (118, 130). This approach, which Kopelson labels the ―performance of
neutrality,‖ can become ―a rhetorically savvy, politically responsive and responsible
pedagogical tactic that . . . minimizes [student] resistance‖ (118). Drawing on classical
rhetoric, its beginning in Ancient Greece, and the role of the sophists in questioning the
state of affairs can serve as such a mêtis to advance student interest in contemporary
issues and the thinking/writing process around these issues without inciting the common
resistance students have toward composition.
The social issues that captivated the sophists and are the subject of Untersteiner‘s
essay may function as a pedagogical possibility for such questioning. Some of the social
issues that Untersteiner describes are currently occurring in the United States.
Untersteiner delineates several social events that took place during the pentecontaetia,
positing them as stimulating the development of sophistry. More specifically, the falling
of physical barriers between social groups, the expansion of commerce, and the incursion
of metics or alien residents broadened the cultural milieu thereby generating new ideas as
well as promoting new political and philosophical systems to address them. These social
issues resemble many of the issues in the U.S. today: globalization and the World Wide
Web not only dissolve barriers between cultures but also introduce new cross-cultural
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ideas beyond physical borders. In Ancient Greece, however, they contributed to the
dissolution, albeit partial and temporary, of the aristocracy.
The decline of the aristocracy is one of Untersteiner‘s most important
explanations for the development of sophistry. When the aristocracy ceased to control the
way in which the public imagination viewed individuals, new areas of freedom arose.
The aristocracy responded by grasping on to traditional values and eternal ideas, which
provided fertile ground for sophistic interpretation. Untersteiner argues that the
preeminence of the collective interest decreased individualism, due to the universal ideas
that impeded any autonomous gesture. The antithesis community-individual was a
momentous issue in the age democracy appeared.
Jaeger underscores the importance of this issue, stating that ―the relation between
a great intellectual personality and the community in which he lived‖ as ―the problem
which ceaselessly exercised all philosophers until the city-state passed away,‖ a problem
that appeared when ―the aristocracy of race had been displaced by the aristocracy of
intellect‖ (289). This problem also receives extensive treatment in an outstanding study
by Suzanne Keller on how a human community emerges. She posits the polis as the
center of public life with the aim of attaining ―a just society able to reconcile the
contradictory tensions between individual ambition and collective goals‖ (17).
Furthermore, Keller continues:

Not unlike two thousand years later, however, another prominent theme vied with
the polis to create familiar and stressful contradictions: the theme of individual
glory, as exemplified by the victors in athletic contests. These victors were a
161

source of pride, since they brought honor to the entire polis, and they were
celebrated in song and story. Yet the contests also encouraged a selfaggrandizement and self-centeredness inimical to the sense of community.
Eventually, the ‗fierce competition for public honor and a raw, undisguised drive
for riches scarcely ever again equaled in ancient times‘ came close to destroying
the spiritual unity of the polis. (19)

This tension, as Keller announces, survives to this day. According to Jaeger, however,
―the individual and the community fight their last battle‖ in Plato‘s educational state
(Paideia, Vol 1, xxvi). In Jaeger‘s discussion of education in the perfect state, ―[t]he
ruling class is meant to serve the happiness of the whole community, and the happiness of
the community can be ensured only if everyone does his own work and nothing else‖
(Paideia, Vol 2, 236). Individualism, in Plato, becomes ―a new disease of personality‖
(336). By addressing the issue of community versus individual in Ancient Greece,
composition instructors can create an opportunity for analysis of the current state of this
ancient problem.
This analysis can be enacted in various ways. I turn to Kenneth Burke and his
discussion in A Rhetoric of Motives regarding individuals being their own audience. He
argues that,

[s]uch considerations make us alert to the ingredient of rhetoric in all
socialization, considered as moralizing process. The individual person, striving to
form him[/her]self in accordance with the communicative norms that match the
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cooperative ways of his society, is by the same token concerned with the rhetoric
of identification. To act upon him[/her]self persuasively, [s/]he must variously
resort to images and ideas that are formative. Education (‗indoctrination‘) exerts
such pressure upon him[/her] from without; [s/]he completes the process from
within. If [s/]he does not somehow act to tell him[/her]self (as his[/her] own
audience) what the various brands of rhetorician have told him, his persuasion is
not complete. Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the
language of a voice within. (39)

I quote at length because this line of reasoning exemplifies the consequence of rhetoric
within the community-individual antithesis. In order to succeed, rhetoric must consider
audience. As a result, individuals must partake in self-persuasion in order for values,
beliefs, and eternal ideas—such as those the aristocracy latched onto when its power was
threatened—to operate successfully.
Composition instructors can enable students to formulate correlations by turning
to cultural studies. As discussed above, Vignali considers general culture as one of the
four subjects of sophistic education. General culture is the object of analysis of cultural
studies, which takes on every aspect of social conditions. Henry Giroux, as he extensively
discusses in a number of books and articles, considers the media to be the strongest
pedagogical force in our society, manipulating perception to maintain the current power
structure. Students can analyze social matters such as the ones Untersteiner identifies as
having generated sophistry. Individualism, community, and (current equivalents of)
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aristocratic dynasties, among others, lend themselves to the kind of analysis composition
asks of students.
While the aristocracy may seem an entity of the past, mammoth income
discrepancies exist in contemporary society. Untersteiner argues that despite the
innovative democratic currents, the people remained inclined toward ancient traditions
and recognized the superiority and ability of the aristocracy as guides for the people.
Thus, the aristocracy retained its power as the heads of the democracy. As an instance of
mêtis, exposing students to the discrepancies and contradictions in Ancient Greece may
trigger a similar analysis of our current state of affairs. To carry out such analysis and
seek possible correlations, students can turn to investigating current social dynamics.
Even a cursory glance at the social dynamics currently in place reveals a kind of
postmodern aristocracy. These days, as James Berlin points out, we ―speak of the income
of the ‗bottom ninety percent‘ of the population‖ (122). This type of aristocracy,
however, proves particularly insidious, as concealed if not more so as that identified by
Untersteiner in Ancient Greece.
Students can examine cultural industries to find representations of individualism
and community and the role of the media in advancing cultural standards and democratic
values. The role and purpose of the media within a democratic political system is
paramount and an instance of general culture. The media are supposed to protect and
advance democratic values. In a way, the media should pose questions regarding social
conditions very much like the sophists did two and a half millennia ago. Michael
McChesney has written extensively regarding the connection between democracy and the
media, finding the media to be largely unsatisfactory. In The Problem of the Media, he
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describes the current situation, stating that ―around the globe media systems are primarily
controlled by a small number of wealthy firms or individuals, who use their power to
advance their political agenda‖ (224). In discussing the political nature of the problem of
the media in democratic societies, he elucidates that ―virtually all theories of selfgovernment are premised on having an informed citizenry, and the creation of such an
informed citizenry is the media‘s province‖ (17). Without the possibility of noncommercially interested platforms, such as would have been the agora in ancient Greece,
the voices of groups of thinkers such as the sophists have no chance of being heard;
therefore, although such opinions are definitely occurring in a number of subcultures,
they are certainly not broadcast and therefore cannot compete with those circulated by the
mass media in our society. Students can thus compare the issues dealt with by the
sophists as expressed by Untersteiner in a contemporary context.
I am arguing for a composition theory that takes account of current social
conditions, that looks at our society critically, asking questions, as the sophists did,
regarding the status of our social reality. By exploring the inconsistencies in our social
condition and political situation, students develop an awareness that the media and a
largely absent public sphere do not provide. This goal can be achieved in many ways, one
of which is by analyzing historical circumstances and identifying the inconsistencies of
the time to draw parallels to the present. Omar Swartz offers an example from the
birthplace of our current political system:

[s]erious contradictions existed in Ancient Athens between its self-image and its
behaviors. . . . [T]he purpose of pointing out these contradictions is not to laugh at
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the people of the past or to condemn them from our ‗superior‘ moral position.
Rather, the point is to recognize that all societies have their contradictions and
that our critical energies need to be spent on learning to recognize our own
contradictions. We cannot go back and ‗improve‘ the Ancient Greek society, nor
can we ameliorate the suffering of its victims. What we can do is to recognize that
the contradictions between our own self-images and our behaviors contribute to
our own legacy of suffering. By acknowledging this point, we can direct our
critical actions toward reducing the suffering that we have some control over.
(29—30)

I interpret this passage as pointing to the ethnocentrism (and ethnologics) inherent in
everyone. The most anyone can do is to be aware of his/her own ethnocentrism. I find
paradoxical that the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have survived in conjunction
with democracy, for these philosophers were explicitly opposed to democracy. Marrou
goes as far as calling Socrates ―the mouthpiece of the old aristocratic tradition‖ and at
―the center of an anti-democratic clique‖ (91). These discrepancies can function as a
springboard for students to question their own social conditions.
Rather than espousing one pedagogical theory over another, I propose a pedagogy
that deploys any of them according to the aim of discourse, as envisioned by James
Kinneavy and others. Exploding the either/or binary, I argue for both/and approach to
composition theory, whereby each composition theory becomes useful based on the
purpose the student rhetor has. More specifically, composition theory of Peter Elbow and
other expressionists, rather than be embraced or rejected, becomes useful for assignments
166

in which the aim is expression of feelings. Likewise, a cognitivist approach becomes
useful when the aim is referential, to borrow Kinneavy‘s term, in technical or scientific
discourse, while the various socio-epistemic and rhetorical theories aid the invention of a
persuasive aim.

Composition Teachers as Sophists
The university, the humanities, English studies, and particularly rhetorical subjects such
as composition and writing remain some of the few places in which individuals can
practice and learn the rhetorical abilities necessary for them to be active members in a
democratic society. The United States today not only considers itself the ultimate
incarnation of democracy but also claims to wish this form of government among the
purportedly less fortunate non-democratic nations, as made clear within the primary
foreign policy interests of the U.S. However, as Omar Swartz argues,

If democracy has any rationale at all, it is that the more people who contribute to
the logos, the richer our understanding will be of our political realities. This is one
of the reasons why, functionally speaking, we cannot really characterize the
United States as a ‗democracy,‘ as there is not much of a commitment to
competing logos. (Swartz 67)

I argue that the United States is not fulfilling most democratic ideals, and as modern-day
sophists, composition instructors are among the few voices that can encourage students to
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examine and question the existing state of affairs, both as a rhetorical/composition
exercise and as an ethical/civic responsibility.
Critical literacy requires this type of questioning, for a society that ceases to be
interrogative becomes passive to the representations presented by powerful media
conglomerates. Ideas such as those of the sophists should be a central part of a democracy
through the media. However, as the work of Robert McChesney reveals, the major role
which the media should play within the realization of a democratic society remains
extremely lacking. In ancient Athens, citizens would argue and persuade one another in
favor of certain routes of action over others; in the U.S. today that role remains outside of
the daily life of the vast majority of people. In ancient Athens, when ―reality‖ came to be
questioned, new answers emerged; in the U.S. today, ―reality‖ is rarely questioned
beyond the inner circles and conversations of academics and underground subcultures.
The type of speculative discourse offered by the sophists is exactly what lacks in our
democratic society today, particularly in the U.S., although other industrialized countries
share this feature. The sophists can be viewed as public intellectuals and compared both
to modern day university scholars and composition instructors. I argue for the importance
of reestablishing the role of the public intellectual, both in the composition classroom and
the society at large.
The sophists carried out myriad types of social questioning. Catherine Osborne
maintains that the sophists ―ask society to question its raison d'être, its political beliefs,
its moral values, its religious beliefs, its educational system, its legal codes, and its codes
of etiquette‖ (131). Untersteiner considers all these issues in his germinal essay,
presenting them as the impetus behind the development of the sophistic movement. As
168

the originators of Western paideia and rhetoric, the goals of the sophists should coincide
with those of composition teachers. Sharon Crowley discusses the similarities and
differences between the sophists and teachers of writing:

Sophistic pedagogy bore one striking similarity to that of contemporary writing
teachers in that the Sophists instructed their students in discursive practice rather
than focusing on the pursuit of abstract knowledge for its own sake. . . . But the
educational practices of the Sophists were markedly different from our own in one
important respect: Modern teachers do not often think of themselves as
professional participants in political or social issues. (―Plea‖ 330)

She argues, rather, that ―those who are engaged in teaching discursive practice are always
engaged in Sophistry; and, because of this, that they cannot escape the public aspect of
their work‖ (330). Composition teachers in particular, as well as more generally teachers
of English, should embrace this objective.
I agree with Berlin that English Studies ―has a special role in the democratic
educational mission‖ (54). A major way of enacting democratic principles necessarily
falls in the hands of Rhetoric and Composition scholars and instructors as modern-day
rhetoricians and sophists. Already in the mid-nineties, James Berlin noted that
―Postmodernism in the academy has led to challenges in our understanding of the subject,
language, epistemology, history, and the relations of all these to each other‖ (47—48).
The shift he identifies is very similar to the one that occurred in classical Greece and
which is discussed in Untersteiner‘s essay in terms of the issues he identifies such as
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individualism, gnoseology, and constitutional crises. Berlin goes further by discussing
knowledge from a democratic political perspective:

knowledge is a good that ought to serve the interest of the larger community as
well as individuals. . . . It must be situated, however, in relation to larger
economic, social, political and cultural considerations. Students must learn to
locate the beneficiaries and the victims of knowledge, exerting their rights as
citizens in a democracy to criticize freely those in power. (52)

Similarly, Henry Giroux echoes this opinion, for him the goal of education in a
democratic society is to impart ―critical literacy‖ in our students. He argues that ―[i]n a
world marked by increasing poverty, unemployment, and diminished social opportunities,
educators must vindicate the crucial connection between culture and politics in defending
public and higher education as sites of democratic learning and struggle‖ (37). These
issues increasingly continue to affect our students. Pedagogy, rhetoric, and democracy are
interrelated concepts that comprise the current historical condition of the composition
teacher and his/her work preparing students.
Henry Giroux argues that providing the knowledge, skills, and values to address
the most pressing questions of our time is a vital element of this mission, corroborating
the role of the sophists. He believes that in order to educate for ―critical citizenship and
civic courage,‖ the role of academics as engaged public intellectuals be reformulated
(37). Similarly, Untersteiner considers the philosophy of the sophists as a ―speculative
mirror of the social forms of the human spirit‖ (552), arguing that the philosophical and
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rationalist idea of community constitutes the fundamental problem for Protagoras and
many other sophists. One way to achieve this modification in the role of composition
instructors is to add sophistic rhetorics to traditional Aristotelian rhetoric. According to
Jane Sutton ―Aristotle reformulates rhetoric and renders it the art for preserving ‗what
is‘‖ adding that Aristotle‘s On Rhetoric ―perpetuates and maintains the established order‖
(153). The sophists‘ rhetoric, she continues, ―is a complex way of thinking that integrates
metaphor-possible-individualistic-generative-radical into rhetoric‖ which can lead to ―the
actualization of human potential‖ (153—54). As teachers of rhetoric, composition
instructors should embrace this element of their sophistic ancestry.
The resemblance between the sophists and composition instructors today also lies
in the place they occupy in society. Much in the same way that Plato and his followers
attempted, successfully albeit, to soil the importance of rhetoric and its primary
supporters, the sophists, the media in modern day U.S. do nothing to encourage citizen
rhetorical education and participation in democratic practice. While many composition
theorists argue that the composition classroom is not the place for politics, I contend that
even though the composition classroom may not be an ideal site, it is one of the only sites
for students to be exposed and instructed in this kind of necessary rhetorical preparation.
Further, politics is always already present, whether it is acknowledged or not. As James
Berlin persuasively argues in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College
English Studies, ―given the democratic political commitments of the United States, it is as
impossible for us to separate literary and rhetorical texts from political life as it was for
the citizens of ancient Athens‖ (xiii). Democratic states should not merely pay lip service
to the words ―freedom‖ and ―liberty‖ but rather should ―conceptualize these words in a
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concrete freedom, one based in a mutual respect between human beings. In a democratic
society, there is no room for racism, sexism, homophobia, a state religion, and a material
inequality among social classes‖ (Swartz 30). Gerard Hauser adds that ―Scholars and
teachers of rhetoric can, indeed must, reclaim their birthright by reasserting the centrality
of rhetoric to democratic life in the twenty-first century‖ (13). The composition instructor
ought to promote the conditions of such political and civic engagement because of the
role that rhetoric plays in the democratic system.
The goal for composition instructors is to recover, discuss, and encourage a sense
of arête in a postmodern sense. For David Fleming, the aim of rhetorical training is ―to
become a certain kind of person, one who has internalized the art of rhetoric,‖
incorporating theory and practice but ―subordinating both to the moral and intellectual
development of the student, who is seen primarily as a future citizen in a community of
free and equal citizens‖ (178—79). In this view, rhetoric is ―inextricably involved in the
character-forming project of education‖ (178). By encouraging students to be
gnoseologically critical, composition instructors as sophists can contribute to promoting a
postmodern arête. Being gnoseologically critical does not deny the existence of truth;
rather, in McComiskey‘s words, it calls attention to the ―historical and empirical
contingency of truth‖ (59). As most Sophists would argue, knowledge and truth mutate
according to context and times.
Untersteiner‘s contribution, like all others, may be questioned and superseded,
revisited and appreciated, misunderstood and reinterpreted. Despite everything it may
undergo, one constant remains, and that is that social conditions create truth/s. Everything
changes, yet nothing changes. This apparent and inherent paradox encloses within itself
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and discloses a truth that the sophists held dear. My main point is that what the sophists
taught, rhetoric, is not in itself good or evil. Much like food, drugs, television, and any
other substance or practice that can be abused, rhetoric comes to life and can be put to
good or bad use. In itself rhetoric is nothing and everything: nothing for, as Socrates
makes Gorgias admit in the Gorgias, it does not have a conventional subject of study; and
everything for it covers every subject which one can discuss when using it, as well as its
own theoretical underpinning. Undeniably, humans use rhetoric every day, for it is what
drives human identity and community. The pedagogy I have sketched and the role of
composition instructors as sophists aim to help students go from being unaware rhetors,
understood as those who practice rhetoric, to being conscious rhetoricians, as in those
who study and know rhetoric, so as to not be victims of it, for undeniably, those who
know rhetoric in Western democracies, such as attorneys, advertisers, and
politicians/speech writers, are rhetoricians who hold disproportionate power over those
who do not know it. David Fleming argues that ―[t]o revitalize rhetorical education, we
need to recapture this focus on the language user as citizen‖ (184). I believe that the
sophists and composition instructors as the sophists‘ postmodern counterparts can and
should take on this challenge.
By translating a treatise about the social origins of sophistry, I make a case for the
reinsertion of this ancient profession and its primary principles into the composition
classroom. Rhetoric and Composition scholars have a hefty mission in their hands, for
not only do we teach young students who have many other concerns but also we teach a
subject that has fallen into disregard and is not considered valuable by most students.
Whatever one what may say about sophistry, whether one agrees with its tenets or not, a
173

form of thought or group of thinkers that challenges, educates, and most of all, perhaps,
questions the current state of affairs is not only beneficial but absolutely necessary for a
democratic society that fulfils even only the most basic elements of democracy. I hope
that this dissertation will make not merely another contribution but a call for the revival
of such thought in our composition classrooms and society.
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